Trajectories

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

ASA Conference Preview

Can Comparative Historical Sociology Save the World?

Monica Prasad
Section Chair-Elect
Northwestern University

Comparative historical sociology has always been most intellectually vibrant when it has been most explicitly engaged with questions of public purpose. At mid-century, comparative historical sociology saw a dramatic resurgence as scholars realized that a serious understanding of the most important issue of the day - how to explain the causes of the Holocaust - required grappling with the long-term histories of multiple countries.

But in more recent decades, the subfield seems to have retreated

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from this tremendous mid-century achievement and from engagement with questions relevant to public concerns. Perhaps this has happened because no single question seems as gripping today, or perhaps because in the (important and necessary) turn towards culture and archival research issues relevant to policy have been lost. For example, instead of trying to solve poverty or climate change, today we often content ourselves with merely analyzing discourses of poverty or climate change. Analysis of discourse can be part of an explicit engagement with policy-relevant concerns, but in too many cases scholars simply describe a phenomenon and then write in the conclusion that they have proven that culture matters. The result is that comparative historical sociology - the one area of the academy where a strong tradition has been established of wide-ranging investigations drawing on the powerful tool of deep historical comparison of multiple countries to shed light on the unfolding of causal processes - does not do a good job of teaching its practitioners how to explicitly engage issues of policy relevance.

This is a real loss, because comparative historical sociologists are experts in exactly the methods that could shed light on many intractable issues relevant to human welfare, such as why some countries have developed much better track records on environmental policy than others, or what it takes to build an infrastructure of public health capacity, or how to prevent genocide. But because there is no well-developed, self-conscious framework of policy-relevant comparative historical sociology today, graduate students who are interested in these methods are unable to find models of research that engage policy concerns, and graduate students who are interested in policy concerns shy away from these methods.

In 2015-2016 the comparative historical sociology section will hold a series of events that we are calling "Can Comparative Historical Sociology Save the World?"

The events begin at this year's ASA meetings, where we will have panels devoted to the issues of climate change, global poverty, Israel/Palestine, modern slavery, and genocide, as described further below.

This will be followed by four issues of the CHS newsletter that will explore different facets of the theme, including a debate on whether comparative historical sociology *should* try to save the world.

Finally, we wrap up the year with a mini-conference the day before the 2016 ASA meetings in Seattle, August 19, 2016.

By conducting a set of events that bring together those who are trying to use the methods of comparative historical sociology to address pressing public concerns, we hope to demonstrate to the sub-discipline and to each other - and most importantly, to graduate students - how to combine rigorous and creative scholarship with moral purpose. We believe the effort will reinvigorate comparative historical sociology, and in ten years we believe the effort will reinvigorate broader public discourse.

We invite all members of the CHS section to participate in this year's events, even if - especially if - they do not think this is a good direction for the sub-discipline. Please contact me (m-prasad@northwestern.edu) if you would like to take part in the general initiative or write for the newsletter on the theme, and please be on the lookout for the call for the mini-conference in a few months.

Israel / Palestine

Kevan Harris
University of California – Los Angeles

Is there anything exceptional about Israeli exceptionalism? Proponents and critics alike tend to posit the uniqueness of Israel's political and social trajectory in order to explain contemporary events. Yet perhaps we have not been comparing Israel with useful cases or examining its nationalist shibboleths with the right historical lens. This ASA panel's four papers use comparative and historical sociological methods to address crucial issues in contemporary Israel: the politics of historical memory, the occupation of Palestinian territories, the antinomies of Israeli nationalism, and the trajectory of party politics. We'll also have a discussion of the papers by Richard Lachmann, who is currently engaged in a comparative-historical research project on Israel.

Papers

"Neoliberal Apartheid in South Africa and Palestine/Israel"
Andy Clarno, University of Illinois – Chicago

"Fatal Attraction: Four Constructions of the Holocaust in Israeli Society"
Ian Steven Lustick, University of Pennsylvania

"Reversal of Fortune: The Trauma of the Displaced Founding Elites in Israel and Turkey"
Shai M. Dromi, Yale University
Gulay Turkmen-Dervisoglu,Yale University

Discussant

Richard Lachmann
State University of New York – Albany

Genocide

Eric W. Schoon
University of Arizona

What makes genocide possible? How are people mobilized to kill, and how does resistance succeed? In 1948, during the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations adopted Resolution 260 (III), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This resolution set in motion ongoing efforts to prevent and punish acts of genocide, and each new occurrence adds greater urgency.

To prevent genocide, it is necessary to understand its causes and dynamics, and as Monica Prasad noted in her introduction to our section's thematic focus this year, comparative and historical sociology has played a central role in advancing this area of study. With John Hagan serving as discussant, this panel brings together scholars studying multiple facets of genocide, ranging from the conditions that make genocide possible to the role of institutional structures and individual beliefs in shaping the perpetration of genocide. Using data on more than 150 countries from 1955 to 2005, Hollie Nyseth Brehm examines what makes genocide possible, offering important new insights and correctives to existing theories. Turning attention to the dynamics of resistance, Robert Braun's research uses newly collected historical data to examine the role of minority churches in aiding Dutch Jews during the Holocaust. Aliza Luft draws on social movements scholarship in her analysis of interviews with perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, arguing that the same processes used to explain social movement mobilization can explain how civilians are mobilized to kill their neighbors. Thomas Maher's research engages extensive archival data to examine how the highly bureaucratized Nazi concentration camps

descended into chaos as guard behavior decoupled from institutional structures.

Each of these panelists offer important new insights into issues relevant to the prevention of genocide, helping us answer the question: can comparative and historical sociology save the world?

Papers

"Rethinking Risk Factors of Modern Genocide"
Hollie Nyseth Brehm, Ohio State University

"Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide"
Robert Braun, Cornell University

"The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Genocide"
Aliza Luft, University of Wisconsin-Madison

"Competing Goals, Organizational Pressure, and Ideology"
Thomas V. Maher, Ohio State University

Discussant

John Hagan
Northwestern University

Climate Change

Diana Rodriguez-Franco
Northwestern University

Climate change is one of the biggest threats facing the world, disproportionately affecting the world's most vulnerable populations. Although this topic is drawing much attention in global and local policy agendas and newspaper headlines, there is a relative absence of studies within comparative historical sociology addressing the issue. As Monica Prasad noted in her introduction, if comparative historical sociology is to remain a stimulating and vibrant field of study, it should urgently engage with arguably the most pressing policy issue of our time, and certainly of future generations. Under the direction of Riley Dunlap, one of the discipline's leading scholars on climate change, this panel takes up this challenge by bringing together scholars that employ comparative historical methods to try to understand a wide array of topics, ranging from the plethora of problems in the global international climate change framework to various ways that countries are successfully grappling with climate change.

In his examination of global climate change politics, David Ciplet calls our attention to the UN's emissions reduction framework which allows temperature to rise above what scientists predict will trigger catastrophic environmental events worldwide. He asks: how did we ever arrive to this inequitable and scientifically inadequate climate regime and what is stopping us from changing course? Jeffrey Broadbent draws on data from the international project Comparing Climate Change Policy Networks to explain why Japan, India, Canada/US and Germany/Sweden are responding so differently to the climate change threat. While some countries have started working to reduce their use of carbon fuels and increase their sinks, others have done nothing, or even denied the existence of the threat. Simone Pulver extends our understanding of possible pathways to reduce carbon emissions by comparing the evolution of carbon markets in Brazil and India. In her study on these two pioneers in establishing carbon market activity and expertise, Pulver uncovers how the intersection of institutional structures and market agents has shaped different paths. LaDawn Haglund investigates the water-stressed urban areas of Sao Paulo, New Delhi

and Johannesburg and explores whether and how legal and non-legal mechanisms can influence environmental public policy and hence transform the socio-environmental reality faced by marginalized populations. Lastly, against ahistorical understandings of climate problems, Hannah Holleman takes us back to the Dust Bowl period to see what the "first global environmental problem" has to teach us about the current climate change threat.

Besides contributing to thinking sociologically and theoretically about climate change, together these panelists aim to offer policy recommendations in hopes of using comparative historical sociology to contribute to the important task of saving the world from climate change.

Papers

"Polar Cases in the Global Climate Change Debate: Japan, India, Canada/US and Germany/Sweden"
Jeffrey Broadbent, University of Minnesota

"Beyond the North-South Divide? Global Climate Politics in the New World Order"
David M. Ciplet, Brown University
J. Timmons Roberts, Brown University
Mizan Khan, North South University

"Carbon Market Evolution in Brazil and India"
Simone Pulver, UC – Santa Barbara

"Socioecological Costs of Adaptation and the Limitations of Reflexivity: Lessons from the Global Dust Bowl"
Hannah A. Holleman, Amherst College

"What does Comparative Historical Sociology Offer for Understanding Human Rights and Global Environmental Change?"
LaDawn Haglund, Arizona State University

Discussant

Riley E. Dunlap
Oklahoma State University

Global Poverty

Samuel Cohn
Texas A&M University

This panel addresses the lessons of history for the study of underdevelopment and global poverty. The saying "Those Who Forget the Lessons of History Are Doomed to Relive Them" by Santayana is particularly germane to the study of development. What are the lessons discussed in this panel?

Matthew Lange will discuss the devastating effects of ethnic violence in throttling economic and social development at the root. Sri Lanka - which was once a model of humanistic development - destroyed both its economic prospects and its potential for humanistic egalitarian growth in the savage civil war between the Buddhists and the Tamils. Jason Moore will discuss the ecological contradictions that undercut sustained projects of growth. The seventeenth century Dutch empire - and the World System associated with it - was a necessary reaction to the ecological limits of European growth, and was equally constrained by the contradictions associated with trans-hemispheric spatial fixes. Ho-Fung Hung and Zhicao Fang consider the limits to state-led development in the Qin dynasty. They argue that the Qin regime was not exempt from the intrinsic limits to power and expansion that afflict all imperial centers, including contemporary America and possibly even a China in the future. Lastly, Michelle Hsieh considers the class limits on the state and development in post colonial Taiwan. Those people who think that all one needs for

state-centered development is an autonomous state and land reform will find Hsieh's historical lessons particularly dismaying.

The most important historical analyses are those that provide warnings from the past. This holds especially true in our own gloomy time of widespread uncertainty about the future.

Papers

"Human Development and Ethnic Violence: A Critical Look at Sri Lanka"
Matthew Lange. McGill University

A paper on ecological limits by
Jason Moore, Binghamton University, SUNY

"Historicizing Embedded Autonomy: Rise and Fall of a Local Developmental State in Dongguan, China"
Zhicao Fang, Johns Hopkins University
Ho-Fung Hung, Johns Hopkins University

"Hollowing Out or Sustaining: Past and Present of Taiwan's SME Network Based Production System"
Michelle Fei-yu Hsieh, Academia Sinica

Discussant

Samuel Cohn
Texas A&M University

Modern Slavery

Mary E. Vogel
University of Manchester

It has been said that "Justice" is to accord to each person her or his due. In the modern west, as a matter of both human rights and of law, this includes liberty, autonomy, bodily integrity and right to a family life, among other things. Perhaps no institution so fully contravenes these legal protections of personhood than slavery. For many years, the West seemed to conclude that slavery was a thing of the past.

Yet we now know that today hundreds of thousands of persons around the world live and work under coercive control that they have no power to terminate. Some scholars have estimated that as many as 27 million people are currently trafficked worldwide. Perhaps most disturbing, this global exploitation is said to be operated for profit primarily by organized crime networks. This panel brings to bear the tools of comparative and/or historical research to explore the nature, extent and patterns of contemporary "slavery."

What elements must be present in order for us to term unfreedom slavery? Shall we understand control to suffice or must a relation of property be present? Is this a useful way to think about this vast humanitarian crisis and can overuse of the term undermine our very efforts to bring "justice"? Can we, and need we, distinguish those who initially enter voluntarily into trafficked work from those who are involuntarily taken? Is indentured work, with a promise of pay that may or may not be forthcoming, different from slavery? What is the role of the state and its complicity in such dealings? Finally, we ask how to imagine the modern slave as "subject" of power and how to turn observation into active witness and resistance.

While some are disbelieving, evidence mounts of extensive coercive arrangements. Recently, journalists documented several hundred Thai and Burmese workers interned seven years on an island off Indonesia. In Italy the Catholic relief organization Caritas reclaims scores of 'trafficked' African women from forced sex

work in Italy each year. British prosecutors have uncovered a vast online child pornography ring showing images of sexual violence toward "unfree" children that has yielded thousands of prospective prosecutions. On American farms, migrant workers, legal and illegal, are tied to horrific working conditions by threat of visa revocation or deportation as illegals, both typically unpaid. In Europe the alarm has been sounded insistently enough that legislation to abate "modern slavery" and related "human trafficking" of women, men and children is being developed.

On this panel, Jean Allain carries forward work on the nature of slavery. Karen Bravo interrogates the role of the state in this global pattern of exploitation. Monti Datta explores the current state and extent of modern slavery with an eye toward its past and what we can learn from the past to inform the present, tying knowledge on contemporary slavery with insights from the historic slave trade in the American South. Laura Brace compares and contrasts the 18th century antislavery project to the challenge of bearing witness to, and challenging, slavery today. Polk, Gran and Shura probe the reasons for governments' failures and successes in pursuing anti-trafficking efforts.

Join us for an exploratory discussion of this heart-wrenching and vitally important travesty of "justice" in our day.

