Reflections from Morocco on the Arab Spring

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I have been ensconced this academic year in a small town nestled in the cedar forests of Morocco’s Middle Atlas Mountains finishing a book manuscript. The book explores how European colonial intervention remapped the political ecosystem of North Africa in the 19th and early 20th centuries, expanding state control to an unprecedented extent and transforming the political, economic, and social context in which collective identity is imagined in the region. Since January, Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution and the subsequent flowering of
the “Arab Spring” have transformed the entire landscape about which I have been writing. Over the past four months, incumbent regimes from Morocco to Bahrain have been shaken by actual or potential mass protests for democratic reform. The current revolutionary wave threatens to reconfigure a state system consolidated in the wake of post-World War II de-colonization.

As a junior member of a rather small group of comparative-historical sociologists working on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is incredibly exciting to see this region explode with the type of macrosociological processes our discipline engages and to be living through historical events that will provide a generation’s worth of work over the next decades. Though grateful for the invitation from Trajectories’ editors to respond to these events, I feel a great deal of trepidation, as a historical sociologist, in aiming at such a rapidly moving target. There seem to be daily game changing developments, the latest of which include a terrorist attack at Morocco’s most popular tourist destination, the Jamaa al-Fna in Marrakesh, and the killing of Osama bin Laden by American Navy SEALs. It is difficult to even keep up with everything happening from Libya to Syria, much less synthesize some type of analysis, but I have grouped my initial reflections on the Arab Spring under the following four (more or less) coherent rubrics.

**Ibn Khaldun and State-Formation in the Middle East and North Africa in the Longue Durée**

Having been trained as a historian, I am intrigued by how the current developments signal breaks from, and continuities with, longer trends of state-society relations in the region. There is a poetic resonance that the Arab Spring started in Tunisia, the birthplace of one of the world’s first social scientists and a seminal theorist of state formation, Ibn Khaldun. He himself was a product of a period of intense turmoil in the Western Mediterranean, caused by the plague and the political fragmentation of the great medieval Muslim empires of Andalusia and North Africa in the 14th century, and spent his intellectual energies on the basic question of how a central government succeeds in consolidating and maintaining power.

In *The Muqaddimah* (2005), Ibn Khaldun develops what he considered a general model of state formation, based on the rise and fall of successive dynastic empires from Classical Antiquity, early Islamic history, and the great medieval Almoravid, Almohad, and Merenid Berber empires more contemporary to him. His basic argument was that to found a state (synonymous with dynasty for him) group solidarity or cohesion (Arabic ‘asabiyah) was the key. According to Ibn Khaldun, only the tribal, kinship-based groups on the region’s peripheral zones had the raw ‘asabiyah necessary to create dynastic states. When mobilized by a charismatic leader, who often forged larger tribal coalitions with the ideological appeal of religion, this solidarity enabled one group to dominate others and thereby establish a stable governmental authority. State formation is a *cyclical* historical process in his model because, eventually, group solidarity wanes. External groups have to be incorporated to sustain the state’s military power, the dynastic family consolidates power and wealth in its own hands at the expense of the tribe, and the pleasures of urban life corrupt and soften the austere discipline that gave the founding dynasty an advantage. In time, another group on the periphery rises up with stronger solidarity and military strength and replaces the older dynastic state.

The question is: does Ibn Khaldun’s model have any relevance to the current regional crisis of the postcolonial state in the Middle East and North Africa? Gellner (1981) observes that though Ibn Khaldun brilliantly described the political importance of “mechanical solidarity” in his own society, he could not foresee the evolution of alternate forms of solidarity and strategies of state formation, including the “mamluk” option of ensuring dynastic continuity by creating a professional and loyal slave class to run a patrimonial bureaucratic state (one of the strategies of imperial continuity perfected by the Ottomans) or the Durkheimian “organic solidarity” of industrialized society, for which nationalism supplies a new type of political ‘asabiyah to legitimate the state.
He also did not see how the modern state could remap the political ecosystem of North Africa and the Middle East. One of the key environmental features of Ibn Khaldun’s model is the close proximity of state and non-state space (Scott 1998, 2009). In this environment there was a relative balance of power. Central governments did not possess the technological means to monopolize the use of force over populations enjoying topographic or other geographic advantages. However, in ways Ibn Khaldun could never have dreamed, colonial and postcolonial state building has dramatically expanded the modern state’s surveillance and policing capabilities in the MENA region, giving the “nation”-state a high degree of resilience. Sedentarization policies, the enforcement of borders, and what seems an overwhelming asymmetry in military power has perhaps eliminated the role of the periphery in replenishing the necessary political will when a dynastic state declines.

In other respects, though, the postcolonial trajectories of MENA states have displayed several classic Khaldunian characteristics. The connection between tribal ‘asabiyah and military power has continued to play an important role in state formation. In the last turn of the Khaldunian wheel in the 1950s and 1960s, coups led by military officers, often from non-elite, rural backgrounds, overthrew dynastic ruling families associated with financial corruption and cooperation with the colonial powers, including Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958), and Libya (1969), and the dynasties in Jordan and Morocco survived multiple coup attempts.* By the late 20th century, virtually all of the MENA states had consolidated as *de facto or *de jure dynastic patrimonial states (some more bureaucratized than others) in which a small, often kinship based, elite controls mamluk-style military and security apparatuses and critical patronage networks through which they reinforce allegiance to the regime (Sonbol 2001).†

In many respects, Ibn Khaldun’s predictions about dynastic decline fit nicely with the fall of Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak, who were brought down due to outrage at their hyper-accumulation of wealth and systemic corruption, which are grievances directed by protestors at many other regimes in the region. In Libya, a rival coalition is contesting the hegemony Qaddafi and his family have consolidated over the past forty years. The question hanging right now is to what extent new social forces might restructure this incumbent postcolonial political order. What type of group solidarity might move to the foreground to consolidate the next political order in places like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, or Syria, if Assad falls? Protestors are demanding transparent, participatory democratic political institutions, but will we see the emergence of more Weberian rational-legal bureaucratic structures or new patrimonial channels benefiting the military, Islamists, or another group? If the Khaldunian wheel of history is turning, who emerges on top in the next cycle?

Colonial Legacies and the Dilemmas of Western Intervention

Since January, the rapid pace of change in the region has confronted European countries (mainly France and Britain) and the United States with a dilemma about how to respond. The reality is that, well before the current developments, the trajectories of state formation and reformation in the region had already been indelibly impacted by colonial and neo-imperial intervention. Less than seventy years ago, every single Arab country was under British, French, or Italian formal or informal control; during the Cold War the region was a frontline in the Great Powers struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; and since the 1991 Gulf War, American hegemony in MENA has been virtually unchallenged. Financial and diplomatic patronage and indirect and direct military intervention by the United States have been wielded for over fifty

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* Jordan’s King Abdullah assassinated in 1951 and his grandson and heir, King Hussein, survived repeated coup and assassination. King Hassan II of Morocco also survived two coup attempts in 1971 and 1972.
† In Iraq, Saddam Hussein relied on his Abu Nasr tribe based around Tikrit to consolidate power in Iraq. The Al-Asads in Syria have relied on kinship ties of the al-Mawatirah tribe and the broader solidarity of the Alawite minority to shore of control. In attempting to withstand the current threat against his control of Libya, Muammar el-Qaddafi is increasingly relying on his own sons, including the heir apparent, Saif al-Islam, and tribes from Western Libya.
years with the overarching goal of ensuring the continuance of a regional framework structured to supply cheap oil.

The fact that the Arab Spring threatens to overturn this status quo has created an awkward policy situation. The ambiguities of Western involvement in the region were manifested first in regards to the protests in Tunisia, where Ben Ali was a vital ally, particularly for France. Their cozy relationship was most embarrassingly manifest when it was made public that, during escalating demonstrations, the French foreign minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, was enjoying a Christmas vacation at a beach resort in Tunisia and flying on a corporate jet with a Tunisian businessman with close ties to the Ben Ali family. She even suggested France send anti-riot police to train Tunisian security forces. Sarkozy eventually fired her, but France continued to be subjected to withering criticism from Tunisians and other North Africans for not more forcefully condemning the incumbent regime and supporting the revolution.

Less than a month later, the United States was caught in a similar bind as one of its primary client states in the region, Egypt, which has received an average of $2 billion annually in aid since the 1979 Camp David accords, erupted in protests. The American administration was caught off guard as images flooded the internet and satellite and network news channels of Egyptian protestors in Cairo’s Tahrir Square demanding political freedoms and the ouster of one of its staunchest allies in the region, Hosni Mubarak. Eventually the U.S. applied pressure, primarily through backchannel communications with the Egyptian military, for a more or less peaceful removal of Mubarak from power. However, elsewhere in the region, as Arab publics continue to protest against the authoritarian, repressive status quo of regional “stability” lavishly underwritten by American military and financial aid, the Obama administration has applied little to no concrete pressure on its allies to reform.

In Yemen, to which the U.S. has given more than $300 million in military and counter-terrorism assistance over the past five years, the incumbent President Ben Saleh, who has been in power for thirty-two years, has used American Huey II helicopters to crack down on protestors calling for his resignation and for democratic elections (Turse 2011). The United States has also been caught in an embarrassing bind in Bahrain, home base for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth fleet and the recipient of millions of dollars of American military assistance, where demonstrators calling for political reform and equality for the majority Shi’a population have been brutally repressed for several months. The blatant disconnect between American “talk” about support for reform, freedom, and democracy and its “walk” in materially buttressing many of the region’s repressive regimes, at what sometimes seems all costs, goes to the heart of the Arab world’s critique of the hypocrisy of American foreign policy.

Yet, while too little support for the Arab Spring protests communicates tacit approval of the region’s authoritarian regimes, active Western intervention, even when invited and encouraged by those in the region, is inherently ambiguous. It smacks of neo-colonialism and threatens to corrupt what has thus far been the most impressive dimension of the Arab Spring: the political agency of civil society. At the same time, the success of the protest movements remains dependent on exogenous factors including potential Western political or military intervention. In Tunisia and Egypt, it was clear that U.S. backchannel communications with these countries’ military leaderships played a decisive role. In the most direct case, Libya, where both the Benghazi headquartered resistance and the twenty-two member Arab League called for Western military assistance against el-Qaddafi, the dilemmas, perils, and limits of intervention are poignantly being played out. Now the U.S., Britain, France and other N.A.T.O. countries are embroiled in what is clearly a Libyan civil war, with no definitive exit strategy and no clear objective other than the implicit desire that Qaddafi be removed from power.

What selection criteria are driving decisions to intervene or not is a critical question. In Libya, military intervention was justified in order to prevent a humanitarian crisis. In his March 28th speech, President Obama (2011) derided Muammar el-Qaddafi as a “tyrant” and argued that: “Some nations may be able
to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States is different.” Arguments for military intervention in Libya, with Qaddafi threatening to massacre citizens in Benghazi, were clearly defensible, but Obama’s rationalization was disingenuous. The United States and other countries do sit by and turn a blind eye to atrocities all of the time and were doing so even as they decided to intervene in Libya. No American or European troops have been committed to stop atrocities in Darfur or in the Congo. Right now, the U.S. has no plans to intervene militarily in Syria, where Assad’s regime is also massacring civilians, or to even apply non-military pressure, as previously mentioned, in Bahrain and Yemen, where there are also high numbers of civilian deaths.

Any type of external intervention involves self-interest, and in Libya, where military intervention was deemed doable and where the incumbent ruler was viewed as expendable, vast oil and natural gas resources located 250 miles across the Mediterranean are at stake. The fact that an entire regional political order is in flux, particularly because this region is among the most strategic in the world, has created understandable dilemmas for outside powers about how to encourage reforms but also preserve some degree of stability. Despite lots of rhetorical support, Western democratic powers have rarely if ever, from the colonial period to the present, provided material support for democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa. As Arab publics continue to explicitly demand these types of reforms in demonstrations, Western democracies are still grasping for a coherent strategy for how to handle this new reality.

‘Facebook-Twitter-Wikileak’ Revolutions and the Question of Agency

The first wave of journalistic, blogosphere, and think tank analysis has understandably focused on why the Arab Spring is happening when it is happening, and social media technologies have been a popular pick as a causal factor. Several Western commentators (Dickinson 2011; Sullivan 2011) asserted the Tunisian demonstrations represented the first “Wikileak Revolution,” claiming revelations in leaked American diplomatic cables about the corruption and ostentatious consumption of the ruling Ben Ali family (particularly by his wife, Leila, and her extended family) acted as a “catalyst.” The faddish fascination with the causal power of social media by Western analysts only increased with the Tahrir Square protests in Egypt, where Facebook and Twitter were feted as critical factors in the revolution.

The danger of this soft-core orientalism focused on Western technological catalysts is that it can miss more important endogenous factors, including the fact that the most important technological dimension of the Arab Spring has arguably been the role of the two main Arabic news networks, Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera. Twitter and Facebook are by nature highly fragmented narrative mediums. However, Arab and later Western news coverage was able to integrate tweets, Facebook commentary, video uploads from cell phones, live footage, and on-the-ground reporting by journalists into a coherent and powerful narrative broadcast to a broad global audience. While the social media technologies are an extremely important question that needs to be examined about the revolutions, they are related less to the causes than to the means of protest, and much works remains to be done digging down into the internal and external factors influencing the Arab Spring.

The more important story in these uprisings has been the totally unexpected political agency of ordinary women and men in the Arab world, including a new generation of Arab youth. The question of how ordinary people have harnessed an array of communications technologies to empower bottom-up pressure against some of the world’s most extensive police states is part of the larger story of the incredible courage and tenacity demonstrated over the past four months, as ordinary people have risked imprisonment, rape, and death to march for reform. I am personally amazed at the extent of agency and empowerment expressed across a spectrum of socioeconomic, gender, and geographical divisions. As with the independence struggles in the region, women have been at the forefront of the protest movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria, and a generational shift is occurring as twenty-somethings have been the
primary organizers of protests and framers of a liberal, democratic narrative of reform.

During the past four months, we have seen an incredible shift in power to the advantage of an emergent Arab public sphere (Lynch 2003) that, despite the lack of guaranteed political freedoms, has flourished and is now wielding political influence that region’s states cannot ignore. I was in Morocco on 9/11 and saw how the ballooning American counter-terrorism superstructure created to wage the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) impacted this country. Despite pro-democratization rhetoric during the Bush administration, the security imperative reversed any momentum for reform in the region; instead, MENA states reaped benefits for collaborating in the GWOT. “Enhanced interrogation” was outsourced to MENA countries that received “extraordinarily rendered” suspected terrorists. After a domestic terror attack here in Morocco on May 16, 2003 in Casablanca, the monarchy was given a more or less carte blanche by Moroccan liberals, previously pushing for democratic reform, to clamp down on the “Islamist threat” with any means necessary. There has been a total shift, however, since January, with virtually all of the pressure in the system now directed towards reform. The Moroccan king himself has now been trying to stay ahead in the game, announcing an unprecedented process of constitutional reform in a televised speech to the country in March.

Explaining Unpredictable and Unthinkable Revolutions

Like other revolutions, including the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall, no one in academia or in the governmental intelligence communities forecasted what is now happening in the Middle East and North Africa: that the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor humiliated by the municipality’s confiscation of his fruit cart, would set off the most dramatic political transformations in a generation in the Arab world. The first round of “retroactive prediction” has nevertheless commenced (Kurzman 2004). One of the most pathetic so far was a New York Times op-ed piece by Thomas Friedman (2011) in early March in which he shared his own “back of the envelope” list of “not-so-obvious forces” fueling the revolutions which included the election of Barack Hussein Obama, Google Earth, Al Jazeera’s coverage of Israeli corruption scandals, and the Beijing Olympics. As social scientists not having to churn out commentary on a biweekly deadline, our job over the next several years is to analyze the current revolutionary wave much more rigorously and to hopefully develop more compelling and accurate explanations for what is happening.

I believe the Arab Spring is going to prove an incredibly rich empirically and theoretically for our sub discipline. There are myriad possibilities for comparative analysis, as revolution processes are synchronically happening across a region with both a high degree of cross-country similarity and significant variation. Why did Iran’s 2009 Green Revolution fail while Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution succeeded? How did Tunisia compare to Egypt? Why were both revolutions so different? What is happening in another authoritarian republic, Syria? Why are some militaries following orders to crack down on protests, while others refuse and oust the president? Why have some protest movements remained non-violent? Why have the U.S. and other Western countries responded with non-military intervention, military intervention, and near non-intervention in different country cases? Why have mass demonstrations not happened in Algeria, while they have almost everywhere else?

I am personally intrigued by perceptions of regime “legitimacy” and why monarchies have proven relatively more resilient than republics so far, even though the differences between the two forms of rule in MENA are largely nominal and symbolic. On most metrics including socio-economic development, wealth distribution, human rights, and political participation, monarchical and republican regimes in MENA are homologous, but Kings Abdullah (Jordan) and Mohamed VI (Morocco) have been much more adept at shoring up the legitimacy of their rule compared to Presidents Mubarak (Egypt) and Ben Ali (Tunisia). While the game is by no means over, comparing why some regimes fall and other do not will be a fascinating study in which multiple
sociological analytical lenses (drawing on literatures ranging from revolutions to social movements to network analysis) will be needed to develop innovative explanations. New types of data and new archives will also need to be accessed (provided the privacy rules of Facebook and Twitter allow it), and new conceptual models will need to be developed to deal with the first revolutions of the 21st century and the first-ever popular revolutions in the Arab world.

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My last comments turn from the world-historical to the personal. I have been intellectually, emotionally, and physically tied to the Middle East and to North Africa, living seven out of the past sixteen years in Israel/Palestine and in Morocco, where our first daughter was born. Watching the events of the past four months unfold has been thrilling in many respects. I was shocked that Ben Ali actually flew off to Saudi Arabia and could hardly tear myself away from watching Tahrir Square on Al Jazeera. I continue to be amazed by the bravery of ordinary citizens that I see first-hand demonstrations here in the smallest villages in Morocco and via satellite television facing down tanks in Syria, persistently pressuring their governments through non-violent protest to reform, to ensure financial and political transparency, and to guarantee basic freedoms. There is also a tragic cost in the physical and emotional violence suffered and the mounting death toll in the violent crackdowns against these demonstrations that has to be remembered, grieved, and condemned. We just reached the end of the Osama bin Laden decade, and the birth pangs of the Arab Spring signal the arrival of a new political order in the Middle East and North Africa. My hope and prayer is that the current upheaval can be quickly negotiated and that firm foundations can be laid for the region’s societies to flourish in this next period.

References


Book Symposium

Editor’s Note: Erik Olin Wright, Saskia Sassen, and Margaret Somers’s comments were originally presented at the 2010 American Sociological Association’s Annual Conference. Michael Tolley’s comments were originally presented at the 2010 American Political Science Association’s Annual Conference.

Genealogies of Citizenship:
Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights
by Margaret R. Somers
(Cambridge University Press, 2008)

Comments by Erik Olin Wright
University of Wisconsin, Madison

The standard criticism on the left of neoliberalism, whose ideological core is what Somers aptly calls “market fundamentalism,” is that it harms the economic interests of most people and is bad for the overall functioning of the economy. On the one hand, market fundamentalism leads to a rejection of the affirmative state and thus the massive under-provision of a wide range of public goods; on the other hand, weakly regulated markets generate sharp increases in inequality, environmental destruction, risky speculative behavior and economic volatility. In the end, the argument goes, market fundamentalism is both bad for the wellbeing of most people and bad for the capitalist economy itself.

That is the standard criticism. Peggy Somers adds a critical additional argument: market fundamentalism is deeply corrosive of the foundations of citizenship. The argument is subtle and powerful: Citizenship is not simply a question of formal rights inscribed in the legal rules of the state. Effective citizenship also depends upon a process of social inclusion as a member of a social and political community, for without such inclusion there can be no robust mechanism for translating formal rights on paper into substantive rights in practice. The core of her argument, then, revolves around an investigation of the conditions for sustaining such inclusive social membership, and the key to understanding this problem, she argues, is understanding the relationships among the state, the market, and civil society. The basic punchline of the analysis is that market fundamentalism weakens civil society by undermining reciprocities and solidarities, contractualizing human relations and making social inclusion dependent upon successful participation in market transactions. The result is a transformation of citizenship itself, from an unconditional status of membership to a contingent accomplishment. Increasingly, a significant proportion of people who are formal citizens in the United States become effectively stateless persons, equivalent in Somers’ analysis, to the stateless refugees after WWII.

These are compelling arguments which I find intensely interesting and broadly persuasive. What I want to do in my comments here is explore a number of theoretical issues in the conceptual framework used in the analysis. In particular I want to interrogate what Somers refers to as the triadic model of state/market/civil society for understanding the effects of market fundamentalism. In my own work on what I call real utopias I have also adopted a very similar triadic model of the macro-settings of social practice, but there are some differences in the way I have formulated these categories and their interconnection and the way Somers approaches them. Some of these differences may be more differences in rhetoric than in substance, and in any case I don’t want to argue that my strategy is in some general way better than hers. But I think it would be useful in engaging Somers’ arguments to bring into focus these differences and explore their possible ramifications.

I will also, at the end of these comments, say something more narrowly about the specific analysis Somers proposes concerning the effects of market fundamentalism on racial inequality.

The triadic model

First, a brief terminological issue: There are many different words one can use to label what we are differentiating when we use
terms like state, market, and civil society. Sometimes these are called “spheres,” other times domains or sectors or sites. The stuff that makes up these spheres are sometimes referred to as social interactions, social relations, or social practices. Somers sometimes refers to the sites as assemblages of institutions. I don’t think that there is much at stake in these terminological conventions, and I won’t worry about this in my remarks. I will refer to them as spheres of social practices, but you could just as easily call them domains of institutions or social relations.

Somers proposes that we analyze the complex processes through which citizenship is constructed with a model that differentiates three spheres of social practices – the state, the market, and civil society. These are not hermetically sealed, autonomous domains, but rather interact in systematic ways. In particular she is concerned with the ways in which the market potentially undermines the reciprocities in civil society and how the state, if it engages in a range of social protections and market regulations, can help sustain a vibrant civil society. She writes:

“…a healthy civil society is not autonomous of markets and states. Indeed the contrary is true; civil society’s very capacity for resistance against external market incursions requires support from the state in the form of market regulations, social insurance policies, public services, redistributive tax schemes and legal mechanisms to institutionalize and enforce the rights to livelihood.” (p.31)

I want to comment on four features of her elaboration of this model:

1. The nature of the spatial metaphor used to think about the three spheres
2. The choice of the word “market” to identify one of the spheres, rather than – for example – capitalism
3. The way of conceptualizing the power relations linking these spheres required for a vibrant civil society
4. The relationship between democracy and the triadic model of state, market, and civil society

1. **Spatial metaphors**

Spatial metaphors are common in sociology and are always tricky. Somers frequently describes civil society as being “between” the state and the market. She writes, for example, that “Civil society … must thrive as the social site between the market and the state, albeit fully independent of neither” (p. 31). Perhaps I am being too literal-minded here – this is one of the ways metaphors can be tricky – but it seems that in a full fledged triadic model, each of the spheres is in a sense between the other two, and, even more significantly, each shapes the interactions of the other two. Here are three contrasting pictures.

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I think the third of these spatial representations better captures the array of dynamics in play. The first representation is not fully triadic – it is dyadic with an intermediary domain. In the second representation, the state is as much between civil society and the market as civil society is between the market and the state, but the representation does not really capture the full sense in which these spheres interact. The third representation tries to capture the nature of these interactions. Here is how to read the picture: In diagram A, the state affects the form of interaction of civil society and the market, or to use another expression, the state mediates the relationship between civil society and the market. This is the causal nexus on which Somers’ analysis has concentrated. In a regime of market fundamentalism, the substantial withdrawal of the affirmative state means that its role in shaping the relationship between the market and civil society becomes quite weak, and thus the interaction of civil society and the market becomes largely an unmediated, direct relation. There are, however, two other mediating processes in the full triadic model: In diagram B Civil society mediates the relationship between the state and the market. The existence of a strong, vibrant civil society with engaged social movements and robust unions shapes the ways in which the state can regulate market processes. And finally in diagram C, the market mediates the interactions of state and civil society. This is one way of
understanding the consequences of the centralized statist economies of the Soviet era: markets in capitalist democracies act as a buffer between the state and civil society, weakening the capacity of the state to penetrate civil society; the absence of markets leads to a subordination of civil society to the state.

The simple idea of civil society being “between” the state and the market does not at all invoke this more complex array of interactions. Of course, it is sometimes useful to have an oversimplified partial representation of a more complex model for particular heuristic purposes. But in this case, the first spatial representation is misleading for the specific cluster of issues explored in Somers’ book – how the triumph of market fundamentalism threatens the foundations of citizenship within civil society. If the key idea concerns the failure of the state to buffer the impact of the market on civil society, then it would be better to refer to the state as being “in between” civil society and the market – as in diagram A in the third representation -- rather than to refer to civil society as being in between the state and the market.

2. The market or capitalism?

The second issue I would like to raise concerns the identification of the economic component of the triad as “the market” rather than “capitalism.” This may be mostly a terminological issue, since when Somers talks about markets she is referring to the historical case of capitalist markets, not markets more generally. Nevertheless, the generic use of the term “markets” does tend to deflect attention from the specifically capitalist character of the social relations and practices within these market systems, and sometimes this leads to the suggestion that the threat to civil society comes from all practices associated with markets as such.