Papers

"Interrogating the State's Roles in Today's Slaveries"
Karen E. Bravo, Indiana University

"Modern Day Slavery - Lessons from the Past"
Monti Datta, University of Richmond

"Rights, Corruption, and Human Trafficking: A Fuzzy Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis"
Brian Kelly Polk, Case Western Reserve University
Brian Gran, Case Western Reserve University
Robin Shura, Hiram College

"Witnessing Modern Slavery"
Laura Brace, University of Leicester

Book Symposium

Fallout: nuclear diplomacy in an age of global fracture

University of Chicago Press

Grégoire Mallard

Editor's Note: The following text is based on an author-meets-critics session that took place at the Social Science History Association Annual Meeting in November, 2014. My thanks to Julia Adams, Ron Levi, Nitsan Chorev, Antoine Vauchez and Gregoire Mallard for agreeing to prepare their comments for the newsletter.

Ulysses and the Nuclear Diplomats

Julia Adams
Yale University

Gregoire Mallard's *Fallout: Nuclear Diplomacy in an Age of Global Fracture* is a strikingly original book, one that opens important intellectual terrain for historical and global/transnational sociology. Its subject is the genesis and development of the regulated field of global nuclear non-proliferation. I read the book for the first time last autumn, but its revealing arguments have been echoing in my ears throughout the recent multilateral negotiations between Iran and the United States.

The 1968 signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the subsequent adherence of some but not all signatory states are major subjects of the book. Technical as it is at times, the book is also a literary pleasure, suggesting a substitution of Homeric metaphors as a starting point for a fresh sociological analysis of these crucial outcomes. For the tale of Ulysses and the sirens is still the dominant metaphor through which academics, at least, grasp how high-stakes treaties are forged. Readers will remember the classical story. As Ulysses charts his course off Circe's island, she warns him that the Sirens' song is so irresistible to sailors that it will lure him and his crew to their deaths. Ulysses has his crew block their ears but leave his open. He orders his men to tie him to the ship's mast, and to ignore whatever he says while he is under the sirens' spell.

The 'Ulysses strategy' includes both his pre-commitment (binding himself to a course of action against future desires that would lead to his own and collective perdition) and the decision to block out any further information, persuasion or drift that might detach them all from the chosen course of action. The canny actor, therefore, renounces sovereignty over self in aid of future more perfect sovereignty … and of staying alive. Note that the strategy also includes coercion (the bonds), applied in part to self, to back up the agreement. So first there is the lead up to the signing of the treaty. Once the deal is made, and the regime is put in place, the terms must be such as to hold all signatories to their word. The fateful agreement among disputants, issuing in a Leviathan who/which can hold everyone accountable to that agreement, is the two-step Hobbesian version of Homer's tale. This at

least is my reading of the typical metaphor, channeled through the lens of social science history.

But when applied to states signing and adherence to the NPT, Gregoire Mallard sees this powerful metaphor as an overly limiting one (p. 39), part and parcel of typical but inadequate conceptions of international law. The metaphor and attendant analysis assume that states (or their representatives) make calculations outside a preexisting legal context, as if people, like Ulysses, actually had their hands free before signing the treaty. He prefers Penelope to Ulysses as a model. New treaties are "new knots" that "Penelope adds to her canvas in order to keep her pretendants at bay until Ulysses' return … or, as far as today's international law professionals are concerned, to buy time in order to prevent challengers from subverting the rights and privileges that their state secured in past treaties." (40)

Fallout's *most exciting innovation is the emphasis on ambiguity and opacity as a key strategy that actors adopt in international affairs.*

In this vision of things, successive treaty regimes take center stage. Change takes place as state actors – overlapping groups of representatives of nation-states jockeying for position at the bargaining table – appear and recede. So, for example, Mallard examines how Israel, India and Pakistan are part of separate regimes that preceded the NPT moment. They simply could not be "easily convinced to tie their hands to the central mast of the NPT regime through persuasion and coercion." (40) The question becomes not why there is legal order instead of anarchy, but how legal change occurs among successive treaty regimes. What matters is "who ties the new knots and how the new knots find their place in a general pattern" (ibid.). This is a refreshing approach to legal regimes. What these existing, overlapping regimes are – how they came to be – and how they might be harmonized in service of something as important as our collective survival are therefore the key intellectual and policy questions that come to the fore.

Fallout's most exciting innovation is the emphasis on ambiguity and opacity as a key strategy that actors adopt in international affairs. Players, who are professionals acting on behalf of nation states, intervene legally in context-dependent ways. Insiders, who share a clear but private understanding of the treaty, have a different stance than the outsiders who also believe that they command the legal terrain. This asymmetry between public and private meanings makes it possible for certain professionals to strategize autonomously, because they are able to maintain two simultaneous truths. Thus a treaty may be secretly aimed at accomplishing some outcome that it publicly disavows. Some understand, make use of, and strategize to maintain that particular vagueness and therefore room to maneuver. No wonder Penelope is a touchstone here.

A critical historical example is detailed in Mallard's chapter on Israel, India, Pakistan – and the ways that the U.S. and Western European governments deliberately worked to keep the nuclear status of these three countries opaque. They were able to do so until recently. Regarding Israel, what may have begun as an emergency measure became a half-century history of non-transparency, only now eroded. As for India, the U.S. and Europe tried to maintain opacity in order to (vainly) reconcile India's nuclear behavior with the rules of the global nuclear game. The West's tactic of opacity vis-à-vis Pakistan's nuclear nonproliferation regime has been even less

successful, however: it undermined the whole nuclear proliferation treaty. In the face of this threat to the entire system, the challenge to 'harmonize' has become increasingly pressing.

This is sharply emphasized at the present historical moment, to extend Mallard's account, as the United States and Iran attempt to establish that as two equals, that they can forge a private understanding that, eventually, yes, Iran will become a nuclear power… but not just yet. The outward opacity in this set of communications seeks to insure not only that dissident internal decision-makers are neutralized, but that Israel in particular is incorporated in the public but not the private understanding. What makes things yet more complicated is that the prospect of the ultimate terms, and their manipulation, influences the negotiators who are making the initial deal, and attempting to formulate terms to which people can finally adhere.

I have three brief comments and questions – on sovereignty and agency; method, and the profession of diplomacy – and advance them in reverse order.

First, the profession of diplomacy is changing. It is qualitatively harder to maintain secrecy or opacity than it used to be. In part this is due to the erosion of old boys' diplomatic clubs, though the rise of technology (including social media) has also played a part. Diplomats in Europe, more than in the United States, for example, tweet with relative freedom and enjoy a lot of latitude in what they can discuss, and their latitude is complemented by the rise of actors invested in dramatic political exposures (Wikileaks, Snowden, etc.). These trends undermine professionals' capacity to maintain two truths simultaneously to achieve their vision of balance in service (they think) of national/international interests. What are the implications for the practice of diplomacy and more particularly for nuclear proliferation going forward? Diplomats themselves comment on these very tensions; they would seem to be significantly disruptive of the current modus operandi.

With respect to method, the trade-off here is between an emphasis on connections and comparison. Perhaps this is an indelible tension in historical sociology and social science history. In *Fallout*, we see it in the emphasis on type concepts and comparison in the more theoretical parts of the text, and the more connected narrative of the empirical story. Because of this, I think that the book may be interpreted in quite different ways depending on the readers' methodological predilections. Some will see it as a sensitizing narrative that emphasizes the role of actors' strategic use of polysemy and public/private spaces in service of constructed tactical goals. Others will construe it as introducing a new variable in service of better explanation of why states do or don't sign onto nuclear proliferation treaties/why shared nuclear regimes survive or don't. Either interpretation seems sustainable to me on the basis of the text, but I wonder what Mallard himself thinks.

Finally, a concluding word concerning agency in the present moment of sovereign power and imperial crisis. We are living in the midst of an era of greatly accentuated international tensions, and the rise of inter-imperial and inter-state rivalries, typical of a period in which there is no hegemonic equilibrium. Executive power is concentrated and the role of the sovereign, of sovereign powers plural, simultaneously heightened and undermined, as George Steinmetz and I (2015) have recently argued in an article in *Political Power and Social Theory*. Agency or action "on behalf of…" will always have a foundational place in the projection of sovereign power, but in a context of troubled sovereignty, enormous diplomatic challenges come to the fore. What is the place

of international treaties – and the particular nuclear non- proliferation regime - in this increasingly unstable and decentered reality, in the "age of global fracture"? What is the role for diplomacy, for diplomats themselves?

We know that *Fallout* does not conceptualize states as fictive individuals, caught in a bad equilibrium of a war of all against all, that then collectively decide, in service of their concatenated self-interest, to surrender their swords to a Leviathan exemplified in an international treaty that will enforce upon them peace such that all might thrive. Yet a signal virtue of even the most rationalistic interpretation of the Ulysses metaphor, as in the Hobbesian state, is that they capture the distributed nature of agency – Ulysses is equipped by Circe to survive the sirens; Ulysses needs his sailors to bind him; Penelope maintains Ulysses' realm on his and her son's behalf while he is en route, etc. – and the ever-present opening to agency problems that such a distribution necessarily involves. The problems of agents-become-principals; of multiple principals, etc., are a key part of the narrative in *Fallout*, but I don't believe that they are adequately captured in the theory. Yet they loom larger than ever in today's diplomatic enterprises and nuclear negotiations.

So there is a lot to learn from, and a lot to argue with, in *Fallout: Nuclear Diplomacy in an Age of Global Fracture*. Gregoire Mallard has written a wonderful, stimulating work, and I trust that historical social scientists and social science historians will be grappling with it productively for years to come.

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Review of *Fallout*

Ron Levi
University of Toronto

On April 2, 2015, *Bloomberg Business* reported on the Iran nuclear negotiations with the headline Iran Negotiators Discuss Secret Annex as Talks Near Agreement (Viscusi, Tirone, & Lakshmanan, 2015). As the article went on to indicate, this would allow diplomats to decouple international and domestic politics, all within the context of legally circumscribed negotiations. "Such a document," diplomats indicated, "would help U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to persuade Congressional skeptics that tangible progress had been made, while Iranian leaders would also have something to show to domestic hardliners."

It is precisely this sort of intrigue, tension, and points of complicity between diplomacy and law, and between the domestic and the international, that are at the heart of Grégoire Mallard's book *Fallout: Nuclear Diplomacy in an Age of Global Fracture*. In it, Mallard provides us with an empirically sophisticated and theoretically nuanced account of law, diplomacy, and international coordination — and along the way, an account of individual norm entrepreneurs, of national politics, and of the power of legal texts (perhaps! I return to this below) — all on the terrain of one of the most trenchant issues of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, namely the world of nuclear diplomacy. Indeed, while foregrounding an exciting set of battles over legal treaties and diplomatic pressures, Grégoire Mallard's book also offers a broad conceptual model for understanding how diplomatic pressures and international legal agreements take different forms, and how these affect the stability, effectiveness, and transparency of international "law" itself.

As a sociology of diplomacy and law, Mallard's choice of case study is ingenious. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is not only one of the most important treaties for global security (and with continued relevance in current events); Mallard also demonstrates that the decades of negotiation that led to the Treaty, and the years following its signing, were among the most exciting and politically embroiled of the twentieth century. The reader is thus kept in rapt attention as we follow the negotiations through changes in US administrations and elite politics over time, through the role of powerful institutions such as the Ford Foundation, Harvard University, or RAND, through the Eurofederalists in France and beyond, and all the while analyzing the social skill, embeddedness, and position-takings of powerful players such as Jean Monnet and Henry Stimson.

Beyond this, Mallard's choice of method allows him to break new methodological and conceptual ground in the sociology of international law. He is able to combine attention and faithfulness to legal texts (in this case, the writing of international treaties) with attention to the social position of those who negotiate and write them. In so doing, he avoids being ensnared in textism while also evading the parallel trap of ignoring the power of legal form. But the book does more than bridge these traditions. Instead, Mallard relies on nuclear nonproliferation treaties to produce a taxonomy of legal texts as being "transparent," "ambiguous," or purposefully "opaque." In Mallard's typology, however, these are not merely adjectives that speak to the clarity of legal language; these instead represent types of treaties that, depending on the social positions and strategic needs of diplomats, allow them to overcome trust problems, to encourage or forestall the likelihood of a successful agreement, to control the likely timing of an agreement (and postpone the reconciliation of disagreements), and which provide varying opportunities to impose sanctions on wrongdoers.

Mallard draws on this taxonomy to understand, for example, why transparent treaties may emphasize fairness, but may run against the interests of domestic states to commit themselves to sign; why ambiguous treaties are more tempting for states to sign, but their meaning can easily slip and be overtaken with time and by attacks from newcomers who may choose to reinterpret in a new light; and why opaque treaties, in which the true interpretation of the treaty is kept a secret, may be the least stable forms of agreements when domestic politics change.

Mallard's choice of method allows him to break new methodological and conceptual ground in the sociology of international law. He is able to combine attention and faithfulness to legal texts (in this case, the writing of international treaties) with attention to the social position of those who negotiate and write them. In so doing, he avoids being ensnared in textism while also evading the parallel trap of ignoring the power of legal form.

In the process, Mallard provides sharp insights not only into the form of these treaties, but maps out who invested in these treaties and legal approaches. American Nationalists of the 1940s, for example, pushed for transparency and public diplomacy in order to, ironically, prevent a deal with the Soviets. Because public transparency makes it difficult to overcome trust problems between states, Southern elites were able to draw in the network of US

Congress to deflect the capacity of US-based cosmopolitan scientists, along with Harvard-trained lawyers and liberal internationalists (such as Henry Stimson, who many may recognize from the creation of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg), to negotiate with the Soviets or create worldwide cooperation. With a turn in the US toward a quantitative and model-based expertise built at RAND to justify a nationalist policy of centralized control (with a correlative increase in influence of the Department of Government at Harvard), the Eurofederalists of the 1950s, such as Jean Monnet, invested ever more in opacity for nuclear agreements, so that the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) could publicly fit the needs of US senators while leaving the determination of peaceful versus military activities to be decided secretly. Importantly, Mallard here trenchantly understands the state—within the US or across Europe—as an inherently competitive space, and the international field as one that reflects and provides fodder for these domestic palace wars (Dezalay & Garth, 2002).