Here is an example of what I am talking about. In discussing the problem of state regulation of economic processes, Somers writes:

“….through market-driven governance and the conquest of regulative agencies, business is able to undo those existing regulative practices in-

stANTIATED BY THE SOCIAL STATE AND REWRITE THEM TO SUPPORT MARKET PRINCIPLES – I.E. USING INCENTIVES TO REDUCE CARBON DIOXIDE VOLUNTARILY RATHER THAN REGULATING IT DIRECTLY.” (P.38)

In this formulation, the use of incentives as a tool of state regulation is identified – and indicted – as a “market principle.” The specific example cited is “using incentives to reduce carbon dioxide voluntarily rather than regulating it directly.” There are, of course, reasons to be skeptical about carbon trading proposals, and the defense of these proposals is often framed in terms of the way they simulate market principles. Nevertheless, a “market” in carbon emissions is nothing at all like a capitalist market and, if implemented effectively, could have profoundly non-capitalist effects and be every bit as effective in reducing greenhouse gases as direct regulation. A “market” in emissions only exists because the state creates a threshold of emissions for calibrating which firms have emissions credits and which have deficits. If the threshold is low enough, it would generate great pressure on companies to reduce emissions. An effective carbon trading system requires just as much monitoring of industry by the state as does direct regulation since without effective monitoring it is impossible to detect cheating. Cheating would lead to fines in both a regime of carbon trading and a regime of direct emission control. One possible advantage in a trading system is that it also creates incentives for successful traders to report cheating. A carbon trading system also has the potential advantage of making possible smoother transitions from one technology to another. All of these properties depend upon the fundamentally statist character of the market in question: it is created by the state, monitored by the state, tightened or loosened by the state. Of course, everything rides on the question of how tough the thresholds are and how serious is the monitoring. Carbon trading could be completely bogus, with violations ignored and thresholds weak. But the same can happen with direct regulation as well. These are pragmatic issues dependent on political balances of forces. In all likelihood in the Ameri-
can context, because of the power of corporations, carbon trading would be organized in a way to generate weak regulation. But, in my judgment, the indictment here should be about the weakness of the standards embodied in the proposals and the absence of adequate monitoring and enforcement of the rules of the carbon “market,” but not the fact that the mechanism involves incentives. The use of the generic term “markets” to describe the economic sphere, rather than “capitalism” or “capitalist markets” tends to encourage this kind of slippage.

3. Power
The principle way that Somers formulates power relations across these spheres is with the expression “balance of power.” Here are two illustrative quotes:

“My central claim is that ideal-typical democratic and socially inclusive citizenship regimes rests on a delicate balance of power among state, market and citizens in civil society…Disproportionate market power disrupts this carefully constructed balance….” (p. 1)

“By disrupting what would otherwise be only a dyad of state and market, civil society is thus central to the balance of power in the triadic configuration of state, civil society, and market.” (p. 31)

The idea of a balance of power is reinforced with an image of civil society providing a defensive bulwark to block external threats. On the first page of the book where she states in a distilled form the central thesis, Somers writes:

“Whether these conflicts result in regimes of relatively democratic socially inclusive citizenship rights or regimes of social exclusion and statelessness largely depends on the ability of civil society, the public sphere, and the social state to exert countervailing force against then corrosive effects of market-driven governance. My central claim is that ideal-typical democratic and socially inclusive citizenship regimes rests on a delicate balance of power among state, market and citizens in civil society…Disproportionate market power disrupts this carefully constructed balance….” (p. 1, italics added)

And a few pages later:

“….[S]ocially inclusive democratic citizenship regimes … can thrive only to the extent that egalitarian and solidaristic principles, practices, and institutions of civil society and the public commons are able to act with equal force against the exclusionary threats of market-driven politics. To accomplish this, the expansionary threats of both state and market must be impeded.” (p. 8, italics added)

Now, it is perfectly sensible to see power as, in part, a question of defending particular institutions from threats. But I don’t think this is the best way to understand the forms of variation in the power relations between the state, civil society, and the market necessary for the full achievement of citizenship in the T.H. Marshall sense of political, economic and social citizenship. Instead of seeing the issue as how to achieve a balance of power between civil society, the market, and the state, I think the central problem is how to subordinate both state power and market power to power rooted in civil society. Full social citizenship, including the enforceable right to a decent livelihood, full inclusion in the social life of a society, and meaningful political equality requires that both the (capitalist) market and the state are subordinated to civil society, not merely that the three spheres interact with equal force.

In one or two places in the text Somers does seem to move towards this position. For example, on p. 42 she writes:
“In direct contrast to a market fundamentalist one, a democratic citizenship regime requires a recalibrated balance of power in which the state, market, and civil society all coexist in a pluralist universe, each able to sustain its own discursive logic. The one twist is that the discourses and practices of civil society must be a little “more equal” than those of the market and the state…the citizenship ethic must have normative influence over both market contractualism and state bureaucratization and militarization.”

“A little more equal,” however, does not seem to me strong enough: a democratic citizenship regime requires, I believe, the systematic subordination of both the state and the market to civil society.

4. Democracy

This brings us to the problem of democracy. The contrast between a vision of a dominant civil society within the triad rather than a triad of equal balancing power is closely connected to the status of the concept of “democracy” in analysis of citizenship. Genealogies of Citizenship contains very little explicit discussion of democracy. Occasionally the word appears as an adjective – as in the expression “democratic citizenship regime” in the quote just cited. And in a few places she refers to “democratic pressures” on the state, for example:

“In this formulation, democratic “pressures” are counterposed to the “market’s potential for undue influence in governance.” Pressure on the state is the language usually used for the action of lobbyists and other organized “special interests.” The underlying assumption seems to be that the state cannot really be a democratic state in the sense of a state which is broadly controlled through democratic processes, so the most we can hope for is an external pressure on its actions. The stronger idea of democracy as rule by the people in which political power is exercised through mechanisms of popular participation and the parameters of state actions are controlled by citizens is not directly explored. Instead, throughout the book the analysis of power and institutions is framed in the language of republicanism, not the language of democracy and popular empowerment.

These are, of course, extremely difficult issues to sort out. Nevertheless, if we are really committed to the comprehensive egalitarian, inclusive ideal of citizenship defended in Genealogies of Citizenship, then I think the normative model should have at its core radical democracy. And this, I would argue, implies that both the state and the capitalist market (or the capitalist economy) must be subordinated to power rooted in civil society.

Here is how I formulate this issue in my book Envisioning Real Utopias (New York and London: Verso, 2010). I argue that three forms of power are always implicated in the organization of economic practices — that is, in the allocation of economic resources to different purposes and the control over production and distribution. I refer to these as state power, economic power, and social power, but in the context of Somers’ analysis they could be called state power, market power, and civil power. State power is based on the control over rule making and rule enforcing over territory. Economic power is based on ownership of economic assets of various sorts. Social power (or civil power) is based on the
capacity for collective, cooperative action. Using an agent-centered language of power, you can get people to do things by forcing them, bribing them, or persuading them.

Social power is grounded in civil society. It gains coherence through the formation of associations. Among these are unions, social movements and political parties. The word we conventionally use to identify the subordination of state power to social power (or equivalently: the subordination of the state to civil society) is “democracy.” Rule by the people does not mean rule by every person taken serially one by one, but rule by the collective organization of people through associations. The word which best identifies the subordination of economic power to social power is “socialism.” This is what I mean when I talk about the “social” in “socialism” seriously. But what this really means is extending democracy to the economy. Again, this is equivalent to subordinating the economy to civil society.

There are, needless to say, no guarantees in such a process that the actual outcome will be inclusionary and egalitarian. As is routinely pointed out, civil society has a dark side of exclusions based on all sorts of particularistic identities. Nevertheless, I would argue, the optimal configuration of power in the institutional triad state, market, and civil society for struggling for democratic egalitarian normative principles is one in which state power and market power are democratically subordinated through the exercise of social power.

A note on race and class

One of the central empirical themes of *Genealogies of Citizenship* concerns the impact of market fundamentalism on racial inequality in the United States. Somers’ basic thesis is that not only has market fundamentalism had the general effect of eroding the foundations of inclusive citizenship, but it has had an especially destructive impact on racial inequalities, intensifying in a variety of ways the “afflictions of racism.” Here are some illustrative citations:

“Yet since the 1970s it [market fundamentalism] has served to radically exacerbate the exclusion of race and class by first delegitimizing affirmative action and then grafting the impersonal cruelties of a ‘color blind’ market onto these pre-existing ‘primordially’ defined differences.” (p. 5)

“…with the casualties of market fundamentalism increasing…civil society becomes more exclusionary on traditional ascriptive grounds.” (p. 41)

“[market fundamentalisation and the contractualization of citizenship] have radically worsened the conditions of African-Americans” (p. 73)

“Blacks now hold less than one-tenth of the wealth of the white population and are disproportionately represented among the poor and working poor.” (p. 100)

“Market fundamentalism thus grafted its universalistic discourse onto the substance of a society that was still deeply segregated and rent with historically inflicted inequalities. In effect, the discursive triumph of market fundamentalism has the effect of freezing in place the identity based inequalities and historical exclusions, and then worsening them through deepening market based inequalities” (p. 104-5)

“In reality, however, two different systems of inequalities and exclusion – one based on immutable particularistic and arbitrary race based attributes, the other based on market-driven class inequalities – have been grafted together to create
a previously unmatched level of almost total exclusion from
civil society, an exclusion that is much greater than the sum of
its parts as it amounts to nothing less than nonrecognition.”
(p. 105-6)

“But market fundamentalism and the contractualization of
citizenship have radically worsened and transformed the
afflictions of racism” (p. 114)

I want to examine these statements carefully in terms of their specific empirical content. This may be unfair. Hyperbole is a rhetorical device in certain intellectual contexts, and it is basically unfair to judge such polemics by the same criteria one would use in a less polemical setting. This is what is sometimes called a “cheap shot”: taking a rhetorical flourish at face value and criticizing it for empirical inaccuracy. Nevertheless, I think there may be some value in looking at these empirical claims carefully because this could help sharpen our understanding of precisely how market fundamentalism shapes the interactions of race and class.

Let us begin with the last quote above: “But market fundamentalism and the contractualization of citizenship have radically worsened and transformed the afflictions of racism.” Taken literally, this implies a trajectory of “afflictions of racism” as illustrated below:

The vertical scale in this diagram, obviously, has no natural metric and is meant to be some gestural idea of the cumulative intensity of the different concrete forms that “afflictions” of racism might take. The point is simply to indicate the hypothesized directions of change in the historical period under study. The claim that the afflictions have dramatically worsened in the era of market fundamentalism means that somewhere around the early 1980s these afflictions began to increase. The statement does not imply that they have become as bad as they had been in the era of Jim Crow, so I have drawn the rising curve lower than the curve before the 1960s.

Now, the empirical question is whether there are indicators of real life conditions of African Americans which support this trajectory. There is one indicator that definitely rises sharply from around 1980: incarceration rates have risen for both whites and blacks since the 1970s, but more sharply for blacks. This is largely due to the differences in arrest
rates and imprisonment for drug offenses, which is certainly part of the repressive face of the contractualized notion of citizenship that Somers discusses.

Most other indicators of racial inequality, however, have either indicated slight improvements in the relative position of African Americans or no change. (All of the figures which follow come from Erik Olin Wright and Joel Rogers, American Society: how it really works, W.W.Norton: 2010). Consider occupational distributions. In 1960 11.9% of white men were in managerial occupations compared to 1.7% of black men. By 1980, on the eve of the rise in market fundamentalism the figure for white men had increased to 12.2% and for black men to 5.0%. That represents reduction in the disproportions from a ratio of 7:1 to 2.4:1. Twenty years later, in 2000, the figures were 12.9% and 6.6%, or a ratio of 2.0:1. The parallel ratios for professional and technical occupations declined from 3.2:1 in 1960 to 1.9:1 in 1980 and 1.6:1 in 2000. To be sure, the sharpest declines in this indicator of “afflictions of racism” occurred before 1980, but nevertheless the improvement in relative occupational prospects continued during the era of market fundamentalism. Similarly, black white differentials in education have continued to decline, as have black/white ratios in poverty rates – from about 3.5:1 in 1979 to about 2.3:1 in 2005. Racial gaps in median income and various indicators of wealth have changed hardly at all. None of these indicators are consistent with the claim that the afflictions of racism have dramatically worsened.

And yet, there is something obviously correct in Somers’ observation that the callous abandonment of poor African-Americans in the aftermath of Katrina signals a harsh new reality and a decline in the idea of full rights of social inclusion in the political community. And I think she is probably also correct that what has changed is, in important ways, a consequence of the cultural and ideological shifts bound up with market fundamentalism. But rather than characterizing this change as an intensification of racism as such I think it is better viewed as an intensification of the interaction-effects of race and class. I have illustrated this in a very simplified – maybe even simple-minded – manner below:

These tables indicate the “degree of social exclusion” for different race and class groups in the period before the triumph of market and during the period of market fundamentalism. Again, the metric (in parentheses) is completely arbitrary. For simplicity the class categories are rich and poor, but it doesn’t really matter for the purposes at hand how these are designated. In the left hand table the effects of race and class are additive: each separately increases the degree of social exclusion by 2 points, and jointly by 4 points. In the right hand table the racial differences among the rich have declined, and class differences in exclusion have increased for both African Americans and whites, but especially for African Americans. The result is the extreme social exclusion of poor African Americans. What has intensified, then, is not the affliction of racism per se, but the afflictions racialized poverty.

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<th>Degree of social exclusion before market fundamentalism</th>
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<tr>
<th>RACE</th>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>Degree of social exclusion in era of market Fundamentalism</th>
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<td>poor</td>
<td>(2) extreme (10)</td>
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<td>black</td>
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<td>(2) low (3)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>rich</td>
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Additive effects of race and class

Interactive effects of race and class

Note: the numbers in parentheses indicate the magnitude of social exclusion.
This alternative view of the way to think about the intersection of race and class before and during the market fundamentalism era is more in keeping with the contractualization thesis than the additive model. There is nothing inherently in the logic of market fundamentalism as such which should give any weight at all to ascriptive attributes of persons except insofar as these serve the contractual purposes of statistical discrimination – reducing transaction costs by using a group signal to provide information about a potential contract. Given the war on drugs, the mass incarceration of blacks, especially young black men, and the economic marginalization of urban blacks, therefore, one might anticipate that statistical discrimination on racial grounds would intensify among the poor, but not among the affluent. This would underwrite an intensification of the afflictions of racism for poor blacks, but not for others, in the era of market fundamentalism.

*I have one final empirical comment, or rather empirical question. In her discussion of racism and Katrina disaster, Somers acknowledges that a significant part of the observed racism in the reaction of public officials is to be explained by historical and cultural legacies:

"...the problems that led to Katrina are deeper and of longer duration than can be explained by market fundamentalism and contractualization alone. No proposition makes sense without considering the legacy of chattel slavery, more than six decades of legal exclusion, a hypocritical New Deal that worsened the ‘old deal’ of race-based exclusion, and the stigmatizing system of welfare.... Nonetheless...much of the fault lies with the noncontractual bonds of citizenship being forcefully displaced over the last four decades by the contractual conditionality of market exchange..." (p. 92)

Suppose a skeptic argues that the historic legacies of racism are more than powerful enough a force to fully explain the forms of exclusion observed during the Katrina disaster. How would one provide evidence that market fundamentalism adds anything to the explanation? One strategy would be to systematically compare the Katrina disaster with an earlier catastrophe that occurred before the era of market fundamentalism and see if there were significant differences in the treatment of African Americans. Of particular importance would be a close comparison of the treatment of poor whites and poor blacks in the earlier conditions.

Somers does refer briefly to one earlier episode (p.66), with a reference to Ignatieff’s discussion of the performance of “Herbert Hoover and the Army Corps of engineers... in their swift and effective response to the Mississippi Flood of 1927.” The expression “swift and effective response” indicates one important contrast with the Katrina disaster – the level of competence displayed by the state efforts at relief. But what about the specific dynamics of social exclusion?

I don’t know the history here, but relying on Wikipedia we get the following (text taken from Wikipedia):

"In population affected, in territory flooded, in property loss and crop destruction, the flood's figures were "staggering"... In one noted location, over 13,000 evacuees near Greenville, Mississippi, were gathered from area farms and evacuated to the crest of the unbroken Greenville Levee, and stranded there for days without food or clean water, while boats arrived to evacuate white women and children. The Greenville Levee was 8 feet wide and approximately 5 miles long.

Several reports on the terrible situation in the refugee camps, including one by the Colored Advisory Commission by Robert Russa Moton, were kept out
of the media at the request of Herbert Hoover, with the promise of further reforms for blacks after the presidential election. When he failed to keep the promise, Moton and other influential African-Americans helped to shift the allegiance of Black Americans from the Republican party to Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Democrats.

As a result of displacement lasting up to six months, tens of thousands of local African-Americans moved to the big cities of the North, particularly Chicago.”

This does not sound so different from the Katrina episode nearly 80 years later. But of course, 1927 could also be described as an earlier era of market fundamentalism, so perhaps the same mechanisms were in play then as now. Alternatively, in both eras, directly because of racism, African-Americans, especially poor African-Americans, lacked the full citizenship of social inclusion.

Comments by Saskia Sassen
Columbia University

Vulnerability or Incompleteness?
Citizenship in Neoliberal Times

In Margaret Somers book, citizenship and rights become heuristic categories through which to understand broader questions of membership in societies increasingly dominated by market fundamentalisms. This focus allows her to go beyond formal features and straight at the conditions for membership, and thereby at its limits and vulnerabilities. Hers is a sharp and relentless analysis that takes us well beyond soothing liberal notions.

The core engagement in this brief presentation is with Margaret Somers interrogation of citizenship and its current travails given the neoliberal onslaught. This means that many important aspects of Somers study cannot be addressed, most notably the important work of recovering the genealogies of key concepts and of developing them for current times; the complexity of this work would require far more time than the 20 minutes allotted.

Vulnerability or Incompleteness?

In her analysis, Somers subjects the aspirational/normative features of citizenship to the world of institutions (state, market, civil society) and of practice. This world of practice keeps appearing, especially in the shape of market fundamentalism and the growing privatization of more and more domains once in the realm of the state or of the civic. The disastrous handling of the so-called Katrina crisis serves as a powerful example where these various trends come together to produce a devastating effect.

“My argument is that increasing numbers of people have lost meaningful membership in civil society and political community—that which confers recognition and rights—through a process of the contractualization and commodification of citizenship.” (p. 118)

But Somers also emphasizes how older genealogies of unequal membership and the violence of exclusion feed into current losses. With her concept of genealogies of citizenship, Somers opens up the category of citizenship to the specifics of time and place.

“The story behind the socially excluded of New Orleans parallels that of starving and conquering the social state, but this time seen from the bottom-up view of a primarily poor African-American population whose precarious lives and patterns of social exclusion long predated the rise of market fundamentalism, even while
And it allows her to recognize the variable bundlings of elements that can constitute citizenship, without losing sight of the normative and aspirational project that is citizenship. This variability functions as a powerful register for making visible the consequences of neoliberal policy, especially market fundamentalism. Thus, when Somers discusses the “unprecedented alliance” for the US today between impoverished white working classes and the elites pushing for market fundamentalism, she points to the ascendance of notions of “the nation” over “rights.”

“By disrupting what would otherwise be only a dyad of state and market, civil society is thus central to the balance of power in the triadic configuration of state, civil society, and market.” (p. 31)

I do not disagree with this nor am I against demands for better protections. I think it is critical to recognize unequal power and to demand equality among these major spheres of social life—state, civil society and markets. Yet this formulation is more a response—what needs to be done to protect citizenship—than an analysis telling us something about the institution of citizenship and its capacities as an institution. Further, the strong reliance on civil society as the institution ensuring that equality of power, again, obscures the institution of citizenship itself. I see here an unresolved tension between the normative and the practical, which leaves citizenship as a sort of recipient of benefits (rights, backing from a strong civil society) or attacks (the onslaught of market fundamentalism). Exaggerating in order to make my point, we might say that it is almost as if citizenship hovers in the penumbra of state, market, and civil society.

Here is one possible way of addressing that unresolved tension between the normative and the practical through an examination of the (ironic) capacities embedded in the institution of citizenship. First, it matters to recognize that there is a sort of pragmatism in Somers’ analysis that can allow us, the readers, to recognize a range of citizen practices which also aliens could engage in and thereby accumulate informal rights and thereby add to the institution—for instance, expand the meaning of membership. This would take the discussion beyond a normative claim and towards a notion of making citizenship.
I would go further, and posit that this points to the incompleteness of the institution of citizenship: from this perspective, the vulnerability of citizenship to the neoliberal onslaught is not simply or only a consequence of that onslaught. The openness to the onslaught is part of the DNA of the formal institution of citizenship, and it is this incompleteness that has ensured its longevity across many diverse historical epochs. In the past and in the present, the presence itself of the excluded—whether outsiders or minoritized citizens—was a factor in the active making of expanded inclusions. And this making strengthened the institution.

Somers’ analysis does not preclude this interpretation, but her focus on the dependence of a strong citizenship on civil society does obscure some of it. The emphasis on the neoliberal attack and on dependence on civil society shifts the focus to vulnerability. Emphasizing incompleteness opens up the analysis to active making even within the narrow confines of the institution. In other words, the institution is a platform for making, not just for defending rights/protections/inclusions. It brings to the fore that though highly formalized, its incompleteness makes the institution capable of absorbing change that could be lethal to a rigidly closed (completed) formal institution.

This type of interpretation would, in my reading, reflect a strong interactive dynamic between the world of practice and the normative. Emphasizing incompleteness would take us down a path—a genealogy—where we could detect the making of new elements of citizenship through the practices of those who lack power (e.g. who lack the power to contest market fundamentalism). The temporality of these dynamics and struggles has often been multi-generational.

What I am trying to emphasize here is that even if under attack by the state, by racist citizens, and other exclusionary agents, the institution’s incompleteness invites its partial remaking by outsiders and their claims. The strength of the institution lies not only in invoking the norm and the vertical protest against power for violating that norm. Its strength also lies in a kind of horizontal dynamic centered in the active making of an expanded citizenship through including those who have been left out. Expanded inclusions have historically strengthened citizenship as an institution. Thus a period of egregious attacks, as is the current one, is also one when the institution’s properties come to the fore: the fact that historically the institution has also been remade from the ground up, not only from power down.

Somers’ “genealogies of citizenship” are, in my reading, a trajectory that reflects these dynamics. Yet they seem to move to the background when she analyzes the devastating effects of market fundamentalism on citizens—with the focus shifting to the overwhelming power of major economic actors. Somers positioning of market fundamentalism and its enactors. She emphasizes their power and their abusiveness. These are facts, and we can and we must keep documenting them. But in my reading of history, this type of power also abuses itself and winds up destroyed, partly or fully.

Let me make a bet: long after those powerful actors will be gone, citizenship will still be around. The institution has survived powerful firms and powerful types of regimes, such as divine kingship (even though some of today’s rulers conduct themselves as if…). This tells us something about the institution: in its diverse instantiations it is made by people under the most diverse of circumstances. The law “formats” and deforms citizenship as an institution. But the law does not make it.

Juxtaposing the formal character of citizenship as an institution with its incompleteness, and hence its capacity to absorb potentially lethal change (as might be the case with today’s market fundamentalism) opens a window onto the possibility that out of today’s onslaught of market fundamentalism will come a collective making that will expand
inclusions. In our country we see it in the emerging recognition among those who have rarely focused on immigration, that we need to work with immigrants, precisely because of the extreme violence against immigrants—by the state and by some citizens.

This extreme violence pushes us to recognize the unstable boundary between aliens and citizens in the US when it comes to the violation and abuse of very basic laws or norms. And the sharp increase in poverty and in the loss of basic protections among citizens is close to emerging as a similarly unacceptable violation of a basic norm. There is here a possibility of exiting the Hegelian master-slave dialectic—not asking more from power, but making new inclusions, formally and informally.

I see all of this as conceivably within Somers’ framing of the genealogies of citizenship, but not necessarily in her strong positioning of two critical actors in her account of citizenship’s vulnerabilities—the attack of market fundamentalism and the reliance on civil society. In a dialogical spirit I have opted for focusing on a particular feature of citizenship that is somewhat obscured by those two major actors. That feature is its incompleteness as a vector for making membership and the political. Incompleteness, married to formalization does not give power, but it does make powerlessness complex. And in this complexity of powerlessness lies the possibility of making—a history, a politics.

There is much to say and admire about Margaret Somers’ Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights (2008). For starters, it provides an innovative interdisciplinary perspective on democratic citizenship “inspired by an admixture of Polanyite, Arendtian, and Marshallian assumptions” (Somers 2008: p. 50). It also makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of rights in contemporary democracies, one that includes “the social inclusionary rights that allow for the meaningful exercise of all the others” (Somers 2008: p. 5). But what stands out in my mind as the book’s signal achievement is the prescient warning for policy makers and scholars alike of today’s threats to democratic citizenship. Her argument is clear and convincing: The betrayal of full citizenship rights in the United States is the result of the rise of market fundamentalism and state coercion. This makes Genealogies of Citizenship one of the most thoughtful and incisive critiques of American democracy to have appeared in recent years.

My review begins with two themes that received considerable treatment in this new work: (1) citizenship as the right to have rights, and (2) social exclusion and the demise of the promise of universal and equal citizenship. After examining the role of these two themes in her central argument, I conclude with some thoughts on an issue that received comparatively less treatment in the book and might form the basis of future research: (3) the challenge that globalization poses to citizenship and ‘the right to have rights.’