Some may note that these features are limited to international treaties, and ask whether this taxonomy is transportable to other areas of law, such as domestic contracts. Yet the insight of Mallard's taxonomy, in my view, is not in its replicability across legal fields. Instead, Mallard here provides us with evidence that the very form of a legal agreement varies based on the positions and position-takings of the agents signing it, rather than a constraint on their behavior. Each of these formats then carry their own effects. In so doing, Mallard provides an analysis of the strength of international law that combines a Bourdieusian understanding of the social positions of agents and the field in which they operate, a Latourian sensibility of how texts such as treaties are part of weaving together an international sphere, and a hermeneutic attention to the degree of openness of legal interpretation in international politics, including in the often neglected work of homonyms in allowing treaties to be part of diplomatic and legal double games.

What, then, is the relationship in *Fallout* between law and diplomacy?

First, for Mallard, these tools point to recursive cycles of legal change in this field over time, though I would argue that many of these events, such as the Suez crisis of 1956, were so trenchant as to lead to new classificatory understandings and struggles that would have broken the stakes and presumptions of earlier diplomatic moves. Understanding the role of events—in the way that Bill Sewell (1996) encourages in his understanding of the taking of the Bastille, namely as ruptures of practices that dislocate and transform existing cycles—would undercut this view of the power of international law, and engage a less complacent interpretation of its use. The Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal did, to be sure, change the course of the French position vis-à-vis a nuclear association with West Germany; but it also requires an understanding of change that extends beyond legal recursivity, to grapple with moral sentiment and national identities in the post-World War II era. This was a highly emotional period, and the tone among leaders–and if it included a changing perception of the Egyptians, it also heightened anxieties over identity and social position for the French themselves (and for the British (Brown, 2001)). The same is true for the launching of Sputnik a year later. To embed these accounts in a model of interpretive legal recursivity tends to downplay the sheer disorienting quality of these highly emotive events of rupture with past categories, and the attempt by diplomats to catch up to them–whatever the legal form may be.

Second, and relatedly, while highlighting the ways in which legal techniques are used by diplomats, Mallard tends to recess the professional differentiation between these two fields that peeks through his narrative of nuclear diplomacy. Through this lens, pace Mallard, law does not enjoy the pride of place that *Fallout* identifies. The field of nuclear nonproliferation is instead suffused with the strategies and position-takings of diplomats. International law and lawyers are integrated where needed to this game, largely through a Machiavellian use of law and language to allow for treaties to be concluded. Perhaps the ambiguity and opacity of diplomatic technique is doing another layer of work here; legal agreements appear to be central to understanding international political agreements, but only if we in turn appreciate that these legal agreements fall onto the terrain and into the purview of diplomats and their moves.

In Bourdieu's recent book *Sur l'État* (2012) there is a reinforcement of the role of language in understanding legal authority that one finds in Mallard's book. Jurists, in this vision, enjoy a capital of words and concepts. Yet building from a Kabyle saying that "every rule has its door," Bourdieu posits that jurists' authority comes from their capacity to state, within the language of the rule, its very transgression. In the context of nuclear nonproliferation, perhaps Mallard's empirical account demonstrates that the holders of this capital may not be lawyers but diplomats–and that they hold the key to unlocking the door for each rule, and that they in turn also know where they have hidden those very keys. Either way, this Maussian-like analysis lies at the core of Mallard's tour de force, a mesmerizing book that is chockablock with intrigue and world politics, while laying out the interrelationships and irreducibilities of law and diplomacy as the most significant claims to authority in global affairs.

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Comments on *Fallout*

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Fallout's historical investigation into nuclear diplomacy offers the kind of carefully crafted empirical examination that gives historical sociologists a good name among both sociologists and historians. Similarly, the book's theoretical framing is a fruitful combination of sociology of law and global sociology, mixed with the politics of Bourdieu and the hermeneutics of legal scholarship, leading to insightful arguments. It follows the steps of the by now classical works in the socio-legal tradition of Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth (1996) on the one hand and the work of Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers (2009) on global lawmaking on the other.

Fallout offers a novel interpretation of nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy after the Second World War, that concentrates on the US and Europe, but includes brief examinations of the cases of Israel, India and Pakistan. Based on that history, the book makes three arguments regarding international negotiations more

generally.

First, all international negotiations fall into one of three types: those that are transparent, those that are ambiguous, and those that are opaque. The first two kinds of agreements have already been identified and analyzed in the literature, but the third kind – that of opacity – was not. The notion of opacity in international diplomacy is one (although not only) of the main analytical contributions of the book.

Second, *Fallout* identifies the conditions under which each type of agreement – transparency, ambiguity or opacity – is the likely outcome of negotiations. Based on the three main negotiations examined in the book, Mallard suggests that transparency is used to kill the possibility of reaching an agreement; ambiguity is used to avoid exactly those difficulties that stem out of the expectation for transparency; and opacity, too, is used to bypass the challenge of transparency, by seeming transparent while having secret agreements that contradict and undermine those public agreements.

Finally, *Fallout* analyzes the consequences of transparency, ambiguity and opacity. Surprisingly, all three failed to achieve successful agreements. In the first case, calls for transparency made it impossible to reach an agreement; in the second case, ambiguity led to some significant drawbacks in the way the treaty was interpreted; and opacity allowed a new generation of diplomats in the US to more or less ignore the private agreements that had been originally achieved. Opacity has also played an important role in the ability of Israel, India and Pakistan to not play by the rules.

What do we gain from this categorization of international agreements? When Robert Merton, back in 1949, called for middle-range theories to replace general theories of social systems, he was quite adamant about their need to be useful. He distinguished between those concepts or empirical insights that are just descriptive and those that are not. And we know that a concept or an empirical insight is not just descriptive but useful, he wrote, when it brings to the fore questions we could not have asked otherwise. The distinction between transparency, ambiguity and opacity – and, more broadly, the analysis of how international agreements are written, not only who writes them – does that. That is, it brings to the fore questions we could not have asked otherwise.

Let me suggest a few examples for the kind of questions and analytical insights that emerge once we employ Mallard's terms for thinking about international negotiations.

- One could argue that how agreements are written could be easily reduced to who wrote them. Mallard does not address this question explicitly and his analysis, which assumes actors who are strategic and rational, might not allow him to make such a distinction (more on that below). Nevertheless, if how agreements are written should be analyzed independently of who wrote them – then it brings an entirely new way of thinking about international agreements and their consequences. Most generally, as Mallard mentions but doesn't emphasize, it invites us to investigate internal features (e.g., content of law) rather than external factors (e.g., who negotiates), or at least an interplay between the two. For a field that is exceptionally sensitive to power, this is indeed quite a revolutionary and fruitful way of thinking about international negotiations.

- Even when considering external factors, once we think about how agreements are written, our concept of power is likely to change, particularly compared to neo-realists' view. Taking seriously the formulation of agreements may provide, for example, a more nuanced understanding of groups' relative influence, including not only the influence of state actors

(who are the ones mostly emphasized in *Fallout*) but also of non-state actors. We can consider, for example, the role of international organizations (IOs), and how IO officials can be influential through their work on drafting and redrafting agreements. NGOs' influence could be understood in a similar way. To make clear, it's not always easy to distinguish this from other forms of influence. Often, the ability to formulate proposals could be reduced to other forms of capital – for example, the richer an NGO is the better its lawyers are likely to be. Nevertheless, the focus on content does provide new insights into what's going on behind the scenes and allows for new questions and inquiries.

- The emphasis on how agreements are written also opens new ways of thinking about the relations between international formulations and domestic implementation. Sociologists often think about this question in terms of "decoupling," which allows for differentiation only along one dimension (Meyer et al. 1997). Halliday and Carruthers (2009), in turn, describe recursive cycles, in which international formulations are altered in the process of implementation at the domestic level and then travel back to the transnational level and causes changes at that level as well. The concepts of transparency, ambiguity and opacity could help us address questions regarding the conditions under which some forms of recursive cycles happen. In identifying those conditions we could rely, as Mallard suggests, on the internal logic of agreements rather than external conditions.

Fallout is not only useful, but also insightful, while still, inevitably, leaving some important questions open. Maybe more centrally, is the question of the mechanisms of power. *Fallout* is surprisingly ambiguous in addressing the relations between how agreements are written and who wrote them. On the one hand, this book could in fact be interpreted as confirming the neo-realist approach (using Bourdieu's theory of fields to analyze domestic processes undermines neo-realists' vision of a unified national position – but not their assumption that powerful states would prevail in negotiations); on the other hand, it provides numerous instances that show the independent role of content. The stakes are high – if the degree of transparency, ambiguity and/or opacity is a mere reflection of power dynamics between the negotiating states then it becomes merely a mechanism (it allows us to explain how, for example, those with power were able to kill an international agreement desired by others) rather than an independent factor (that allows us to explain why an international agreement failed to materialize).

Fallout *is not only useful, but also insightful, while still, inevitably, leaving some important questions open. Maybe more centrally, is the question of the mechanisms of power. Fallout is surprisingly ambiguous in addressing the relations between how agreements are written and who wrote them.*

At the same time, it is important to note that one of the novelties of Mallard's analysis is his interest in the doings of specific individuals (diplomats, but also others) more than in the neorealist unit of analysis of (unified) states. Indeed, it offers a useful follow-up for Robert Putnam's notion of the two-level game (Putnam 1988), with a twist. Putnam's two-level game offered an alternative to the tendency of political scientists, especially at the time, to reduce every outcome either to international negotiations or to domestic politics. Instead, Putnam suggested a model of

two-leveled negotiations, where at the domestic level, diplomats have to respond to domestic demands; at the international level, they have to respond to the demands of other countries. Interestingly, Putnam works under the assumption that all agreements are transparent. One of the contributions of *Fallout* is to suggest instead that diplomats – that is, those who are torn between the need to reach an international agreement and to address domestic concerns – can manipulate their audiences.

Thinking about *Fallout* as an example of a two-level game reminds us that the analysis here – like most other sociological analyses – assumes actors who are strategic, rational players, and assumes outcomes (here, whether the agreement ends up being transparent, ambiguous or opaque) that are the result of these strategic, rational choices. But this assumption is not entirely compatible, in fact, with the literature on hermeneutics in law that *Fallout* also relies on. For Mallard, as for Putnam, the diplomats are strategic actors who are able to control quite effectively the level of ambiguity in the texts they formulate. This is certainly true in some cases. It is easy to find examples in which legal terms are introduced into international agreements with the tacit understanding that either no one knows what they actually mean or that different parties of the agreement hold a very different view of what they mean. But isn't ambiguity always the result, even when not intended? This is, after all, a central insight of hermeneutics in law; it is one of the core elements in critical legal studies. The scholarship interested in interpretation of law is particularly sensitive to the inherent inability of law to be clear. As Mallard mentions in the book, according to that literature there isn't supposed to be a law that is clear. This highlights a potentially irreconcilable tension in the book. After all, why would intended ambiguity be more consequential than unintended one?

Finally, there is the issue of generalizability. The categorization of transparency, ambiguity and opacity should be extremely useful for the analyses of transnational policies more broadly. Indeed, this is an important contribution to the literature that normally assumes that the law is transparent and rarely pays attention to intentional ambiguities or the function of contradictions in and across agreements. (As a side note, however, transparency according to *Fallout* is used to undermine the success of an international agreement, but one could consider cases in which transparency is demanded as a constructive rather than obstructive exercise). But what about the generalizability of the outcomes? *Fallout* gives little room for optimism regarding the success of international agreements. Readers of the book are likely to conclude that any international agreement that is somewhat conflictual is doomed to fail, independently of how they are written. In the cases analyzed in *Fallout*, transparency failed, ambiguity failed, and while opacity led to an agreement, this is hardly a preferred way for reaching agreements (constituents were lied to, after all, and parties found it easy to later manipulate the agreement). Should we expect similar results in other cases as well? Can we use this to predict, for example, the outcome of the current international environmental negotiations that, like the negotiations over nuclear non-proliferation, attempt to prevent an inevitable catastrophe? Is the fate of these agreements determined by the level of transparency, ambiguity or opacity? Should we hope for opacity since *Fallout* concludes that this is the most successful strategy for concluding agreement? Should we expect – independently of how it's written – the outcome to be disappointing? Evidence to the success of the book is the fact that it makes us believe that the answer could be yes to all these questions.

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Comments on *Fallout*

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Grégoire Mallard's book reads like a personal (and fruitful) journey across academic fields. It's not hard to find track of the variety of national and disciplinary encounters that have accompanied his eclectic intellectual trajectory from Paris to Harvard, and from Chicago to Geneva or Florence. While *Fallout* draws from a variety of influences in the fields of international relations (IR), historical sociology or socio-legal studies, it never fully embraces anyone of them. In that, he is part of a broader intellectual undertaking that brings a variety of French authors - Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault and Bruno Latour - in closer contact with the field of European Union (EU) studies and IR. Interestingly, all these attempts converge in paying a renewed attention to social and professional practices, a focus that has been a dead angle of the fields' controversies for quite a long time (Pouliot Forthcoming; Adler-Nissen 2014; Mudge and Vauchez 2012; Bigo and Madsen 2011). Yet Mallard's contribution goes beyond IR theory: it is also an important contribution to the historical sociology of EU polity as much as to socio-legal studies. The book does not only bring a renewed understanding of "nuclear diplomacy in the post-WWII period"; it also suggests an interesting research agenda for the study of diplomatic practices. In particular, he provides a very original and quite sophisticated toolbox for analyzing what would seem to be, at first sight, a very classic and age-old theme of study, that of diplomacy, secrecy and treaty-making strategies.