Comments by Michael C. Tolley
Northeastern University

**Citizenship Betrayed: Understanding Today’s Threats to Democratic Citizenship**

“The implications are clear: civil society’s ability to resist market fundamentalism and state coercion is not the optional fantasy of sociologists and socialists: it is necessary for the survival of democracy.” (Somers 2008, p. 117).

**Citizenship as the right to have rights**

“My conception of citizenship as the right to have rights ... allows me to think comparatively about citizenship regimes as variable, along a continuum from lesser to greater degrees of democratic and rights-based social inclusiveness.” (Somers 2008: p. 6)

At the core of Somers’ conception of citizenship are the ideas of social inclusion and
membership. Her focus on inclusion and membership forms the basis for a new theory of citizenship that presupposes the need for certain egalitarian principles, practices and institutions in civil society to counterbalance the threats of market fundamentalism and state coercion. Somers writes:

Democratic citizenship regimes require robust civil societies, which are deeply entangled with both the state and the market, while doing the boundary work necessary to protect their own integrity. It is in civil society that citizens constitute themselves as such, and it is in civil society that Polanyi’s “counter [market]-movements” of social protection are nurtured… (Somers 2008: p. 48).

Indeed, one of the themes she develops in this work, borrowing from the insight of Karl Polanyi, is how important it is to shore up the principles, practices, and institutions in civil society to thwart encroachments by market and state.

It follows from this conception that citizenship needs to be made more, not less, inclusive. Today the country is divided again over who may become a citizen and how far the rights of citizenship extend. The 2011 bill, introduced in the Arizona Legislature (SB 1611 Immigration Omnibus), challenges the notion of birthright citizenship long rooted in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeks to bar the children of illegal immigrants from enrolling in schools and receiving most public benefits (Lacey 2011). Debating whether the American-born children of illegal immigrants are “constitutional” citizens today is not unlike the debates earlier generations of Americans had over who may become a citizen. In an account well told by Rogers Smith in Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (1997), the struggles for access to full citizenship have driven political development and resulted in a more egalitarian citizenship ethos. The forces of reaction today that are calling for changes to the Fourteenth Amendment and in 2010 they pressured 46 state legislatures and the District of Columbia to enact 346 immigration measures, some mirroring the controversial restrictions passed in Arizona (National Conference of State Legislatures 2011: 1). Fights over who may become an American citizen and the policies governing citizenship are not new to American politics. Tension between e pluribus and unum has been a persistent theme throughout American political and social history. We are in another period of reaction against the egalitarian civic reforms of the 20th century and Somers’ conception of citizenship gives policy makers and scholars a better vantage point from which to view America’s citizenship regime both historically and comparatively. Somers’ analysis reveals how America’s citizenship regime today is tilted against the socially excluded. Although we hear so much about the rise of anti-immigration fervor, the threats to democratic citizenship in the United States are more extensive, including citizens whose poverty results in the lack of moral and political recognition full citizenship demands.

Social exclusion and the demise of equal citizenship

“…social exclusion stretches the meaning of poverty from a focus on either the socioeconomic or the characterological pathologies of individuals to the lack of recognition by others as moral equals due the same level of respect and dignity as the rest of the community, and treated according to the same standards and values.” (Somers 2008: p. 103)

Somers’ poignant account of the socially excluded of New Orleans (Somers 2008: p. 63-117) succeeds as a parable for the betrayal of citizenship in America today. Those who were left behind as the floodwaters rose were the “invisible,” “surplus population” for whom citizenship’s promise of treatment as equals remains unfulfilled.
If social exclusion is the problem, then the solution, Somers argues, is social membership. Needed are new principles, practices, and institutions in civil society to erase the “boundaries deep within the heartland of the nation” that separate full rights-bearing members of society (that is, “those who are well served by the market”) from the poor who are not recognized as members (Somers 2008: 102). Lacking recognition as full citizens of equal worth and dignity, the poor are rendered stateless losing the right of access to equal justice and the right to participate fully in democratic governance.

Somers’ concern about the ability of the “socially excluded”/“internally stateless” to participate meaningfully in the civic life of the nation reminded me of the debate over what rights to include in South Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution. In an article titled “Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution,” Etienne Mureinik argued that the constitution they were creating would not be accepted as legitimate by the vast majority who are poor and lack access to the basic necessities of life if the only rights provided for in the bill of rights were rights to vote, free speech, free press, free practice of religion, and the like:

If one is starving, food is more important than free speech, and a document which declares the latter a basic right and the former not is likely to attract derision. A bill of rights containing only first-generation rights would be perceived to be elevating luxuries over necessities, and that would discredit it as a charter of fundamental values. (Mureinik 1992: p. 465)

The decision to include judicially enforceable, second-generation social welfare rights in the South African Constitution spawned a transnational debate resulting in the acceptance elsewhere of the idea that furnishing the basic conditions for a dignified life for all is a fundamental value (Langford 2008).

The promise of democracy is to include citizens in the rule of the state. In the 18th and 19th centuries, democratic inclusion focused on extending civil and political rights guaranteeing citizens freedom from government encroachment and freedom to engage in political activity. In the 20th and 21st centuries, views of the democratic state came to include the welfare rights of people. These rights are most often defined as social and economic rights and they commit government to provide for basic subsistence needs, such as health care, food, housing, social security, and education, and to guarantee the right to work, ensure a safe work environment, and provide protection against unemployment and for labor union activities.

Greater understanding is needed of the positive duties on government to furnish the basic conditions for a dignified life for all. How much must a state provide to its most needy citizens? Is there a “minimum core obligation,” to use the language of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, below which a state may not fall and still call itself a democracy? Somers’ social theory of democratic citizenship lays the foundation for answering these questions. A nation that turns a blind eye toward its poor and maintains its exclusionary politics risks the democratic legitimacy of its collective action.

Citizenship rights in the era of globalization

“A second reason for the interest in post-nationalist citizenship is the far-reaching implications of globalization, most
important of which has been what some believe to be the shift of power away from nation-states toward the abstract, decentered global marketplace, where business and finance capital operate in a zone outside the reach of any global polity or international political/legal entity.” (Somers 2008: 16)

The political and economic changes occurring in the name of globalization are creating new threats to people struggling for recognition as full rights-bearing citizens. The forces of globalization have blurred the boundaries of nation-states and have made it increasingly difficult to know just where the locus of civic rights and obligations reside. Though not explored fully in this book which focuses on the threats to democratic citizenship in the United States, it is clear that the pathologies Somers describes of markets rush to alter the concept of citizenship in this country are present elsewhere as a result of the new global marketplace.

In recent years, there has been an increase of salience of international and supranational citizenship, especially in Europe. The development of European citizenship in the “new” Europe is one prominent example (Howard 2009; Bellamy and Warleigh 2005). The European “experiment” is based on the notion that citizenship should rely on a shared sense of values rather than a common ethnic origin. Such a notion has been given prominent expression in Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union:

“In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.”

Recent scholarship suggests that market fundamentalism’s threat to citizenship is not contained by the boundaries of nation-states (Jackson, Volcansek and Tolley 2010; Held and Kaya 2007; Archibugi 2009; Aman 2004). Global markets have already begun to turn full citizens, who may enjoy all the rights and privileges within their nation-states into socially excluded, stateless citizens, lacking the right to have rights under such systems of global governance as the World Trade Organization, Mercosur, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. The path Somers elucidates toward the promise of full citizenship rights for the socially excluded in the United States—creating robust institutions in civil society to resist the encroachments of market fundamentalism—has much to offer those who are worried about citizenship rights in the new systems of global governance. Testing Somers’ social theory of democratic citizenship cross-nationally and in these emerging global governance systems appears to me to be at least one promising area of scholarly inquiry opened by this work.

Conclusions

*Genealogies of Citizenship* draws from and adds to social science scholarship in many ways. The book’s core theme—the threat of expansionary markets on citizenship and civil society—may rely significantly upon the classic works of T.H. Marshall, Hannah Arendt, and Karl Polanyi, but it also draws from a wide range of recent scholarship, including the works of Foucault, Habermas, Sen, Putnam, and others. In fact, it took 42 pages to list the scholarly works cited throughout the book (Somers 2008: 289-331). The result is an innovative interdisciplinary perspective on democratic citizenship, arguably the foundation on which the study of democratic institutions and processes ultimately rests. The powerful case Somers makes for what she calls a “democratic socially inclusive citizenship” regime is not only a welcome addition to the scholarly literature, but is a policy prescription for those who have been working to advance social justice and fulfill the promises of democratic rule.
References


Reply to the Critics†
Margaret R. Somers
University of Michigan

I am grateful to the ASA and the APSA for sponsoring “Author Meets Critics” panels on Genealogies of Citizenship at their 2010 annual conventions. In addition to Saskia Sassen, Michael Tolley, and Erik Olin Wright, I want to thank the full array of participants on those panels, including Craig Calhoun, Jeff Manza, Frances Fox Piven, and especially the organizers, Myra Marx Feree and Eileen McDonagh. I am especially cognizant of the temporal costs this kind of voluntary citizenship entails. Critical readings of each other’s work is surely the highest form of collegial generosity. Thank you all.

Genealogies of Citizenship is a book is about citizenship rights—what they are, how we think about them, why they are currently in peril (p.3). As such, it is part of a growing conversation about a “new sociology of rights.” Its theoretical objective is to identify the institutional processes, relationships, and cultural dynamics that support or disable democratic citizenship regimes. Genealogies unfolds against the narrative emergency of Hurricane Katrina, a social and political crisis that demands sociological attention. I use “Hurricane Katrina” as a placeholder to refer specifically to the days between August 28, 2005, when New Orleans was put under mandatory evacuation, through September 5, 2005, when the New Orleans police shot and killed unarmed men on the Danziger Bridge leading out of the flooded city into the dry suburbs.

These were the days when the veil of silence surrounding one of our foremost zones of abandonment was torn asunder to reveal

‡ Thanks are due to Fred Block, Greta Krippner, and Hugh Miller for their helpful readings of this Reply.
the “left behind”—thousands of poor black New Orleanians by whom the evacuation simply passed indifferently. Left to fend by themselves for the five days before FEMA arrived, thousands were stranded on roof tops crying for help while helicopters flew closely overhead and the National Guard held much of the Ninth Ward at gunpoint. By the end, almost 2,000 drowned, died from the heat and dehydration, and other miscellaneous causes.

If the status of emergency and crisis was self-evident, however, the analytic lens through which to make sense of it was not. I identified it as a particularly dramatic episode in a three decade-long crisis of citizenship. Hurricane Katrina brought out of the shadows and into stark relief what social exclusion in America looks like. The shock superficially trained itself on the failures of government. The real horror was in witnessing a surplus population of internally stateless and disposable people. This mural of abandonment reflected a zone of rightlessness, a zone long robbed of public goods, of inclusion in civil society, and of recognition by others as moral equals due the same level of respect and dignity as all other citizens.

Combined, these processes reflected years of governmental withdrawal and redistribution of public provision, protection, and resources away from the poor and working poor of inner cities, toward wealth and corporate power. The institutional foundations of civil society in African-American communities thus steadily eroded, as they were depleted of the basic public goods necessary to social recognition and livelihood, including the capacity to earn and to learn. Inevitably, poor African-Americans came to bear the injurious brand of moral unworthiness consequent to these depletions.

In short, over three decades of market-driven governance has transformed increasing numbers of once rights-bearing citizens into socially excluded internally stateless persons. The growing moral authority of the market has distorted the meaning of citizenship. Social inclusion and moral worth are no longer given rights of membership; rather they are now earned privileges, wholly conditional upon the ability to exchange something of sufficient market value. With little considered of sufficient market value to merit market worthiness, vast swaths of America’s inner cities have become zones of abandonment and thus zones of rightlessness. A political culture that tolerates and legitimates these brute disparities in life chances has a corrosive effect not only on citizenship and human rights, but also on perceptions of what we owe each other as fellow humans.

Michael Tolley’s reading of Genealogies is remarkable for how he manages to highlight in such a short space precisely the political valence I was trying to strike in the book. (Even the quotations he marshals don’t make me shudder on reacquaintance.) I’m especially taken by how he draws links between my arguments about internal statelessness and several immediate political issues of the day, notably the controversial exclusionary 2011 Arizona immigration bill (SB 1611), calls for restrictions to the citizenship birthright of the Fourteenth Amendment, and even debate over South Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution. The last of these resonates most directly with Genealogies’ recurrent theme of the iron-like bond between social exclusion and socioeconomic rightlessness. It is not by chance that the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to which Tolley refers remains unratified today by the United States, one of exactly six nations in the world today to refuse to do so, along with Belize, Comoros, Cuba, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa.

Michael also points to the implications at the global level posed by market fundamentalism’s threat to citizenship. In the book I note that the boundaries of exclusion are difficult to draw crisply at the borders of nation-states today, not least because of the porousness in the divide between “internal” and “external” exclusions. That the non-democratic global organizations of economic governance (WTO, IMF, World Bank) continue to reign without any meaningful countervailing political or legal power very much parallels the dystopian market fundamentalist vision of a world without political power, which makes it, in effect, a global space of rightlessness. To be sure, some supra-national institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights, have defied
the bounded national landscape of rights-claims, thus laying the groundwork for a “post-national citizenship.” Even so, one must question the institutional heft of EU citizenship for, say, North African migrants living in France, when they are excluded from membership of their own residential civil society. The borders of exclusion at the global level are mirrored by the exclusionary internal boundaries at the heart of the metropolis. While the future is undoubtedly increasingly global and cosmopolitan citizenship appeals as a normative aspiration, for now the terrain of actual and aspirational rights remains within the nation-state.

The Epistemics of Representation

With the caveats that spatial metaphors are tricky and trafficking in them risks an overbearing literal-mindedness, Erik Olin Wright frames his reflections on *Genealogies* by comparing our respective triadic models of state/market/civil society. Famous for his conceptually-sharp diagrammatic representations, Wright does not disappoint. He pictures my theory as a straight line with three spheres, which is “dyadic with an intermediary domain,” and thus an “oversimplified partial representation” that falls short of capturing the “full complexity” of how these three institutions systematically interact. “Spatial image 3” (W3), by contrast, is a “full-fledged triadic model” in that not merely civil society but each of the spheres is between the other two. Representing Erik’s own work on “real utopias,” W3 is meant to capture three variations of actually existing societies, thus making it superior to S1 in that it invokes more closely the “complex array of institutions” that comprises our social world today.

I appreciate Erik’s diagrammatic proclivities: we both have a passion for explaining social relationships by visual variations in distances and arrangements; we both indulge in metaphorical spatial models which aim to depict how the state, the market, and civil society “interact in systemic ways;” and we both call these diagrams “triadic.” Moreover, I especially like Erik’s diagram W3. And, if my project was indeed that which he assumes it to be, that would be close to an ideal spatial model of actually existing possible social world/s.

Actually, however, Erik and I evoke spatial metaphors for different reasons, and thus evaluating them against each other mixes apples and oranges. Erik’s diagrams are intended to correspond to an underlying sociological reality, which he calls actually existing types of societies. Ideally then they map continguously onto and reflect accurately an actual social reality.

By contrast, my project is *not* to represent real social worlds. Philosophical realists, which I believe Eric to be, assert that there are social formations that exist independently of our mind-dependent social constructions. I am mostly sympathetic to this insight, as I’ve discussed at length (Somers 1998). I’m skeptical, however, that we have epistemic access to that reality such that we’d be able to determine its ontological make-up, and thus distinguish between an over-simplified versus a correctly complex representation of any given social world. If there were such a thing as a representation that could correctly depict its object, then that representation, however flexible, fluid, and multiple, would also have to be mind-independent—*pre-determined*, that is, with its spheres and domains and metaphorical interactional dynamics already arranged in their varying possible relationships to each other. Our challenge as social scientists then would be not to construct but to *discover* through logic and thought experiment what that accurate representation must look like. Were this possible, I’m sure Erik’s diagrams would elegantly capture that representational model.

My project is different, as I don’t believe that we are epistemically equipped to construct recognizably right or wrong, more or less accurate, representational images of the social world. Representations of the social world and its social arrangements are not given in the nature of things. Instead, my aim is to invent heuristic diagrammatic social imaginaries that will vary markedly from each other because how something is represented depends entirely on what it is that we are trying to explain. Different theoretical problematics require different representations of those social processes, relations, and arrangements.
that are relevant to that specific issue. The goal is to capture a partial and circumscribed social imaginary for the limited purpose of exploring the problem at hand (Somers 1998, p. 758). Rather than striving for impossible representations of reality, I see my task to develop whatever spatial heuristics best illustrate the specific theoretical expression of any given problematic. All representations are temporary analytic frames constructed exclusively by the problem the researcher sets out to explain. As Marc Bloch (1934, p. 81) observed in his path-breaking work on comparative historical analysis, “Only the unity of problem makes a center.”

Consider, for example, the following. If Erik’s were the best single representation of actually existing societies, it would have to embody and exhaust the full range of societal institutions and practices. Why then is the religious sphere absent from either of our diagrams, or the family for that matter? Do we really think religion and family are insignificant features of our modern world? Of course not. And their absences are easily explained once we adjust the purpose of the diagrams. Religion doesn’t figure into either of our representational images not because it isn’t “out there” but because it is not central to the problematics that motivate and drive our research. For the many thinkers for whom little about the social world can be explained without the religious sphere, no diagram would be conceivable that didn’t give it a prominent place in the metaphorical arrangements. Would one of these be right (accurate) and the other wrong (inaccurate)? It all depends upon what is being problematized.

It’s in this context that my use of the metaphor of civil society’s “betweeness” takes on a completely different hue. Throughout Genealogies (especially in chapters five and seven) I explore “a puzzling failure of conceptual space” that characterizes the fate of the civil society concept since its celebrated recuperation in the 1980s, primarily during the years surrounding the Eastern European democratic revolutions. As it was characterized at the time by participants and theorists alike, civil society served as the organizational and normative social foundation for the participatory solidaristic associations and citizenship practices that were able to topple the tyrannical Communist states. At the same time, however, the term resolutely was not mobilized to represent an ideal of an unfettered market society as the sole non-statist alternative. Rather, it was dubbed a “third sphere” and “called upon to break apart this dichotomous closure and to liberate a new social and political space—one in between and independent of both private markets and administrative state authority…a place where citizens can participate in the practices of citizenship free of both coercion and competition” (p. 256). The “puzzle” or the problematic of civil society as a third sphere is that its “in betweeness” was overdetermined by the power of the much more deeply entrenched dichotomy between public and private of modern political thought and policy. It is in this context that I used the term “in between” market and state—not to characterize any actually existing society but for the limited purpose of capturing the problem of the failed aspirational status of the newly recovered civil society concept.

In sum, the contrast between Erik and me isn’t in the degree to which we are willing to take on the challenge of representing the full complexity and variability of modern societies, nor is it in the superior accuracy of his depictions of reality. It is that we view the ontological and epistemological status of representation differently. His is “reality-driven” whereas mine is “problem-driven.” Put in more philosophical terms, Erik is a theoretical realist whereas I’m a pragmatic realist.

**Market or Capitalism?**

Erik’s second concern is what he believes to be my wrongheaded labeling of the economy as “the market” rather than “capitalism.” He worries that markets and market incentives as such are being wrongly tarred, when in contrast to specifically capitalist markets they are neutral forms of social exchange that can be used for good or for bad. Suggesting that there’s nothing inherently preferable about non-market state-centric solutions, Erik seems most anxious to defend the utility of market incentives, citing instances such as a carbon

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trading system in which they work better than state regulations—instances in which the markets at issue are not capitalist markets.

Erik acknowledges that our differences are mostly terminological. Still, I can only assume that Erik has simply overlooked that I work from a Polanyian vantage point that is very similar to his own opposition between markets and capitalism. We both use the plain term market in the Polanyian sense, to refer to societies in which markets are means of allocating the needs of livelihood but are nonetheless subordinated to a larger social goal such as economic democracy or the ethic of solidarity. Where we differ is that what he calls capitalism I call market fundamentalism. Market fundamentalism is similar to Polanyi’s “market society;” it signals a society that is organized by and subordinated to market principles in all its institutional domains. In a market fundamentalist society what Daniel Bell famously called the “different axial principles of the different spheres of society” are all collapsed into the overarching principles of the market. Reinforcing the important distinction between markets as part of society and market fundamentalism, a “real utopian” democratic citizenship includes markets-in-society and is absolutely preferable to Soviet-style societies. Indeed only someone who slept through the twentieth century could still believe that state regulation is universally preferable to markets.

Market fundamentalism thus is another way of characterizing what Erik prefers to call a capitalist society. There are reasons to prefer the former, including the danger of universalizing what are widely agreed to be the multiple “varieties of capitalism.” Moreover, I find the epistemological similarities between religious fundamentalism and neoclassical economic theory to be critically important to the stories I want to tell. To be sure, there is an important discussion to be had on the meaning of the recent switch from “capitalism” to “market society” as the term of art. And one cannot but be impressed by Streeck’s (2010) brilliant argument in favor of a return to the historical specificity of “capitalism.” But that isn’t what’s at stake in this minor semantic difference between Erik and me.

At the same time, however, there does need to be further probing of uncritical acceptance of economic incentives as neutral instruments, rather than part of a worldview dedicated to imposing market discipline. The rise and remarkable popularity of “incentive management” has to be seen in the larger context of an epistemic shift over the last three decades from social models of reality to economics-based ones. This is reflected in the popularity of pop cultural icons such as Freakonomics and Superfreakonomics, which (not unlike Gary Becker earlier) purport to be able to make sense of virtually every existing (and imagined) social phenomenon—good or bad—by incentives either misplaced (perverse) or well-thought out (conducive to market discipline).

Especially notable is the new hegemony of incentive management at the heart of modern social and public policy, to wit in substituting punitive and incentive-driven social programs for those of the New Deal and Great Society. Most infamous, for example, is poverty policy. Once conceived in social structural terms and taken to be the subject matter of sociologists, poverty has morphed into an economic problem of individual choices and perverse incentives. Thus the blame for poverty transitioned from structural unemployment, for example, to that of wrongheaded liberal social policy that set into place perverse incentives, which induce the poor to choose the degradation of welfare over that of hard work. What Hacker (2006) calls the “Personal Responsibility Crusade” is part of the project to shift responsibility away from social insurance and “shared fate” towards vulnerable individuals, driven by a notion that an ethic of social responsibility instantiates incentives for parasitism on the body politic. Given the longstanding Malthusian assumption that only the threat of hunger and scarcity could spur the poor toward industriousness, the new “poverty knowledge” hitched social policy to the power of incentive management, which as a central component of economic theory is incompatible with social and structural analyses. “Unintended consequences” is conservative language for denying basic social needs on the grounds of perverse incentives. When it comes to the poor, the market is
the terrain of character-building incentives, whereas the social is the site of incentives to parasitism (See also Somers and Block 2005; Block and Somers 2003).

Economic epistemics and incentive-centrism thus entail radically different ways of representing reality than does a social epistemology. They transform the political culture into one hospitable to *homo economicus* writ large. However much rational choice theorists and some economists smuggle in such oxymorons as self-interested altruism or co-operative game models, market incentives are not simply neutral phenomena given in the nature of certain things. Rather, they are designed by economists with the power to set the rules to induce utility-maximizing (selfish, that is) behavior from individuals acting exclusively in quid pro quo market exchange. One question, then, is whether we want a society indifferent to the moral valence of individual agency manipulated to be exposed solely to market principles. Moreover, give individual motivation a moral high-ground and it will crowd out competing principles of, for example, solidarity and social insurance. As Ha Joon Chang puts it bluntly, “assume the worst about people and you get the worst.” Incentive management, in short, is used to enforce market discipline.

It is also worth noting that using incentive management to induce market discipline is selectively and singularly applied to justify ending social provisioning and social insurance for the poor. Moral hazard is the term of art for ascribing high-minded morality to the simple project of denying assistance to the “undeserving” poor. And yet, the idea of moral hazard is nowhere to be found in the public morality tales of Wall Street bailouts and government protection of wealth and corporate power from full exposure to market failure. “Too Big to Fail” substitutes, instantiating intact every incentive to risk other people’s money and even global financial stability as it is well-known that for the financial sector there is no down side to the losses and massive private accumulation from gain. “Socializing the losses, privatizing the gains” captures the essence of modern incentive management. The occasional Lehman Brothers notwithstanding, when it comes to wealth and power, all the players have full knowledge that they will not in fact be left to the discipline of the market. “Socialism for the rich, and the free market for the rest of us” is another way of pointing to the selective nature of the tough love imposed by incentive management.

Erik would argue that once again I’m wrongly conflating incentives and capitalism, when incentives could just as well function for the good in non-capitalist markets, as per the carbon markets. But this is the critical point I am making in the book: They are *not* functioning in the context of non-capitalist markets. Rather, these carbon markets are being initiated under a historically specific form of governance. “Market-driven governance,” as I call it in the book, is not simply the use of market incentives; rather, it entails an institutional complex of political interventions and public policies which in no way are driven by actual free market practices. It is a hybrid mix of free market *ideology*, in tandem with government-driven market interventions and legal arrangements that redistribute wealth upwards. Market driven governance only exposes only the poor and the middle class to real market discipline. Wealth and capital, by contrast, is fully supported by state and government regulations that make market outcomes predetermined in their favor. The genius and the alchemy of market-driven governance is that it puts a heavy political thumb on the societal scales, while behind the veil of free market ideology it appears that the rigged outcomes are actually the natural results of the free market at work.