As I am no specialist of nuclear policies, I will essentially point here at the innovative conceptual frame that Mallard has built to grasp the complex set of diplomatic, military and political practices in the domain of treaty-making. Drawing from interpretative sociology, *Fallout* suggests that treaty-making is best understood as a continuum of interpretative tactics and strategies that goes beyond the oft taken-for-granted disjuncture ("coupure") between treaty-negotiation and treaty-implementation. The grand bargain of diplomacy does not just end up with the signing of nuclear treaties but it actually continues through competing hermeneutic strategies and tactics over the authentic meaning of the treaty and the degree to which this meaning should be public or not. Thereby, Mallard sheds a light on a completely new layer of analysis, one that has remained mostly in the shadow, so far, of the competing diplomatic attempts to preempt and secure control over what could be coined as an " hermeneutic space" of the treaties (established customs, shared understanding, ambiguities, and holes, etc) (Heinich and Brown 1996). To grasp the many possible interpretative arrangements in a systematic manner, Mallard suggests a two-by-two table (from publicity and, later, transparency, to secrecy on the one hand, and from clarity to ambiguity on the other hand), thereby sketching out four

possible ideal-types with which to study international treaties.

With this innovative compass, the book reads like an exploration of the practical conditions of modern diplomacy. It may well be the case that we have finally our modern addition to *The Prince* ! , one that is a sociologically - and historically - informed reflection on the relative costs and advantages of opacity, transparency and ambiguity in diplomatic practices. What can be gained from maintaining secret interpretations? What is the risk of transparency? What does it mean and imply to "clarify" the meaning of a treaty? The book explores all these questions and provides a renewed understanding of diplomats' repertoire of possible tactics and counter-moves when it comes to securing interpretation and maintaining secrecy, both domestically and internationally (creating a parliamentary committee, consulting with the national supreme court, writing a protocole, etc.). As the book brings to the forefront diplomats' skills and their pratical knowledge of the international game, it clearly is a must-read for all good diplomatic schools!

...nuclear treaties involve a rather simplified diplomatic game with very few relevant players - a handful of scientists, some military experts and a lot of diplomats. This is probably the reason why* Fallout *somehow underestimates legal interpretation and its relatively autonomous dynamics when it comes to making sense of international treaties.

Yet, for all its worth, the book still raises a number of questions. The first one relates to the historicity of this conceptual framework built around notions such as secrecy/publicity and opacity/clarity. These concepts actually have a rich history of their own at the international level that goes back in the past, before the Cold War period. To fully grasp their changing normative underpinnings, it would be interesting to track how they were articulated into a new repertoire of diplomacy in the post-WWI period. In that respect, the League of Nations and the rise of multilateralism was a key moment. A new regime of publicity was shaped at the time, one that would tie together *public* negotiations, systematic *registration* of all international treaties before the League of Nations, their exhaustive *publication* in Official Treaty Series, their official "coming into force" and their actual *legal value*. Importantly, this new arrangement gave law and the international lawyer a new role as public *garant* of this new multilateral order against the return of secret diplomatic practices –and its alleged consequences (conflicts, wars). While this certainly did not prevent secret agreements to re-emerge,[1] the system of values was however being profoundly transformed, prompting continuing debates and controversies over the scope and legitimacy of secrecy.

My second remark questions the extent to which this framework can travel beyond the particular case of nuclear policy and may be generalized to other diplomatic fields. Nuclear policy is certainly a great case-study for Mallard's purposes as it stands at the crossing between scientific research, diplomatic strategies and military power, all three sectors sharing traditions of secrecy. Yet, for these very reasons, this is a highly specific field. As the atom gets to the core of sovereignty and provides the ultimate tool of world hegemony in the context of the Cold War, it has become a matter of "high politics," big stakes and grand strategies. As a result, nuclear treaties involve a rather simplified diplomatic game with very

few relevant players - a handful of scientists, some military experts and a lot of diplomats. This is probably the reason why *Fallout* somehow underestimates legal interpretation and its relatively autonomous dynamics when it comes to making sense of international treaties.[2] Still, legal tactics have always provided a distinct layer of interpretative battles and an essential lever for strategies of concealment. Although the following sentence famously comes from an economist, Alan Greenspan, it could equally qualify for lawyers : "If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said." To be sure, this capacity to maintain forms of "*clair-obscur*" around treaties and international agreements has been one of lawyers' most appreciated quality in the context of international relations! The entry into force of the long-negotiated Vienna convention on the law of the treaties in 1969 has actually recognized the specificity and the legitimacy of these legal battles, that in turn bring limits or deadlocks to the way diplomats can maneuver when it comes to securing the most suitable meaning for a particular treaty.

I do think *Fallout* offers a lasting theoretical framework to study contemporary diplomatic practices. For that reason, it would be interesting to question the extent to which we have now moved away from the rather simplified game of post-WWII nuclear policy negotiations with few diplomatic actors bound by inter-personal ties and a certain amount of control over the treaty-interpretation. In most areas of the diplomatic bargain, a large part of the interpretative dynamics take place outside the chancelleries. This is not to say that diplomats have lost all control over treaties' meaning. However, they now form only one group among the many public and private actors involved in the international political process. As a matter of fact, securing the interpretation of a treaty has become a far more complex business. With the rise of an international "public sphere", there are many more actors that have a vested interest in publicity and transparency of diplomatic practices – from scholars to NGOs. Just consider the ongoing controversy over the secrecy of the European Commission's mandate in the transatlantic trade and investment treaty (TTIP): while the Commission has refused for a long time to disclose its negotiating mandate in the name of efficiency, it has proved impossible to maintain such a position in front of an increasingly wide front of NGOs that criticized the legitimacy of opaqueness given the importance and variety of interests at stake. This is proof to the fact that *Fallout* opens up a new research agenda –one that would question the new context of diplomacy and assess the changing value and risks of the different diplomatic tactics over the clarity and transparency of international norms.

Endnotes

1. Cf. Megan Donaldson's ongoing Ph.D in history of international law at NYU : *Renegotiating secrecy : the registration of treaty and international order between the wars*, American Society of International Law Midyear research forum 2013, on file with the author.

2. This is particularly true for the Euratom treaty of 1957 governed by the emerging law of the European Communities, which has become a field of its own (Vauchez 2015).

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Response to Critics

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Before I start, I must say how honored and privileged I feel to have received such insightful comments on *Fallout*. The comments deserve more attention that I can devote to them in such a limited space, but I will try to answer the most important ones, which touch upon three different aspects of *Fallout*: 1) the ontological status of my object of research; 2) my methodological approach, especially the relation between genealogy and comparison; 3) the transportability of my theory to the study of other transnational legal fields – to use Terrence Halliday and Greg Shaffer's (2014) concept –, especially in the context of growing global openness between domestic public spheres.

Transparency, Ambiguity and Opacity: Textual Properties or Networks' Organizational Structures?

Some commentators point to an ambiguity in the ontological status of that which I call either "transparent," or "ambiguous," or "opaque." Is "opacity" the quality of a meaning-making strategy followed by a specific set of actors (diplomats, politicians, experts, etc.) to turn their preferred policy into law? Or is it a property of the texts themselves in which states' commitments are sealed (treaties, conventions, etc.)? Nitsan Chorev remarks that *Fallout* somehow leaves the reader to wonder whether what is opaque or transparent is the text of the treaty, convention or pact in which statesmen and politicians seal their plan, or whether it is something else.

I would say it is something else, which I will explain further later, using language that is a bit different from that used in the book itself. Indeed, I first want to alert (future) readers of *Fallout* that, especially if they are formally trained in law or international law, they might "naturally" associate the terms "ambiguous" or "transparent" with the properties of the text itself (its sentences and propositions). They are not the only ones to do so: lawmakers also associate transparency with clearly written provisions, and they dislike textual ambiguity in bills, statutes or contracts. Even scholars of "legalization" (Abbott and Snidal 2000) and scholars of "legal recursivity" (Halliday and Carruthers 2007) share the same textual perspective in their study of the process by which ambiguous covenants are clarified and the interpretation of their provisions fixed by the accumulation of court judgments. For them, transparency and ambiguity are properties of the legal texts.

This is where *Fallout* innovates. I do not consider that it is the written sentence of a text that is transparent, ambiguous or opaque. I attach these adjectives to discourse rather than text: discourse about what the text says, e.g. interpretations found in transcripts of conversations, written commentaries published in law journals, in other words, all the text, sub-texts and accompanying texts that surround a treaty itself and embed its meaning in a network of interpretations. Thus, what I consider transparent, ambiguous or opaque is this network of interpretations, whose structuration is therefore qualified by one of these terms. Although it is not a term I have used, Antoine Vauchez uses the term "hermeneutic space" to describe the object

whose organizational structure I am describing, giving an interesting name to such a network of interpretations.

In fact, I propose a two-by-two table to distinguish between various types of networks of interpretations– two cells in the table correspond to two slightly different versions of opacity, which is why I end up with only 3 terms: transparency, ambiguity and opacity. The first dimension of the table distinguishes whether the interpretation of a text is open to one clear interpretation or to a multiplicity of meanings, and in so doing, it may give the impression that I could be talking about a textual property (and not about a property of the interpretations of the text). But the second dimension concerns whether the network in which these interpretations circulate is strongly split into a public front-stage and a private backstage, or whether the boundary between the two is porous and in some ways irrelevant. This second dimension indicates that I am not talking about textual clarity, ambiguity or opacity. Rather, I am talking about the structuration of a network of interpretations, which is sometimes transparent, sometimes ambiguous and sometimes opaque.

My main theoretical ambition in *Fallout* is therefore to explain the evolution of such networks of interpretations, by answering such questions as: How is opacity constructed? Thanks to which strategy? How does opacity evolve in reaction to certain shocks (like the renewal of the majority of members in the networks of interpreters, or attacks against the boundary between public and private interpretations by outsiders)? How can opacity be sustained over time? What is the effect of opacity on the interpretation of other overlapping treaties? Especially when the latter are embedded in ambiguous or transparent networks of interpretations?

In order to answer such questions, I selected a few cycles of treaty interpretation and re-interpretation to analyze. For instance, after showing how the network of interpretations that created ambiguity around Europe's nuclear trade rules failed to yield the hoped-for results (chapter 4), I looked at how the erection of a strong boundary between public and private interpretations of the treaty instituting a European Community of Atomic Energy (Euratom) turned the ambiguity of Europe's nuclear trade rules into opacity (chapter 5). I then showed how, with little textual amendment, such a boundary between public and private interpretations was successfully challenged by new political-legal elites in France and the US (chapter 6), which thus reduced the opacity of Europe's nuclear trade rules and turned it into clarity. *Fallout* thus focuses on such dynamics within these networks of interpretations.

I do not consider that it is the written sentence of a text that is transparent, ambiguous or opaque. I attach these adjectives to discourse rather than text: discourse about what the text says, e.g. interpretations found in transcripts of conversations, written commentaries published in law journals, in other words, all the text, sub-texts and accompanying texts that surround a treaty itself and embed its meaning in a network of interpretations. Thus, what I consider transparent, ambiguous or opaque is this network of interpretations...

Now, Antoine Vauchez makes an excellent remark when he notes that my choice of words

for these types of network structuration is not neutral. "Transparency," "ambiguity," and "opacity" indeed have a long history, both in law and in moral philosophy. They mean certain things for diplomats and international law scholars and for the public at large, which might not correspond exactly to my understanding of these concepts – hence, the possibility of misinterpretation. Thus, by choosing to capture some of my concepts with terms coming from folk practice – concepts taken from "the field" – I may encourage international law scholars into thinking that I am talking about textual ambiguity when I am not. That is an excellent point, and indeed, is the drawback of my strategy, a drawback long noticed by sociological theorists, who have debated whether they should coin new terms (like "habitus" for instance, coming from Latin) to build sociological concepts; or whether they should infuse folk concepts with sociological meaning. Durkheim and Bourdieu chose to use sociological concepts (like "anomy") whose names could not be confused with folk concepts, but they ran another risk: that these concepts may not relate at all with the experiential worlds of their readers not trained in sociology, thus artificially insulating sociology from broader political discursive fields. As I have preferred to use folk concepts and translate their meanings into sociological theoretical terms, I followed in the footsteps of the ethnographic tradition of the Chicago school, or the Goffmanian dramaturgical approach. For me, the advantage is that most international law practitioners immediately (or intuitively) get the idea behind transparency or opacity, even though they may slowly realize that I define them differently from their prior understanding. But at least they are given an anchor to tie this new sociological theory to their intuitive world.

Trotsky Rather than Skocpol: When Genealogical and Comparative Approaches Merge

Commentators make a second set of comments that relate to methods, and – it will come as no surprise to historical sociologists –, these comments deal with the status of my comparative approach. Julia Adams in particular notices that *Fallout* mixes genealogical and comparative approaches, and asks for more explanation of how I relate the two, as historical sociologists most often see both approaches as quite separate (even if complementary) rather than as parts of one unified approach.

In fact, Julia Adams is right to point out that my approach to comparison is not orthodox in the eyes of a historical sociologist. To use Michael Burawoy's (2009, chap 3) opposition, I will say that *Fallout* sides with "Trotsky" (a Trotsky turned into a comparative sociologist by Burawoy) rather than with Skocpol – and this is a heterodox position in historical and comparative sociology. Indeed, since Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol pioneered their comparative case-based approaches to national revolutions, historical sociologists have long established that small-n comparisons should respect the principle of independence between the cases – a methodological approach beautifully systematized by Charles Ragin (1989). My approach differs from theirs and relates to what Burawoy calls "Trostky's principles of comparison." Here, I develop only one point of similarity for reasons of space, but Burawoy's description captures in many respects how I relate my political/normative positioning with regard to the questions addressed in the book and with the construction of my object of research.