**Power and the Primacy of the Social**

Erik categorizes his third point of contention under the label of “power,” but his concern is the influence of civil society *relative* to the state and market in a ‘real utopian’ democratic citizenship regime. In *Genealogies of Citizenship*, I argue that the ideal typical democratic citizenship regime must be driven by the citizenship ethic/ethos of civil society’s normative principles of solidarity, shared fate, and social insurance. State, market, and civil society must coexist in a pluralist universe, each able to sustain its own discursive logic, but nonetheless one in which the citizenship
ethic must have normative influence over both market contractualism and state bureaucratization and militarization (p. 42). Thus I call civil society the “more equal” among equals.

Erik objects to civil society being only “more equal” and prefers the “subordination” by civil society of both state and market, rather the idea of a pluralist social universe. Here is where we do part company: For civil society without a robust social state is a conservative communitarian chimera, very much along the lines of Britain’s new Conservative anti-statist “Big Society” program, or the market-driven darling of social capital—both of which appeal to the privatizing demands of an all-expansive civil society. In such a world, civil society first takes up the tasks previously allotted to government—public schools an underfunded disaster? Try home schooling. Social Security and retirement pensions gone the way of dinosaurs? Families and communities should practice communitarian solidarity and generational caretaking. In such a world civil society must absorb the externalities of the market, which would have been previously the responsibility of the state.

Here I believe Erik fails to distinguish between institutional power, which should be plural, and normative principles, which should be dominated by what I call the “civil power of solidarity, equality, and rights...” (p. 43). This kind of civil influence, however, requires public goods, and public goods are a matter of political power. Institutional domination by civil society, by contrast, is a world without political power. It is a world without the countervailing power of rights, which requires the social to be in alliance with the state. Civil society by itself lacks the political power of the state to serve as a necessary force of coercion against the power of the market to exclude and make unequal. Civil society without the state is thus a world without the rule of law, without minority rights, a world without rights.

**Democracy**

Erik is disappointed that *Genealogies* is not a book about democracy, which he believes is institutionally prior to citizenship in a sequence of emancipation toward real utopia. My frequent use of “democratic” to modify an ideal type citizenship seems especially annoying, as it seems to underlines its secondary status. It is an inadequate conception of citizenship that doesn’t reserve an a priori place for democracy.

True, I do not believe that democracy is an a priori part of citizenship. Citizenship, as I define it, is the right to have rights. This definition is both thicker and thinner than many others. Thinner, in that I don’t include in it any particular rights such as “participation or individual property rights,” contra conceptions of citizenship that derive directly from Greek ideas of the polis. Membership alone is my minimalist requirement of citizenship. This allows me to think comparatively about citizenship regimes as variable, contingently sited along a continuum from lesser to greater degrees of democratic and rights-based social inclusiveness. I use democratic is an adjective because it is because it is only one kind of citizenship. At the same time my conception is thicker, because it does require in the first instance the foundational right to political and social membership as well as inclusion and recognition both *de jure* (by law) and *de facto* (in practice). Inclusion, in short, is prior to participation.

Citizenship, in other words, is a variable for comparative analysis, and participation qua democracy, even radical democracy, does not come ready made as part of the foundational concept. Rather than an a priori, democracy is an achievement. It cannot be assumed but must be empirically demonstrated through comparative analysis. Only then can we theorize the social conditions necessary to achieve democratic citizenship. One way to do that is to come face to face with those zones of rightlessness where *de jure* citizenship exists without any meaningful *de facto* democratic participation.

Here is what we learned about citizenship and democracy from Hurricane Katrina: Those New Orleanians left rotting in the Superdome and baking on rooftops crying out for help had their *de jure* rights fully intact. They had the right to vote, the right to participate in political processes, the right to sue in court—all these rights were still theirs as they negotiated alligator and snake-infested water, trying to survive. This ironic observation
should highlight the radical contingency of democratic rights. For what they did not have was social inclusion in civil society, without which all the democracy in the world is worthless.

The Real and the Ideal

I thank Saskia Sassen for her concise summation of some of the aims of Genealogies, especially that of how the violence of historical exclusions and racial apartheid have been reconfigured under the aegis of a new color-blind market regime, in which the quid pro quo requirements of market exchange as prerequisites for citizenship inclusion set the stage for the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005. She also nicely captures my argument about internal statelessness, the nexus of nation versus rights, and that of rights versus citizenship.

Sassen’s main concern is what she calls an unresolved tension between the normative and the practical, which leads me to emphasize the recent losses suffered by citizens under the contractualization of citizenship. If I understand correctly what she is saying here, it is that I stress an ever-widening gap between the normative ideal of the citizenship ethos, including solidarity and what Jacob Hacker (2006) calls “shared fate,” and the practical reality of citizenship as it has transformed over the last three decades into socially excluded zones of abandonment and rightlessness.

Sassen does not disagree with my characterization of this hiatus between norm and practice. Rather, I believe her concern is that I present an overly pessimistic view of citizenship’s recent losses, at the cost of shortchanging attention to citizenship’s more institutional capacities for ever-increasing inclusiveness. The danger of this focus, for Sassen, is the danger of reading a more general theoretical statement about citizenship from this limited historical moment, thus missing what she calls the “incompleteness” of citizenship, what I interpret to mean its inherent “elasticity,” when viewed not in any particular historical moment but more generally in its ideal-typical form as a theoretical concept.

Approaching citizenship more theoretically at a greater distance from its contemporary predicament, Sassen argues, would allow us to see citizenship’s variable manifestations in different times and places, most especially those moments not of closure and vulnerability like today but in its expansive moments of making from below, when once excluded groups and “aliens could engage in and thereby accumulate informal rights and thereby add to the institution...expand the meaning of citizenship” (p. 4). In short, Sassen prefers we concentrate on citizenship’s inherent inclusiveness rather than its vulnerability.

As I read her, what Sassen is posing as an opposition is actually two different levels of analysis, and there is nothing about either that negates the other—as in a true dichotomy. Genealogies is a problem-driven project that traverses normative, historical-empirical, and theoretical landscapes. It posits that the current crisis of citizenship has to be explored at the level of history, sociology, but also as conceptual history and historical epistemology. But not all at the same time, and not all in response to every problem. The book takes an empirical problem—the fact of the “left behind” of Hurricane Katrina, or the celebrity status of “social capital,”—and then tries to account for that problem historically.

If Sassen has detected a certain ether of pessimism that pervades my empirical findings, she has detected rightly. With respect to our current political culture and social economy—guilty as charged. There seems to me nothing peculiar about discerning an “illiberal citizenship in neoliberal times” (to riff on Berezin’s [2009] felicitous title). This is, after all, a book driven by contemporary questions and empirical problems, and I dare say that the weight of history is on my side if we weigh the balance of almost four decades of market fundamentalism against an optimistic reading of its consequences for most Americans and would-be Americans alike.

Still, I think that Sassen has mistaken my pessimistic view of citizenship today for a more general theoretical statement about citizenship as an ideal-type. While my point of departure is different, I too arrive at a more general “architectonics” of citizenship, from which I construct positive and negative ideal types—not of citizenship in the abstract but of both a “democratic socially inclusive” citizen-
ship regime, as well as a “dystopian citizenship regime.” Captioned “a democratic socially inclusive citizenship: conditions and consequences of its making” (emphasis added), the socially inclusive ideal anticipates to the letter Sassen’s argument that we should “take the discussion beyond a normative claim and toward a notion of making citizenship” (p. 3, emphasis in original). As she notes, we share far more than we differ.

Where we do differ may be in methodology. I prefer working with citizenship as a variable for comparative research, which avoids questions of essential disposition and instead explores conditional historical variability along a continuum of possible arrangements. Saskia’s is a theoretical statement about citizenship as an ideal-type historically emergent institution, one that accentuates its elasticity and capacity for expansion. It is this, she argues, that characterizes its DNA or, to use different language, its essential properties across time and space. I find history to be less consoling than ideal types, as it throws down far too many gauntlets to believe in the inherent expansionary tendency of citizenship inclusiveness. Elasticity, yes; but a steady increase in inclusion is difficult to argue. In the US alone, one need only think of the regression from 19th-century post-bellum Reconstruction immediately followed by almost a century of Southern legal apartheid, or more recently, the de facto social exclusionary regressions in our inner cities over the last three decades. Citizenship’s history is in fact one of expansion and contraction, and my stress on how rights are currently in peril is an empirical confirmation of that historical contingency.

In the end, Sassen is uncomfortable with my emphasis on the vulnerability of civil society among African-Americans in pre-Katrina New Orleans. The concept of vulnerability seems to her to signal an inherent weakness in the institution of citizenship as such, pushing it into a defensive and defeatist crouch. She reformulates this as the property of “incompleteness” and stresses instead the expansive inclusiveness that such incompleteness makes possible, especially with respect to the currently excluded. I admire Saskia’s ability to detect in vulnerability its dialectical possibilities, and don’t disagree that there have been historical periods where such transformations can be empirically demonstrated. But until I see some evidence suggesting that the tragic social exclusion we witnessed during Hurricane Katrina is, in actuality, laying the ground for an imminent leap toward inclusion, then I remain skeptical that these ideal typical properties have any immediate bearing on this particular historical case.

I don’t think that Sassen would disagree with this empirical observation, because she does not claim to be marshalling evidence to challenge my historical argument. Rather, hers is a conceptual discourse about citizenship’s dialectical properties that can transform vulnerability into incompleteness and incompleteness into inclusionary expansion. There is nothing in my argument to reject that conceptual claim. Empirical stories, after all, don’t confirm or disconfirm conceptual entities, Karl Popper notwithstanding. But neither do ideal types challenge empirical findings.

References

Letters

Editor’s note: Saïd Amir Arjomand granted the editors permission to publish his unsolicited letter in Trajectories. James Mahoney and Immanuel Wallerstein graciously agreed to respond at our request.

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What happened to the ‘comparative’ in comparative and historical sociology?

In the 1980s, I eagerly participated in the foundation of our ASA Section, and served as its Secretary-Treasurer from 1987 to 1990. In that period, I made a plea in one of the Section’s sponsored publications for the study of culturally-specific developmental patterns while referring to my work on the political ethic of Shi’ism (Arjomand 1985). The subsequent drift of our Section’s development has been in the opposite direction, however, and I have increasingly pursued my comparative interests within the framework of the ISA rather than ASA, serving as Editor of International Sociology from 1999 to 2005 and helping organize the thematic plenaries on “Worlds of Difference” at the July 2010 World Congress of Sociology in Gothenburg, Sweden. Needless to say, I remain a member of the ASA Comparative and Historical Sociology community, and am therefore writing to reiterate my plea of a quarter of a century ago, and to urge my fellow members to rectify the increasing neglect of comparative sociology.

The full plea for a return to comparative sociology and civilizational analysis to fulfill its original promise after intermittent progress through three generations has been made elsewhere (Arjomand 2010). Here I wish to complain about the failure of the sociological community in the United States to take up the challenge. My original plea for comparing culturally-specific patterns of social change was made shortly after the ‘historical turn’ in social theory in the mid-1970s (Tilly 1975) that, to many of us, signaled the fall of the modernization theory. This turned out to be cold comfort to comparative sociologists, however. The ‘historical and comparative sociology’ that has developed since the 1980s in the United States as an alternative to modernization theory curiously succumbed to the same temptation of regarding the Western patterns as paradigmatic. The revisionist Marxists and Weberians who founded it followed Barrington Moore’s, Reinhard Bendix’s and Charles Tilly’s heavy reliance on the Western historical experience for analysis and forming concepts. Moore (1966), for example, forged his key concepts to trace the origins of democracy and dictatorship to the class-coalition in the course of commercialization of agriculture in the West, and then extended its class analysis to India and Japan. The application of the concepts formed out of the Western historical experience to other cases is an imposition, as is most evident in Moore’s analysis of the in-
ter-War Japanese “fascism” as the “labor-repressive” outcome of the Japanese class alignment during the critical transition. (See Skya 2009 for a culturally-specific alternative.) The same imposition of metropolitan categories on the periphery is true of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), who extend Barrington Moore’s class analysis to highlight the contribution of the working class and its organization to the development of democracy. Despite their extensive coverage of the Caribbean, it is hard to detect any acknowledgement of the one significant attempt at theorizing on the basis of the historical experience of a specific world region, namely M.G. Smith’s (1965; 1974) periphery-derived conceptualization of plural societies distinctive of the Caribbean region.