Indeed, in accordance with Burawoy's approach to comparison, I do not consider that the cases I study – e.g. networks of interpretations about regional regimes of nuclear trade rules – are independent from one another. First, as I say in *Fallout*, the networks

of interpretation about overlapping trade rules (some regional, others global in scope) evolve in conjunction with one another, through processes of distinction, insulation or harmonization – a concept that is at the core of my narrative. Second, past successes and failures are taken into consideration by policymakers as they re-interpret some of the rules of various regimes. The particularity of world historical events is that they enter into our collective memory, albeit with many re-interpretations and modes of forgetting certain facets of the events, but still, the result of this memorialization process is that we cannot treat cases as independent from one another. Claiming that my "cases" are independent units would have been a plain fiction, only meant to assuage the anxieties of positivist methodologists.

Some historical sociologists have preferred to ignore this methodological problem and they have found various justifications. As they have focused on cross-national comparison, they claimed that they were thus able to hide their simplification of history (and their ignorance of transnational factors, which threaten such independence) behind the assumption that national histories (and their lessons) do not cross national boundaries. But as Burawoy writes, this is largely untrue. As far as world historical events – like for example the French, the Russian or the Maoist revolutions – are concerned, it is impossible to treat these cases as if they could be independent. Indeed, one big difference of the Maoist revolutionaries is that they have come after the Russian and the French revolutionaries, and that they have learnt to study past revolutionary sequences and draw some lessons from such study. The same is true of Lenin's acolytes with respect to the French revolution. The same is true for nuclear nonproliferation treaty regimes. The failure and success of the first international attempts to govern nuclear trade has been analyzed by those who later tried to set new global and regional regimes to regulate nuclear trade. Thus, it becomes really hard to sustain the Skocpolian fiction of case-independence when one compares – as I do in *Fallout* – various transnational legal orders, which are essentially tying together many national histories, and whose normative status is hotly debated across regions.

Ron Levi makes an excellent remark when he says that future comparative research of transnational regimes should embed more than I do the study of their "foundational events" into the larger study of political emotions, as political emotions have the property of traveling very fast across national boundaries, thus tying together previously unrelated zones of the world. This is a well-taken point.

Thus, the specific dynamics of the networks of interpretations I study are embedded in a (though fragmented, still widely-encompassing) world history, and I did not treat the "cases" I followed as if they were different species of insects with no temporal relation between them. Here, they are embedded in a temporality that is full of recursive cycles and moments of disjuncture as well as moments of suturing. The recognition of this fact led me to construct the first part of *Fallout* in a way that is both uniquely comparative and genealogical. The three chapters in this first section compare three successive specific attempts at constructing a supranational nuclear trade regime: the rules developed in the first attempt were embedded in a network of interpretations that created transparency (chapter 3); the second attempt resulted in a network of interpretations that created ambiguity (chapter 4); and the third in an opaque network of interpretations (chapter 5), which was later challenged from within (chapter 6), and from outside (chapter 7). Each case can't be treated as independent from the others, as the actors involved in the construction of each treaty regime learnt

lessons from the failure of the others, achieving success only on the third attempt.

Thus, the comparison between transparency, ambiguity and opacity that I develop in these three chapters is not purely comparative, nor is it purely genealogical, as I think that following this process – what some call "process-tracing" (Collier 2011) – can help us learn something about transparency, ambiguity and opacity from a comparative angle (even if they are placed in this temporal sequence). "Learning something" does not mean "testing" the impact of a variable – or factor, in a small-n cased-based comparison – by looking at how each factor plays out in independent cases, but rather it means becoming aware of the specific constraints that each interpretive structure may create for the actors playing the game.

I use the same approach in the last chapters, in which I compare how opacity resisted various external shocks: first, in the case of the opaque rules governing Europe's nuclear production and trade (chapter 7), and second, in the case of the opaque rules governing nuclear trade with, respectively, Israel, India and Pakistan (chapter 8). In this last chapter, I thus take a long view of the dynamics of opacity and I look at how opacity has been differently affected by inter-generational change within domestic policy fields of the countries tied to the nuclear trade regimes in question, and by the pressures exerted by outside hegemons. This chapter explains how various dynamics lead to different outcomes: for instance, how domestic elites in these countries reacted to challenges by further obscuring the private meanings of their own program and its relationship to the rest of the world (Israel and Pakistan), or by openly challenging and exposing the West's hypocrisy, and being fought against in turn (India). Here again, the cases are not independent, to the extent that the evolution of the opaque nuclear trade rules in Europe affected the evolution in India, or Israel, or Pakistan. Still, the comparative/genealogical approach brings lessons for both social science history and for policy debates.

In many ways, the comparison between Europe, Israel, India and Pakistan also undermines a "rationalist" reading of *Fallout* which is sometimes encouraged by my use of tables (see pp. 23 and 24 in chapter 2 especially), in which I list predictions about the long-term effects of transparency, ambiguity and opacity – as if these predictions could be separated from contextual factors. This rational action reading is certainly possible. As I have said, transparency, ambiguity and opacity refer to the structuration of networks of interpretations, but they are also the outcome of strategies. Then, one can read opacity as a strategy followed by rational actors to obtain specific outcomes – outcomes that are not context-dependent – when actors face certain constraints. This reading of *Fallout* could perfectly complement, as Julia Adams and Nitsan Chorev underline, the two-level game theory of Robert Putnam, which stresses that one of the main problems faced by diplomatic agents is that they have a multiplicity of principals (some domestic, others international), and that not all principals have the same interests and policy preferences. Then, opacity could be an efficient strategy, which, to the extent that it seeks to erect a strong boundary between various kinds of interpretations and various kinds of publics, could help agents solve their problem of multiple loyalties. This is a possible reading of *Fallout*, and I am sure some readers will look for such recipes in the book, if as Antoine Vauchez suggests, they read it as a modern-day adaptation of Machiavelli's *The Prince* – a very generous comparison. But the comparison between the dynamics of opacity in Europe, Israel, India and Pakistan balances that possible reduction of opacity to a rational strategy, as it leads me to conclude that opacity

does not always have the same kind of effects on the dynamics of treaty interpretation.

The Relevance of Fallout in the Face of Global Changes

My commentators make a last wave of comments, which I will address very quickly for lack of space but not for lack of interest. Both Julia Adams and Ron Levi wonder whether the kind of opacity that I describe as being produced in the early days of the Cold War by a small transatlantic elite could still be possible in the digital age of Wikileaks, in which media diffusion of scoops, scandals, leaked documents and unofficial rumors is both instantaneous and global. I would answer by saying that while the structure of the global elite I am describing has changed since the early days of the Cold War, it does not mean that opacity is absent from the world of foreign policy and global governance.

We can turn to the initial reaction of the State Department right after the publication of State Department cables by Assange's team to illustrate this point. The State Department reaction was very interesting and subtle: officials sent letters to the press (which were relayed by deans of major US universities) saying that anyone reading and citing leaked cables would jeopardize their employability as future federal government employees (LaFranchi 2010). The rationale was that doing so could have been interpreted by the future authorities in charge of delivering a security clearance to a future employee as a political message of support for Assange's decision, rather than just the manifestation of legitimate intellectual and political curiosity for contemporary US foreign policy. This message was later denied, maybe for fear that someone in the future might be denied a job and sue the US government for undue discrimination (e.g. discrimination against people who exert their constitutionally protected right of free speech). The denial itself was not official. Thanks to these mixed messages, the US government succeeded in leaving the impression that maybe reading public information on the web could be held against one's employability (and security clearance). This was by all means a smart strategy, although we may question how legitimate it was. In many ways, it worked: even though the press amply commented upon the cables (not always smartly, as some favored the most sensational ones without considering possible security risks for diplomats stationed abroad), most US students of foreign policy still prefer not to read the cables, which means that scholars and their students have incorporated the fact that they are watched when they use the internet.

After reading about Edward Snowden's revelations, and the US reaction to the Wikileaks disclosure, it seems to me that transparency is imposed upon the citizens of most democracies and authoritarian states, while the governments still keep opaque most of their activities.

After reading about Edward Snowden's revelations, and the US reaction to the Wikileaks disclosure, it seems to me that transparency is imposed upon the citizens of most democracies and authoritarian states, while the governments still keep opaque most of their activities. Even when leaks are published by the press, they remain neither public, nor classified, largely because governments refuse to acknowledge their authenticity and use the threat to deny employability and access to classified information as tools for policing the boundary between public and secret knowledge. This latter strategy is not new. After all, one of the earliest scandals of nuclear policy was the

decision, made by an internal board of the US Atomic Energy Commission, to revoke J. Robert Oppenheimer's security clearance as, even though Los Alamos' former director was not found to be disloyal, he was seen as a "security risk" for the new administration. The US government's reaction to Wikileaks thus shows the long-lasting legacy of the institutions of classification, which have been especially entrenched in the world of nuclear policy.

As those practices of classification and opacification have proliferated in many other policy fields than nuclear policy, we can expect that the analysis of opacity I develop in *Fallout* could be extended to the study of many other transnational legal fields. For instance, one of the most important pieces of global legislation that, if adopted, is likely to change policymaking in the twentieth century - the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal - remains so secret that lawmakers can only access the text of the draft treaty in a secure room but cannot discuss it in public. This triggered Wikileaks' decision to propose a $100,000 reward for whoever would leak the document to the press (McBridge 2015). In today's world, it is not transparency but secrecy that is the rule, so that transparency is only too often the result of (criminalized) leaking practice. We should thank Peter Galison (2004) for reminding us that the size of the textual world classified by the US government since the Second World War amounts to a tenth (according to his estimate) of the size of the published textual world held in the Library of Congress. A few leakers and hackers may have endorsed the objective of challenging the opacity of governmental practice, either because they follow the ideals set by President Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points, or because they oppose specific policy decisions, or because they pursue darker goals. But in the end, their challenge remains relatively small. So far, both democracies and (to an even greater extent) authoritarian regimes have successfully managed to preserve (and sometimes augment) their ability to protect the opacity surrounding their international dealings, whether the latter concern trade negotiations, climate policy or human rights protection. I think that there is a great urgency for historical and comparative sociologists to expand their analyses of national-level dynamics to study these transnational processes, but whether the latter want to turn these dynamics into objects of study remains for the readers of *Fallout* to decide.

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Book Symposium

The origins of global humanitarianism:
religion, empires, and advocacy

Cambridge University Press

Peter Stamatov

Editor's Note: The following text is based on an author-meets-critics session that took place at the Social Science History Association Annual Meeting in November, 2014. My thanks to John Hall, Jonathan Sassi, Bryan Turner, and Peter Stamatov for agreeing to prepare their comments for the newsletter.

Comments on *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism*

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In his important and compelling book, *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism* (hereafter, *Origins*), Peter Stamatov makes the case that, over the long course of European imperialist expansion beginning in the sixteenth century, diverse religious activists – the earliest of them with medieval origins – became radicalized by the colonizing experience. These religious activists originated and developed long-distance advocacy networks meant to ameliorate or change the plight of those colonized and enslaved as a consequence of European expansion – first in the Iberian Americas, and later in North America, with repercussions for Britain and the world as a whole. This book reveals the religious sources of ethical concerns in Europe about colonialism, and it makes a strong case that current practices of long-distance advocacy have deep origins in emergently institutionalized religious cultures of advocacy.

The practices of long-distance advocacy are summarized (p.14) as including appeals to political and religious authorities for policy changes, formation of political alliances with non-European leaders connected to the colonized and/or enslaved, dissemination of information about abuses, and the spread of ideologies and norms about human dignity in relation to treatment of distant non-Europeans, especially beyond religious circles.

Stamatov's argument is both historically important and sociologically nuanced in its capacity to revise off-the-shelf theories of globalization and social movements that tend to be invoked to explain the emergence of modern international institutions. For Spanish imperialism, Stamatov focuses on the Catholic religious orders that accompanied conquests and colonizations – Dominicans, Jesuits, Franciscans. He notes the frequent internal disagreements both within orders as well as contestations by religious activists with alternative colonizing and imperial networks concerning the activists' efforts to ameliorate conditions, minister to the colonized, and deny salvation to Catholics involved in exploitation and abuse. In North America, Stamatov argues, Quakers "took the same road" (p. 2).

However, as I will explore below, he argues that the consequences were quite different.

Overall, *Origins* is an analytically, historically, and sociologically rich book that draws together analyses of diverse social processes and demonstrates the deep sources of "modern" movement practices in the religious domains of expanding post-medieval Europe. The book is a gold mine that yields important insights and issues to be pursued further on a variety of fronts. Stamatov works in what I would characterize as a deeply weberian historical sociology, or more accurately, in his case, a sociological history. His approach differs in analytic focus from Weber, whose explanatory interests and civilizational concerns are not always ours. However, Stamatov demonstrates that our concerns can fruitfully be addressed in weberian ways. As he constructs his analysis, its thematic backbone, "long-distance advocacy," is the confluence of diverse historical developments, brought to life through sociological conceptualization. The book proceeds through a distinctive methodological strategy. At the outset, Stamatov takes the early-20th-century Congo anti-atrocities campaign as the pattern to be explained – a pattern that involved mobilization of Quakers, evangelical Christians, and free traders. In the terms of my typology of sociohistorical methodologies of inquiry in *Cultures of Inquiry* (1999), he then embarks on a configurational history, similar to Michael Mann's *Sources of Social Power* in how it traces a long-term development across different times and places. Stamatov's approach both traces detailed historical developments and zeroes in on key historical "break points" where the character of the dynamic, practice, or cultural structure shifts – where the explanatory challenge is to figure out why the shift occurred. Thus, it is important to assess the analytic claims of the book.

To begin, Stamatov rightly notes that the pattern of Iberian colonization in the Americas was preceded by earlier, medieval colonization in which Catholicism played a role. The basic colonization pattern was already set by explorations along the coast of West Africa and in the Canary Islands, and this pattern, of sugar production and slavery, has its origins in the colonization of the Levant during the Crusades (cf. p.74). Indeed, as Stamatov observes, Columbus promoted his "discovery" expedition as a basis for financing the conquest of Jerusalem – a continuation of the crusading spirit that began in the 11th century. Thus, given that the crusading mentality was simultaneously religious, militant, and imperialistic, Stamatov includes an important discussion (p. 68) of the origins of Catholic radicalization in the orders as early as the 12th century, and shows how more radicalizing Catholic orders came to the fore in the wake of the failure of the Crusades (p. 70), especially in subsequent colonial expansion, to the Canary Islands in the 15th century, and the colonization of the Americas beginning in the 16th century (p.29). Origins thereby contributes to a growing body of scholarship exploring how the European colonizing formula linking religion and imperialism had origins well before the "discovery" of the Americas.

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The centrality of religion in the developments that concern Stamatov is beyond question – even if he seems to think that this point will prove controversial relative to previous histories of advocacy, which tend to treat alliances – involving religion, to be sure – as critical. This is more a difference in emphasis than disagreement, as Stamatov himself argues for the importance of advocacy movements that attracted both religious and secular participants. But Stamatov's point is that 18th- and 19th-century advocacy coalitions drew on recipes that were distinctly religious in origin and development.

Stamatov is rightly careful to detail the uneven character of religious stances toward colonization and slavery, posing religious radicalization – Weber's charismatic religious virtuosi – in contrast to religious complicity in Catholic orders pacifying indigenous populations and Protestants in the US either holding back from condemning slavery or developing a theology of something like "the white man's burden," encouraging just treatment of slaves.

Focusing on Iberian colonization, Stamatov shows in nuanced detail the multiple developments of "long-distance advocacy" in Catholic orders in Latin America. There, activists developed a toolbox of strategies to appeal to both religious and secular authorities, seeking fair treatment of indigenes and imported African slaves. And importantly, *Origins* points to the conflicting agendas of the Catholic hierarchy – of supporting the imperial project, but also of opening up the salvation of new souls, especially as Protestant colonization began to open up elsewhere (p.66, 69). Thus, Stamatov shows that religious activists interact not only with competing imperial networks, but also with a broader audience at both the edges and the core of empire. For Stamatov, it is important (p.15) that in the West, separate institutional spheres were developing in the medieval era, such that religious actors were not simply controlled by autocratic political power. Yet in that this finding invokes larger structural transformations in the West, it implies that religious activism per se is not an adequate explanation of the emergence of long-distance advocacy networks.

Here, the analytic shift from Iberian to American, British, and French developments reveals a key configurational historical shift that gets less emphasis than it should, I think: as active as the radicalized Catholic orders were, the Spanish empire aligned with Catholicism could "contain" religious entrepreneurs more effectively than could the British empire - more modern, more religiously pluralistic, and more democratic at its core – this despite the fact (p. 95) that religious actors in the British sphere were less powerful. (France represents an interesting comparative case, due to its politics of revolution and counterrevolution in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.)

Given the overall argument put forward in *Origins*, what points deserve further consideration? Let me briefly mention two.

1. *Diffusion versus reinvention*. When historical and comparative sociologists find similar social patterns in different times and places, the explanatory challenge is to explain the similarities. For the question of how long-distance advocacy became institutionally established, Stamatov approaches this issue by arguing that "issue entrepreneurs" did not "independently rediscover" a toolkit and script, but that "they reproduce, consciously or not, a culturally and cognitively available model" (p.11). And their actions were consequential: "...antislavery activists were able to establish organizational structures and patterns of action that have informed developments of global solidarity ever since" (p.23). Yet how reproduction transpired

remains a puzzle. At one point (p.92), Stamatov is very clear that "there was no interaction between these two [Catholic and Protestant] traditions of emerging antislavery thought and practice." Yet despite the differences and separation, "in both the Catholic and Protestant cases, the same interactional pattern reasserted itself" (p.92). A little further on, Stamatov (p. 95) states that "the underlying processes were largely analogous." And (p.93) he describes "the reappearance and rearticulation of the same pair of mutually antagonistic ideologies." There are nuances of differences between these formulations, but certain of them come close to suggesting direct diffusion, even if implicit, whereas others seem to imply that the disparate intersections of colonialism/religion vectors under Catholicism and Protestantism amounted to equivalent structural conditions that yielded similar patterns of activism that nevertheless produced an emergently novel outcome under Protestantism. History does not always tell us its secrets, but the ambiguities here suggest an open question for future research: whether and how the similar patterns in Spanish Catholic versus religiously pluralistic British colonization emerged.

2. *The thematic centrality of petitioning*. The ambiguity concerning diffusion versus reinvention in turn raises the question of why the consequences of long-distance advocacy were so different in the case of Iberian colonization versus that of Britain in North America. Here, Stamatov rightly invokes the difference of historical context. However, in his account, one node of explanation does not get the direct treatment that I think it deserves. I refer to the practices of petitioning authorities for redress and relief. Such practices are not identified as such in the case of Spain, but *Origins* certainly describes various types of direct appeals to Spanish authorities and to the Pope. Defined broadly, petitions are to be found in every case that Stamatov touches upon in many different contexts: in Spain, in North America, in Britain after the passage of Quaker concerns to London, and in France. In short, petitioning is one of the central practices by which "long distance advocacy" takes place. Yet there is a key difference between petitioning in relation to Spanish colonialism versus North American and British practices, and this difference can be pinpointed via David Zaret (2000), who argues that in 17th-century England, partly driven by use of the printing press, petitioning shifted from a relatively privatized intercession with authorities to an increasingly public one. In England, petitioning became an increasingly important basis for public mobilization and pressure on authorities. Thus, it would be useful to consider a "mental experiment" in the analysis of long-distance advocacy's emergence. Granted the importance of the package of tools that emerged from religious networks, might developments in the character of petitioning also be considered a necessary condition for the emergence of long-distance advocacy, indeed, one that underwent transformations along the lines that Zaret has described, in the religious advocates' development of the practice in North America and Britain, compared to Spain?

To sum up, put in a wider context of religion and modernity, *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism* offers a detailed and important analysis of a phenomenon that has been a hallmark of modernity, but only recently analyzed as such. In effect, Stamatov demonstrates that, in the emergence of long-distance advocacy, religion "jumps the tracks" over into a secular practice. This analysis brings to light an important dimension of emergent scholarly recognition that so-called secularism is permeated with "religious" elements (two parallel developments involve the infusion, beginning with the English Civil War and the French Revolution, of previously apocalyptic themes into modern politics, and

the latter-19th-century influence in the U.S. of the Social Gospel on corporate liberalism). Thus, Stamatov has given us a great deal to think about, not only in relation to long-distance advocacy per se, but also in the consideration of secularization and its complex relations to the persistence of religiosity in the modern world. *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism* offers a major advance in the revisionist analysis of modernity, and it warrants the attention of anyone seriously committed to understanding the complex roots of the contemporary global social order.

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Comments on *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism*

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Peter Stamatov's *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism* explores the roots of our contemporary societies' compassionate concern for the suffering and injustice experienced by people far removed from us both culturally and geographically. Scholars have tended to attribute the rise of such long-distance humanitarian advocacy to some outworking of globalization and to locate it historically in the period after World War II. By contrast, Stamatov takes his readers much earlier, back to the early modern era, and focuses on the productive tensions generated between religion and empire. First, during the sixteenth century, Spanish missionary priests such as Bartolomé Las Casas, to name just the most famous individual, raised their voices against the exploitation of the indigenous peoples of the Caribbean and Central and South America and carried their protests all the way to the Habsburg imperial court. Then in the mid-eighteenth century, American Quakers launched another campaign aimed at the imperial center, this time in London, over the plight of enslaved Africans and African Americans. Building upon a foundation laid by the Catholic missionary orders, Quakers such as Anthony Benezet developed the modern strategy and tactics of mobilization on behalf of a humanitarian cause, including publicity and petitioning campaigns.

Overall, I find the account provided in T*he Origins of Global Humanitarianism* to be compelling. The book displays an impressive scholarly range. Whereas many scholars, myself included, tend to specialize in just one facet of the story, Stamatov's account compares the early modern Spanish and British Empires on both sides of the Atlantic. He has mastered a large scholarly literature in at least six languages, to say nothing of his complete comfort in both disciplines of history and sociology. Moreover, very little theoretical jargon gets in the way of his narrative, which is not to say that he avoids intervening in some major theoretical debates, such as about the creation of institutions of humanitarian action or Max Weber's interpretation of how religion motivates the same. As someone who has studied eighteenth-century Quaker antislavery, I also think that his account of that is on the mark and provides a model of synthesis and concision. He rightly criticizes the dichotomy that would divide the Quakers' activism into charitable and political phases. In sum, I tend to agree that Peter Stamatov's *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism* has correctly identified the originators of our contemporary model of humanitarian advocacy on behalf of "distant strangers."

All that said, I would not be fulfilling my role as a commentator if I did not bring some food for thought to this scholarly buffet. For all its attention to historical contingency and detail, I would like to propose three ways in which the story provided in *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism* might be complicated further. First, I want to suggest that first-hand witness to, and familiarity with, nearby injustice was often an important factor in motivating people to work to alleviate the long-distance suffering of others. Second, I think that theology matters. Particular Christian doctrines were repeatedly cited by "The Negro's & Indians Advocate[s]," to play upon the title of Morgan Godwyn's book (1680), whereas other theological emphases tended to anesthetize humanitarian concern. Third, I would also like to say that we still need more work on Anthony Benezet, perhaps the most important figure, along with Las Casas, in Stamatov's book. At times, for all his astuteness, I think that Stamatov has perhaps been lulled into an acceptance of an eighteenth-century Quaker legend about how "a poor Philadelphia schoolmaster" (175) sparked a movement of "ordinary middle-class men" (152).

One of the few works, it seems, not included in Stamatov's bibliography is an article published in the November 1990 issue of the *Journal of Southern History* by James L. Huston (1990). The article deals with a later period, which is probably why it did not come across Stamatov's radar screen. It is about antebellum-era American abolitionists, but Huston's argument, I think, is relevant to many of the historical actors discussed in *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism*. Huston's thesis is that "The shock of northerners who saw slavery's inhumane features provided an experiential basis for antislavery activity." "[W]hen northerners witnessed slaves being auctioned, taken in chains to market, or whipped," Huston explains, "they immediately condemned the institution" (Huston 1990, 609, 620). The same could be said for several of the historical actors in Stamatov's book. Morgan Godwyn, Benjamin Lay, and James Ramsey all turned against slavery on account of what they witnessed during their time spent working in the British West Indies. John Woolman (1971, 32–38) famously recorded in his journal that he felt the first pangs of conscience against slavery when he was asked as a young clerk to write a receipt for a slave woman who was being sold, and his convictions solidified during a religious journey through the slave societies of Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina in the 1740s. Anthony Benezet (1783, 12) testified that it was his experience teaching a night school for African American children that convinced him that many derogatory stereotypes about blacks were nothing more than "vulgar prejudice." Similarly, it was their eye-witness experiences of the cruelty and abuses suffered by the indigenous inhabitants of Hispaniola that first moved Dominican friars to action on their behalf. Huston (1990, 640) concludes that "it is the historians of the twentieth century for whom slavery is an abstraction," and we might now expand that statement to include the historians and historical sociologists of the twenty-first century. "Historians are now entirely removed from the sights and sounds of the auction block and of floggings, and their failure to understand the reactions of sensitive Americans to the cruelties of slavery is a considerable and embarrassing failure of imagination." I wonder, therefore, if more needs to be factored into *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism* about the personal ordeals of the individuals involved and how their witness to the violence inherent in both Indian dispossession and chattel slavery prodded them to think about the bigger picture of imperial affairs that fostered such systemic injustices.

Along the same lines, I wonder if more

research might be done about the Natives and African Americans involved, not just as victims but also as historical agents in their own right. I am not saying this just to make a cliched point about the "agency" of the oppressed. Rather, I have lately come to see more and more how early antislavery developed through the cooperation of slaves and sympathetic white allies. Kirsten Sword's terrific article (2010), which Stamatov cites, makes this same point. In the Elias Boudinot Papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania there is an April 1790 letter to Boudinot, a U.S. Congressman from New Jersey, from Joseph Shotwell, the clerk of the Plainfield (NJ) Monthly Meeting of Quakers. Shotwell wrote to convey his thanks to Boudinot's brother Elisha for his help in a recent court case that had resulted in the manumission of a slave named Thomas. Shotwell wrote,

> Before I conclude I can't omit mentioning a circumstance which has recently occur'd as thy Brother has been a principal actor in the case. A Negroe Man whose Master often in his lifetime & on his Death Bed declared should be free, but before the Person who was sent for to write his will came he was deprived of his reason and in that state died[.] the Negroe applyed [sic] to me for assistance, & I to my friend Elisha who kindly offered his assistance, a writ of Habeas Corpus ordered the admrs. to bring him before the Judges at the Supreme Court last week, where his case was nobly advocated by my fr'd Elisha (& seconded by the Attorney General)…. the Judges after considering the case 2 or 3 days unanimously agreed he was entitled to his freedom & discharged him accordingly….[1]

What is so striking to me is how this letter reveals that the slave Thomas, fearing that the death of his master would cheat him of his promised manumission, knew to go to a locally prominent Quaker for assistance. This Quaker, Joseph Shotwell, in turn used his abolitionist connections to obtain the best legal counsel in the state, win Thomas's freedom in court, and set an important precedent in the process (Bloomfield 1794). I think that historians are coming more and more to appreciate such instances of cross-racial cooperation in the early antislavery movement, and perhaps that is something to factor into our understanding of how long-distance humanitarian concern germinated as well.