Indeed it is more accurate to describe this flourishing school of macrosociology simply as ‘historical sociology’ (Adams, Clemens and Orloff 2005). What progress has been made by members of our Section has been largely driven by methods appropriate for historical sociology—analyses of temporal sequences, path dependency and rational choice in institutional development, and network analysis. The comparative element has, by and large, remained limited to those implicit in case studies. It is unmistakably anemic and at best a secondary feature, expressed in ad hoc explanatory parallels and contrasts deduced in case studies, which Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003: 14) call “contextualized comparison.” Both the metropolitan bias and the inordinate privileging of the historical over comparative sociology is evident in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer’s state of the art volume which identifies “Otto Hintze, Max Weber and Marc Bloch” as the founding figures and hardly mentions diversity, referring to “area studies” only once and quite dismissively (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: 3, 11-12). Even the so-called ‘cultural turn’ in historical sociology was largely methodological and historiographic, entailing understanding of patterns meaning with little or no attention to cultural comparisons.

To the extent that the periphery was not ignored, its experience was fitted into the straightjacket of allegedly universal processes such as modernization and development. The-se generalized what was taken as the dominant Western pattern into a universal teleology. I have traced the line of theoretical development as viewed from the center as a universal pattern of value-rationalization spreading from the center to the periphery. This development was characterized as a discontinuous process of expansion of the scope of rational judgment driven by periodic shifts in dominant value-ideas in the course of the twentieth century (Arjomand 2004). The view from the periphery was different, however. It was from the periphery that challenges to the dominance of metropolitan theory and its claim to universality originated. These challenges sought to rectify the denial of diversity implicit in the putatively universalistic Western-based categories and patterns of the modernization theory. This amounted to provincializing the metropolitan theory through studies on different regions of the world, seeking to correct what Raewyn Connell (2007: 46) has described as “the erasure of the experience of the majority of humankind from the foundations of social theory.” Without wishing to minimize the achievement of my colleagues in developing institutional historical sociology in the last quarter century, I wish to contend that the acknowledgement of the challenge to recognize the distinctive experience of the periphery through comparative sociology and comparative study of civilizations is imperative in this global age.

References


Replay by James Mahoney
Northwestern University

Is Comparative Sociology Marginal within the Section?

Said Amir Arjomand’s letter makes a plea for “a return to comparative sociology and civilizational analysis,” which he believes has been neglected within the professional sociological community of the United States, including in the Section on Comparative and Historical Sociology. In this short reply, I suggest that while Arjomand may well be right to complain about the relative lack of area-centric work on Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East in the discipline as a whole, he misses the mark in targeting the scholarship associated with this section.

I think that Arjomand’s conclusions will be surprising to those who follow the section closely. Consider some of the books that have won or received honorable mention for the Barrington Moore Prize over the last few years:


All of these works involve the study of culturally or regionally specific phenomena taking place outside of the West. They all reject universalistic conceptions of modernization. In fact, they appear to represent precisely the kind of comparative scholarship that Arjomand endorses, at least as I understand his argument. Certainly none of these excellent works fit well the description that Arjomand holds up as a general characterization of the field.

Arjomand presents no systematic evidence for arriving at his conclusions, leaving me
somewhat mystified by his argument. What does Arjomand think about the hundreds of works on the periphery that have been produced by section members over the last two or three decades? What are examples of well respected recent works that treat the periphery as following a process of development marked by Parsonian shifts in dominant values and orientations? Which contemporary historical sociologists endorse a universal process of modernization and development? Arjomand’s characterization seems to make sense only if we ignore vast quantities of scholarship produced since the 1980s. My conclusion is that he is fighting a phantom menace from the 1960s.

I should note that Arjomand targets some criticism at my work with Dietrich Rueschemeyer in our edited volume, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge University Press, 2003). He says that we exhibit a “metropolitan bias” and dismiss area studies. In fact, however, we cite and discuss many different comparative works (e.g., the bibliography for our chapter includes the work of Karen Barkey, Mourina Charrad, Peter Evans, Gary Gerreffì, Jeff Goodwin, Patrick Heller, Evelyne Huber, José Itzigsohn, Terry Karl, Atul Kohli, Juan Linz, Joel Migdal, Gerardo Munck, Guilmero O’Donnell, Jeffery Paige, Misagh Parsa, Gay Seidman, Kathryn Sikkink, George Steinmetz, Robert Wade, Timothy Wickham-Crowley, and Elisabeth Wood). In my own case, I first learned about development by reading the dependency theory works produced by Latin American scholars. My past and current research concerns the historically-grounded and systematic comparative analysis of Latin America. Like many comparative-historical researchers, I see this work as at the intersection of area studies and sociology.

It is when we look beyond the section to the discipline as a whole that comparative research informed by area expertise outside of the Western countries seems relatively marginal. For example, I was once invited to participate on a roundtable panel focused on sociological work about Latin America. The panel organizer lamented the tiny size of the pool of potential scholars to invite. There are just not that many us who work mainly on Latin America. My hunch is that the same is equally true of other regions such as Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

Ultimately, I have no interest in fighting with Professor Arjomand, whose work on the Iranian Revolution I have used and admire. He may well be right that real comparative work is relatively marginal within the discipline as a whole. However, his characterization of the state of comparative research within this particular section does not seem to correct to me.

Reply by
Immanuel Wallerstein
Yale University

On Comparison

A very long time ago, one of my teachers said to me, what is this thing about comparative sociology? All sociology is necessarily comparative. And of course he was right. All knowledge is necessarily comparative.

There are, it seems to me, two basic issues when one is making scholarly assertions. The first is, are we comparing (explicitly or implicitly) two or multiple situations in order to demonstrate that they are largely the same or in order to demonstrate that they are largely different? The second is, what are the units or entities that we are comparing?

I would say the same about historical sociology. There is an inherent time frame in any scholarly assertion. Nothing is, or can possibly be, ahistorical. But how long is the historical unit that is explicit or implicit in our assertions? And on what basis are we arguing the validity of a particular historical length? This is another way of asking, what is the larger historical entity/system of which this immediate object of our research is a part?

Said Arjomand is a distinguished scholar who writes about what he calls civilizational analysis. What Arjomand is trying to do is undo the built-in Eurocentric bias of most of traditional sociological research. In effect, therefore, his units of analysis are "civilizations" and the object of the exercise is to sub-
stinate the differences, not the similarities, of the multiple civilizations.

Arnold Toynbee was another distinguished scholar of civilizational analysis. He too used as units of analysis “civilizations.” But his object was opposite to that of Arjomand. Toynbee wishes to demonstrate the similarity of the multiple civilizations. He developed a model of stages through which all civilizations were destined to pass.

However, most people who assert that they are engaged in comparative sociology do not claim to be using civilizations as their unit of analysis. Most of them claim to be using states (or “nation-states” or “societies” or “social formations”). There is sometimes an implicit “civilizational” edge to this work, in that they then may make statements about differences between “developed” and “less developed” states or between the “West” and the “rest.” But once again, the question remains, are they doing this in order to demonstrate an essentially common pattern, if an evolutionary one, between the multiple units or to demonstrate fundamental differences? Empirically, I think the majority are seeking to prove common patterns, which is the basis of Arjomand’s complaint.

We can of course raise questions about the quality of the comparisons. I have to intrude another anecdote of a long time ago. In the 1960s, Terence Hopkins and I launched a project in which we sought to see what kinds of empirical results were to be found in the explicitly comparative analyses found in a long list of scholarly journals. We created a profile of information we wished to have about each article in a journal. We recruited some 20 graduate students in sociology at Columbia University to do this work. These students amassed between them an impressive range of linguistic abilities, so that our list of journals was not limited to those written in English.

We were forced, after a year’s work, to give up on this project. What we discovered was that articles that compared the results of field work in a specific country (usually in what was then called the Third World) were compared by the author to what the author believed to be the case in the United States or in western Europe. I say “believed to be the case” because an overwhelming majority of these authors (this was as of the 1960s) did not do empirical research about the United States or western Europe. They somehow “knew” what was empirical reality there, and compared this with what they found in their Third World country. They then proceeded to analyze the “comparison” either to prove long-term similarity with interim differences (a theory of stages) or, less frequently, to demonstrate long-term differences, usually said to be “cultural.”

No doubt “comparative” work today is less egregiously presumptuous about “Western” reality but there still remains a legitimate concern about the assumptions implicit in much of this work. Arjomand provides us with some examples, and this is also a source of his complaints.

In my own work, which I think of as being both comparative and historical (but as I said, what else can it possibly be?), I use neither states (in their many avatars) nor civilizations as my units of analysis. I use “historical systems.” What I mean by a historical system is a structure with boundaries (although the boundaries can be changing over time) that has a structure (that is, rules or norms governing institutions) whose logic of operation can be discerned/uncovered. This quality makes it a “system” — a relatively autonomous system. However, I also presume that no system of any kind (from the most macrospatial to the most microspatial) is eternal. They all have lives, which means that they have a genesis (which needs to be explained), a “normal” life (under the rules that have been discerned), and a structural crisis when its historical development reaches a point when the structure is too far from equilibrium and it therefore bifurcates and comes to an end. This quality makes it historical.

Let me state my discomfort with both civilizations and states as units of analysis. We all know, more or less, the standard list of “civilizations.” They range between 10-25. Some are said to have existed for 5000 years or even more. Some have shorter time lines. I think what are referred to as civilizations are usually a series of historical systems (as I define them) that have some marginal continuity of characteristics, and whose degree of continuity is asserted in the present for purposes relat-
ed to the operation of the current historical system in which the claimants reside.

As for states (or their avatars), I do not believe them to have been more than one variety of institutions within the larger “world-system” of which they are a part. I do not believe states are autonomous structures running on parallel tracks to each other. Rather I think their actions like those of other institutions within the “modern world-system” must be situated in terms of the overall set of happenings in order to understand their genesis and importance.

So of course one can compare two states at the same point of time or at different points of time, or the “welfare systems” of two states or two blocs of states, as long as one doesn't presume their ontological independence.

Arjomand also raises the question of the historical role of sociology or more largely of all the historical social sciences. He correctly suggests that we have to understand why today there are some scholars doing “historical sociology” and others doing “civilizational analysis” and (I might add) still others doing “world-systems analysis.” We need also to understand why virtually no one was engaged in such practices in 1945 while many were doing something similar (under perhaps other labels) in the late nineteenth century.

I would label this kind of question the study of structures of knowledge. Many of us have written on this subject, offering various explanations. I think the important point to underline, of which Arjomand is reminding us, is that we should all be doing this much more self-consciously.
Winner: Robert Scott Jansen
Populist Mobilization: Peru in Historical and Comparative Perspective
UCLA 2009
Adviser: Rogers Brubaker

Honorary Mention: Besnick Pula
State, Law, and Revolution:
Agrarian Power and the National State in Albania, 1850-1945
University of Michigan, 2011
Adviser: George P. Steinmetz

The 2011 Theda Skocpol Dissertation Award is awarded to Robert S. Jansen for “Populist Mobilization: Peru in Historical and Comparative Perspective” (UCLA 2009, Dissertation Adviser, Rogers Brubaker). Robert Jansen’s dissertation represents a major contribution to comparative-historical scholarship on populism. Breaking with prior work that identifies populism with a specific rhetorical style, social base, or substantive set of policy objectives, Jansen argues that populism is best understood as a form of political mobilization. Populism is conceived as a type of political practice, a distinctive organizational means for accomplishing a range of social, political and economic ends. Jansen’s dissertation identifies the historical preconditions for the emergence of populism, thus understood, and suggests how populist mobilization, once introduced into a political field, may generate conditions that favor its cyclical reincarnation.

Jansen's dissertation combines a broad comparative analysis of populist mobilization throughout Latin America in the first half of the twentieth century with a fine-grained historical analysis of a critical and previously neglected juncture in the history of populist mobilization. Drawing on original archival research, Jansen reconstructs the 1931 presidential elections in Peru, demonstrating that it was a critical episode in the history of populist mobilization that left the Peruvian political field forever transformed. Jansen’s analysis offers a persuasive case for why this particular historical episode must be considered to advance theoretical understanding of populism. Further, his analysis of 1930s Peru forces us to rethink what we thought we knew about other, better known, cases of populism in the region. Exemplifying the best of recent scholarship in the comparative-historical tradition, Jansen's dissertation combines conceptual clarity and innovation, creative and productive reliance on prior scholarship, and original archival research to generate new theoretical insights about a topic of major historical and contemporary significance.
**Member Awards**

**Nancy Davis** (DePauw University) and Rob Robinson's (Indiana University) paper, "Overcoming Movement Obstacles by the Religiously Orthodox: The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Shas in Israel, Comunione e Liberazione in Italy and the Salvation Army in the United States" (American Journal of Sociology 114 (March 2009):1302-49) is the recipient of the 2010 Distinguished Article Award of the ASA Section on the Sociology of Religion and honorable mention from the ASA Section on Collective Behavior and Social Movements.

**George Steinmetz** received a Norbert Elias Fellowship (Norbert-Elias-Stipendium) from the Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach for research on the entanglements of sociologists with empires, and a year-long fellowship the National Endowment for the Humanities to complete that study next year.


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Please email your information to Robert Jansen, CHS Web Editor:
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Contributions to Trajectories are always welcome: please contact the editors at emily.erikson@yale.edu and isaac.reed@colorado.edu.