In the second place, I would like to know more about the theological doctrines that sparked the concerns of humanitarians or that they invoked in denouncing injustice and cruelty toward long-distance strangers. Stamatov emphasizes a concern for salvation as that part of "the inherent logic of religion" (18) that fueled activism, but I do not think that this gets to the heart of the matter. A genuine concern for salvation could lead to missionary outreach that did nothing to challenge the systemic injustices that the pro-indigenists or abolitionists tackled. Take the example of the Reverend Thomas Thompson, who was a mid-eighteenth-century missionary for the Church of England's Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG). He was stationed first in Monmouth County, New Jersey, from 1745-1751, a region characterized by "small farm slavery" to use historian Graham Russell Hodges's description, and then he took up a similar position as chaplain at Cape Coast Castle on the Gold Coast of West Africa from 1752-1756. After his return to England, he published *An Account of Two Missionary Voyages* in 1758. During his stint in New Jersey, he recollected, "I was not unconcerned for the poor Negroes, who wanted enlightning more than any, and therefore spake to the Masters

and Mistresses to be at the Pains to teach them the Catechism: And this was taken care of in some pious Families, and I catechized them in the Church on certain Sundays, and sometimes at Home: and after due Instruction, those whom I had good Assurance of I received to Baptism, and such as afterwards behaved well I admitted to the Communion." Reflecting on his later time at one of the most important British slave trading forts on the African coast, Thompson concluded, "Upon the Whole, it is my humble Opinion, that the Gold Coast Negroes may be brought to receive the Christian Religion; and whatever the Effect or Success may be (as that is in the Hand of God) yet the Design of their Conversion will be worthily intended, and the Endeavours used for it well employed to so truly excellent an End." Thompson illustrates, in short, that a concern for conversion of Indians or Africans, which I think he sincerely held, could easily be accommodated to slavery and the Atlantic slave trade. The SPG was an institution dedicated to a sort of long-distance humanitarianism, but as an arm of the established Church of England, it did not rock the imperial status quo (Thompson 1937, 11–12, 87; Hodges 1997, 43; Glasson 2012, 172–74). Of course, Stamatov recognizes this in his discussion of how some religious groups radicalized while others did not, but I still think that it would be fruitful to move beyond Weber's emphasis on salvation and get into the theological specifics. Many of the historical actors who wrote against slavery, such as Granville Sharp or Samuel Hopkins, recognized the importance of demolishing the specifically religious justifications of slavery and published theological works that did just that (Sharp 1773; Sassi 2004).

Stamatov's book and others suggest a variety of theological doctrines that held greater importance than mere salvation. Warnings of divine retribution formed a common theme for both Spanish friars and Quakers (115). Likewise, millennial expectancy added urgency to action (69), whether for Catholics or Calvinists (Bloch 1985). Both the Spanish friars (51) and the Quakers (88) emphasized the doctrine of the unity of mankind — that God "hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all of the face of the earth," to quote Acts 17:26 — in the face of those who would justify their exploitation by denying the full humanity of either Africans or Native Americans. Finally, Brycchan Carey (2012) shows that the Golden Rule of Matthew 7:12, "all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them," formed the consistent core for Quaker antislavery rhetoric from the time of George Fox onward. In sum, I wonder if there was a particular set of Christian doctrines or developments in theology that we might identify as having motivated the birth of long-distance humanitarianism more specifically than a general concern for salvation.

Third and finally, I would like to raise a couple of questions about the depiction of Anthony Benezet in *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism* and suggest some potential areas for additional research, although I think that Benezet deserves the prominent place that

...I wonder if there was a particular set of Christian doctrines or developments in theology that we might identify as having motivated the birth of long-distance humanitarianism more specifically than a general concern for salvation.

he receives and that Stamatov gets him right by and large. In the first place, I would like for Stamatov to clarify exactly how he thinks that the example of seventeenth-century Spaniards informed the eighteenth-century Quakers. On the one hand, he writes that "There was no

interaction between these two traditions of emerging anti-slavery thought and practice" (92), but, on the other hand, he notes in more than one place (22, 152) that Benezet referred to the "Bishop of Chiapa" (129), meaning Las Casas. In other words, Stamatov seems to deny any direct link between the Spanish and Quaker antislavery protests, but still points out that they had "the same interactional pattern" (92) and "parallel trajectories" (93). Is this just a case of similarity without any causation, and if so, what does that do to the structure and argument of the book overall? Perhaps Benezet's reference to Las Casas was just part of a widespread English Protestant discourse about the "black legend" of Spanish colonialism that added yet another piece of evidence about slavery's injustice to his compilation, rather than an inspiration for antislavery strategy?

One more point about Benezet and I am finished. Stamatov concludes that when we get involved in some distant humanitarian cause, "we are — unbeknownst to ourselves — enacting the script for which a poor Philadelphia schoolmaster wrote the first draft in the 1760s" (175). Let me say that I admire Anthony Benezet a great deal and think that he deserves a place of historical honor for his indefatigable antislavery labors, but he also hid behind the mask of the "poor Philadelphia schoolmaster." That poor schoolmaster was close, personal friends with some of the wealthiest families in Pennsylvania and New Jersey at the time, and a good part of his effectiveness derived from his place in the transatlantic community of Quakers. He was not the humble schoolmaster toiling away in isolation, but he knew how to get in touch with colonial and early state governors and legislators up and down the Atlantic seaboard, colonial agents at the seat of empire in London, Members of Parliament, and even members of the royal family - all thanks to his Quaker connections (Sassi 2011). And once he and his protégés launched the antislavery movement, they worked to cover their tracks, as Kirsten Sword has alerted us, and create the appearance of a groundswell of "ordinary middle-class men." Yes, Thomas Clarkson collected thousands of signatures, but we should also be cognizant of how all those newspaper pieces that started cropping up in the British press in the 1780s were the work of a deliberate campaign to create the appearance of a mass movement even if there was no such thing yet in existence (Sword 2010, 337). In other words, to Stamatov's attention to "the general interactional pattern that gets repeatedly activated," I would join a call that we study the specific networks of activists that made the pattern work. It is their historical agency that needs to be uncovered as well.

Endnotes

1. Joseph Shotwell to Elias Boudinot, 12/4m/1790, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Elias Boudinot Papers, box 2, vol. 3, p. 49

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Comment on *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism*

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In a period when large-scale historical and comparative sociology is in decline, this volume is especially welcome with its bold question: what are the origins of humanitarianism? Equally important is the creative way in which Stamatov examines the conduits of humanitarianism – namely, global advocacy. The volume pushes the boundaries of the sociology of religion by asking large and important questions in a period when sociological research has narrow professional rules that limit its scope. Consequently it is a work carried out on an immense historical and geographical scale. He develops new and important concepts about a major change in attitudes towards other human beings in the anti-slavery campaign. The book is based on a deep and troublesome ethical conundrum: can one human legally own another as property? In so doing, it challenges many taken-for-granted assumptions about religion and social change. The normal assumption, much promoted by post-colonial studies, is that Christian missions were hand in glove with the most brutal forms of colonialism, especially in the Spanish empire. In the language of American sociology, religion is treated as the independent not dependent variable in the explanation of the social movements that promoted humanitarian objectives. This view makes a welcome change from Marxist history which is inclined to regard religion at worst as an ideological smokescreen of material interests or at best the "heart of a heartless world" in Marx's famous critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (2005).

More specifically, what are the strengths of his study? Firstly, the historical scholarship is deeply impressive and Stamatov weighs the historical evidence very carefully. On the one hand, he fully recognizes that, for example, Quakers were also slave owners. On the other hand, he presents a challenging argument that the origins of western humanitarianism had its roots in religious abhorrence at the sight of enslaved and persecuted human beings. Whereas much critical historical research sees religious groups combining with colonial forces to subjugate indigenous peoples in order to spread Christianity, Stamatov provides a compelling account of how religion was instrumental in forging "global humanitarianism." Perhaps a sub-theme of the

book is how struggles at the margin of empires brought about significant change at the core – albeit after centuries of struggle.

Secondly, he develops a coherent and important political theory about how advocacy was organized. There is impressive detail in his account of the interconnections between Philadelphia and London via teachers, business men, politicians and religious leaders.

Thirdly while the plight (perhaps genocide is a more accurate description) of Native Americans rarely takes center stage in accounts of the American Revolution, Stamatov gives them center stage. The conflict between white settlers and Native Americans further illustrated the underlying problem of ownership of a human being, especially as a result of warfare. The savagery of Native Americans was demonstrated by their treatment of white settlers who were captured in colonial wars. Yet the enslavement of white settlers (especially white women) was parallel to the enslavement of Black Americans.

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Whereas recent research (mainly by anthropologists) on the effects of Christian missions treat conversion as an attack on indigenous cultures with overwhelmingly negative consequences, the implication of Stamatov's historical account is that conversion had the consequence of defining the Other as in fact a human being. In other words the desire to bring salvation to the world changed attitudes towards pagans who were now included in humanity. The book explores a theological puzzle in the minds of religious missionaries in the New World: If slaves or Native Americans had sincerely converted to Christianity, was it at all ethical to enslave them? More fundamentally, could one human being legally enslave another? For the activists of long-distance advocacy, clearly the answer was No. To resolve these issues it was necessary to undertake religious reform.

As the title suggests, Stamatov wants to provide an historical account of the early origins of humanitarianism. He undertakes this historical inquiry through two main case studies: Catholic religious orders in the sixteenth century in the Spanish colonies of Latin America and Quaker-driven anti-slavery movements in New England coastal cities and London. One obvious question here is: why these two religious groups? Was there something about their geographical and institutional marginalization from the centers of power? The other reason behind the selection is that the growth of humanitarian values presupposed some degree of religious reformation in both Catholic and Protestant Christianity. The main victims of colonial economic exploitation were African slaves and indigenous peoples. To explain these developments he draws on the idea of "long distance advocacy" and how humanitarian networks struggled against the economic interests of settlers and states. The conflict of interests between settlers and religious groups produced a long drawn-out battle.

Perhaps a minor criticism of the book is that I did not find a forceful statement of the thesis of the book until well into chapter 5 and 6. In both chapters, Stamatov gives significant weight to religion as the catalyst for peace-making, forgiveness, and recognition of the humanity of the Other. Thus, in Stamatov's

account of the mounting conflict between Spanish settlers and indigenous peoples, when Spaniards "called for a total war against the Chichimecs and the Mapuche and for an official authorization of their enslavement…a religious faction emerged that urged reconciliation and peace, initiated negotiations and called for investigation and rectification of the Europeans' unjust practices"(p. 114). Another aspect of Stamatov's argument is somewhat submerged in the historical details, namely the reform of empire. For example, Stamatov writes that "In their urgent prophetic vision, the sinfulness of slavery – like violence against Indians – tainted the entire social fabric of an empire in which Quakers were deeply implicated despite their separate religious and corporate identity"(p.126). Religious reform was also a call to reform the aggressive and exploitative basis of empire.

While Stamatov writes from the perspective of historical inquiry, he connects with contemporary literature such as Luc Boltanski's work *Distant Suffering* (1999) and the concept of "enlightened indignation" as well as the social movement literature of Charles Tilly and Dieter Ruch when he asks how globalization has transformed local protests into world-wide oppositional movements. He does not, however, believe that in some way distant advocacy and humanitarianism are linked to 'modernity' broadly described through simple causal links. Thus Stamatov writes that "there is no single feature of modernity that in itself created the conditions of long-distance advocacy as we know it today" (p.184).

In the same spirit of interdisciplinarity, I am concerned to flesh out his account to consider his argument within a broader intellectual context. In particular I want to connect his research with the recent debate about the so-called Axial Age religions. Karl Jaspers's *The Origin and Goal of History* was published in 1949. However in the English speaking world, the debate was launched by his publication in *Commentary* (Jaspers, 1948). The sub-title of the *Commentary* article – "A Base for the Unity of Mankind" – adequately captures the moral purpose of his project. In many respects Jaspers was writing against the legacy of Hegel arguing that the notions of history, criticism, transcendence and humanity were already highly developed in the Axial Age (800-200 BCE) before the rise of the modern world. For Jaspers, the Axial Age was the transformative period of the prophets and religious leaders such as Confucius and Lao-Tse in China, the Buddha in India, Zoroaster in Iran, the prophets of ancient Israel, and finally the poets and philosophers of ancient Greece – that is, all before the rise of Christianity and Islam, which are simply variations on an established theme. Through revelation, the prophets offered humanity a vision of a different superior world distinctively contrasted with the mundane world of the here and now. These religio-ethical movements established a division between a sacred sphere and the everyday world of violence, power and interest. These prophets established "the age of criticism" (Momigliano, 1975:9). In this religious critique of the mundane world, the prophets set up a lasting tension between the political and the religious.

Robert Bellah in *Religion in Human Evolution* (2011: 271) has pointed out Jasper's view was echoed in Max Weber's notion of the "prophetic age." For Weber, charismatic movements for social change depend on a conflict between secular and religious values or between this-worldly and other-worldly orientations. The idea of "religious orientations" to the world, conflicting with dominant economic and political realms, was pivotal to his analysis of the significance of "world religions" (Weber, 2009). In Judaism and Christianity, Weber found the roots of an ethic of brotherly love in opposition to this-

worldly greed, power and violence. This sociological vision of an ethical realm standing over and against politics was tragic in the sense that love (*agape* not *eros*) is always compromised in this world (Turner, 2013).

Was humanitarianism a long-term project of the Axial Age Religions rather than an early modern response to slavery in the New World? But we have to recognize that the message of "the age of criticism" ultimately succumbs to a compromise with political power and economic interest. The Axial Age religions failed ultimately to overcome violence in the exercise of power. Weber was pessimistic about the development of a rational world, rejecting the possibility of eudemonia in modernity. Stamatov's book, by contrast, is essentially optimistic. Global advocacy was successful, humanitarian values triumphed and the slave trade was brought to an end. However, we live in a world where hundreds (perhaps thousands) of African migrants are drowning in the Mediterranean. Thousands of migrants are afloat in the Andaman Sea and no government wants to give them permanent sanctuary. The Australian government has introduced policies to control the arrival of 'boat people' that contradict its human rights obligations. There is a global trafficking of women for sex slavery. Many would argue that slavery as an institution is a basic aspect of the global labour market and in 2010 the ILO estimated that 2.45 million people were trafficking victims. One might conclude pessimistically that global advocacy and humanitarianism failed and that the optimistic undertow of Stamatov's challenging thesis is misplaced.

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Reply to Critics

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I'm deeply grateful to Bryan, John, and Jonathan for engaging so thoughtfully and generously with my book. Before I address their specific comments, I want to plead an attenuating circumstance, namely the inherent difficulty of the double optique of my research which combines two inherently contradictory analytical dimensions: a "cosmological" dimension of long-term historical change and a comparative dimension that juxtaposes—within the wider "flow" of historical change—two relatively distinct and non-simultaneous cases that were themselves in constant flux and change. The two dimensions were hard to capture at the same time with the same analytical lens. So I had to do what any photographer confronted with the limitations of her equipment does: make pragmatic choices of what to focus on, blur, or even leave out. My critics' reflections and

comments thus give me a welcome opportunity to expand on important points that I was not able or neglected to develop in the book. I will start with the comparative dimension, will address questions on causal mechanisms, and then will return to the larger "cosmological" dimension of the research as well as its implications for ethical concern over space in the present moment.

The difficulty of disentangling the "cosmological" from the comparative angle is my first line of defense on the points raised by Hall and Sassi regarding the possible connection between the Iberian and British cases. I simply did not have enough evidence to make a strong causal statement on the exact nature of that connection. It is clear that at least the historical memory of Las Casas' actions, as cited by Benezet, were influential in enhancing the "thinkability" of later Protestant abolitionism. What I still don't know is if there were any more direct contacts between Catholic carriers of the Lascasian program and emerging Protestant abolitionists who could have found inspiration in Catholic action. The Capuchin Francisco José de Jaca, perhaps the first proponent of the radical idea of immediate abolition of slavery historically, visited British and slave-holding Barbados. Could his ideas have influenced Quakers on the island? This is quite possible in light of the fact that empire-building Dutch and the British learned and adopted a lot from the Portuguese and the Spanish, the pioneers in overseas expansion. At the same time, no seventeenth-century Protestant would have willingly admitted indebtedness to Catholics, the least so members of a "non-orthodox" organization like the Friends who were themselves chastised by Protestant foes as crypto-Catholics. The question is important, Hall points out, because on it hinges the specification of a casual process: was abolitionism generated by a conflictual configuration similar to yet independent from the conflictual configuration in Iberian settings—or was it, at least partially, generated by the Protestant adoption of a Catholic practice? At this point, the most judicious answer seems to be "both" while my critics' suggestions feed my curiosity to know more about the interactions happening across and despite the highly policed confessional boundary.

Another set of issues relate to aspects of the comparative analysis that I, rightly or not, "blurred" in the book, namely the differing "political opportunity structures" of the Iberian and British empires. One such issue arises from Sassi's observation of the role of non-whites and non-Europeans in the configuration of long-distance advocacy. I wanted to highlight one important aspect of that dynamic: the political alliances between humanitarians and indigenous elites, something that happened in sixteenth-century Mexico and Peru and eighteenth-century Pennsylvania. As abolitionism, unlike Catholic pro-indigenism, was focused on the issue of slavery, the picture is more complicated in that across empires the enslaved (mostly Africans) had less access to political power than indigenous people who were able to take advantage of their political organization to withstand the assault of European colonizers. What is remarkable in the Anglo-American context, thus, is the lack of non-whites in positions of authority. There was in Anglo-American abolitionism no non-white leader of the stature of Julien Raimond in France or someone like Dionisio Inca Yupangui at the 1810 Cortes of Cádiz. And this is not a reflection of the inherent agency potential of enslaved Africans. It was rather the outcome of the remarkably stronger racial boundary policing in the Protestant case which suppressed the possibility for political expression by the enslaved. Here is an "exogenous" factor that excluded the enslaved from participating in the shaping of the abolitionist project. Paradoxically,

abolitionism was stronger in the Anglo-American imperial world where a more exclusionary racial regime circumscribed more strictly the political role of individuals unable to claim full "whiteness."

Hall notes that I could have devoted more attention to the differential ability of the state to suppress humanitarianism and to the availability, in the British case, of mass petitioning as a mobilization tool that contributed to the configuration of long-distance advocacy. These points usefully sharpen the comparison between the Spanish and British imperial cases by focusing on their significantly different political cultures that interacted with mobilization around distant issues. I avoided a strong causal statement on both counts because, upon a closer look, here the comparability of the two cases was severely stretched. Hall's two points refer to an important difference between a more participatory if not proto-democratic political practice in the British case and a more traditionalist, clientelistic political practice in absolutist Iberia. Yet when we consider, for example, the ability of the state to suppress humanitarian agitation there are at least two additional dimensions that complicate the Spanish-British comparison: a distinctly different configuration of the imperial state and a distinctly different configuration of the religious field. My point here is indeed configurational: it would be unwise to grant the development of a more participatory political practice in the British case a status of an "independent" variable unconnected with developments in the state and religious field. And teasing out these complex causal dependencies could have easily produced another book.

Take the example of public petitioning which Zaret and others have shown to be an important element in the emergence of a proto-democratic public sphere in England. As Hall points out, it would be impossible to understand the institutionalization of a distinctively "mass" humanitarianism without the late eighteenth century British petitioning campaigns against the slave trade—something that won't happen in Spain until the late 19th century and on the British model (Schmidt-Nowara 1999). Yet seen in the larger historical perspective, the distinction between Spanish friars petitioning the Crown and the Council of Indies and Manchester artisans petitioning the House of Commons is less clear-cut. Throughout the nineteenth century, public petitioning in Britain preserved the characteristics of its "pre-modern" origins as a humble act of supplicating political authority for a favor. The traces of this origin were preserved in the petitioning "etiquette": a distinctive humble language had to be employed, only parchment and not paper could be used, the presentation of the petition whether to the Crown or the houses of Parliament had to follow a highly circumscribed ritual. In short, this wasn't a case (like today) of a political entrepreneur identifying an issue and then collecting signatures for support. The possibility of ordinary people, and occasionally women, to add their signatures to a petition clearly opened up the prospect of democratic participation, yet the parameters of that participation remained limited by the traditionalist rules of obedience and humiliation in front of political authorities. Returning to the issue of humanitarianism, the interesting circumstance here is that the historical transformation of long-distance advocacy into a "mass" or "democratic" practice sprang not necessarily from an increasing popular awareness of distant suffering or from the democratization of political practice. It just happened so that in the specific British context abolitionist political entrepreneurs saw the utility of petitioning as part of a strategy to capture the authorities' attention. In this context, profusely signed

petitions were not so much the expression of a widespread humanitarian sentiment or public desire to take advantage of democratic participation for ethical purposes. The petitions are better interpreted as an index of the organizational dedication and savviness of abolitionists. The road towards a more "democratic" humanitarianism didn't spring organically from the widening democratic participation, but was in a sense a historically contingent by-product of political actors' search for most effective practices.

It is in this sense, incidentally, that I emphasized the importance of "ordinary" folks like Benezet. I certainly didn't want to idealize the "small man" in history. As Sassi points out, Benezet was a remarkably savvy politician who knew how to try and get what he wanted from the powerful. But this is exactly the point that I wanted to make: the remarkable ability of people otherwise disconnected from the channels of grand politics to produce change by triggering a complex chain of events within the limitations of their otherwise disadvantageous political position.

To say that ordinary people mattered more than we think they did is a nice yet far from causal statement. In *Origins* I argued that what lent these people historical "efficacy" was their embeddedness in a culture of religious reformism, the source of their motivation to engage in a conflict with competing networks of empire. Moving from the larger comparative context to the more "micro" context of causal mechanisms, let me reflect on some of the alternative causal connections suggested by my critics. Sassi highlights the importance of the process of "moral shock," the transformative moment of "seeing" injustice that sets a person on a course of advocacy. This is a very good observation and a process I saw repeatedly occurring in the historical material. I downplayed it, however, because of the competing realization that there were also a lot of people who witnessed injustice, recognized it, yet did little or nothing about it—like, for example, Thomas Thompson, the missionary Sassi quotes. Or take the example of John Newton, the evangelical who not only joined the abolitionist movement in the 1780s but also bequeathed us a moving rendering of this transformative moment of "seeing" when he wrote "I once was blind but now I see." In his earlier career

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on slaving ships Newton had witnessed the cruelty of the slave trade yet had done nothing beyond registering his uneasiness with it, as when he wrote in his 1764 memoirs that he considered himself "a sort of Goaler or Turnkey" and "was sometimes shocked with an employment that was perpetually conversant with chains, bolts, and shackles." This did not translate, however, into abolitionist action until Newton was recruited by the Quaker-dominated London Abolition Committee. There was thus something "deeper" then just the witnessing of injustice that drove certain, but not other, individuals into a confrontational trajectory and my analysis tried to identify that deeper factor.

Is it possible, as Sassi again suggests, to identify a specific theology as the important element that accounts for this process of moral radicalization? Again, the evidence is inconclusive in the sense that there was no single doctrinal position shared by those

religious actors who initiated activities in defense of imperial "others." There is hardly any common theological ground between the friars, Jesuits, Quakers, "New Divinity" men, Methodists, Baptists and Unitarians who were the inventors and early adopters of humanitarian practices. The only commonality pertains not so much to their doctrinal position but rather to the assumption of the Old Testament stance of prophetic critique and reformism, of an engagement with the world and restoring a fallen world to the imperatives of divinely ordained precepts—and this is the link between the development of humanitarianism and reform of empire that Turner notes.

Hall is more receptive to the causal centrality of such radical religious reformism in the processes I analyze yet asks if it offers "an adequate explanation" per se, apart from the larger global structural transformations. I agree that it would be far-fetched to explain the formation of long-distance advocacy as simply arising organically from radicalized religion. My claim is more modest: that such religious reformism with radical potential was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition within the historically contingent institutional trajectory of long-distance advocacy as we know it.

What does all this mean in an exceedingly long historical framework that Turner's comments skillfully bring in? Is my account, from a "cosmological" view, the historical unfolding of the "energies" that condensed in Jasper's "Axial Age"? I hesitate to make a clear statement here, partly because I'm not entirely sure about the empirical utility of the Axial Age concept (Boy and Torpey 2013). But also I'm struck by the powerful working of historical contingencies in the evolution and "survival" of institutions. What would Christianity have looked like if the Roman imperial court had identified with the so-called Arian version and not the "Trinitarian" orthodox version of Christianity? What would have been the implication of such alternative Christianity to the development of Western institutions and culture? By raising such questions I want to advocate further inquiry along the "double optique" I attempted in *Origins*: the uneasy combination of the study of long-term developments with attention to concrete, historically contingent and often local casual dependencies.

And here I want to "fine-tune" the optimist overtones Turner rightfully hears in my account. My intention was to sound hopeful, not Panglossian. I believe that the hard work of dedicated individuals (with all their foibles and errors) to confront injustice and change moral norms deserve recognition and serves as inspiration to us, if only because it shows that change is possible. As I write this, thousands of African and Asian clandestine immigrants across the Mediterranean are facing the contemporary version of the old slave trade. In the heart of Europe, criminal gangs are forcing the vulnerable into prostitution and inhuman labor. People are suffering, caught between the cupidity of those seeking easy profit from the exploitation of other human beings and the inability of states to effectively and justly regulate labor conditions and migration. Clearly, the work is unfinished.* Yet the example of people like Las Casas and Benezet tells us that this is a work that we can and should commit to.

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**Editors Note: See Vogel's panel (p. 6) which takes up the question of how comparative and historical sociologists might contribute to this "unfinished" humanitarian work.*

Book Symposium

Sinews of the nation:
constructing Irish and Zionist bonds in the United States

Polity Press

Dan Lainer-Vos

Editor's Note: The following text is based on an author-meets-critics session that took place at the Social Science History Association Annual Meeting in November, 2014. My thanks to Lyn Spillman, Beth Popp Berman, Bart Bonikowski and Dan Lainer-Vos for agreeing to prepare their comments for the newsletter.

Cultural Forms of Resource Mobilization and their Consequences

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In *Sinews of the Nation*, Dan Lainer-Vos makes a major contribution to scholarship on nationalism. In doing so, he also makes significant contributions to historical and economic sociology. This book is innovative and exciting, and likely to have a long-term impact by opening several productive new lines of research.

Although comparative-historical sociologists are centrally concerned with understanding large-scale, long-term social changes, nation-formation has typically remained something of a peripheral topic, and comparative-historical contributions to the vast interdisciplinary literature on nations and nation-formation have been relatively sparse (Spillman and Faeges 2005). *Sinews of the Nation* refreshes historical sociology by examining processes of nation-formation from an entirely new angle, and offering important theoretical advances for understanding these processes.

Drawing on extensive research in nine archives, Lainer-Vos investigates and compares how Irish and Jewish diaspora communities in the United States were mobilized as their respective nation-states were formed. In particular, he explores how economic exchange between diaspora and homeland movements was understood in different ways as a form of national attachment. Whereas contemporary theories of nation-formation emphasize the ongoing cultural construction and reconstruction of national identities in terms of the meanings of the commonalities and differences they encompass, Lainer-Vos challenges this approach and emphasizes instead the practical organizational accomplishment of national attachments. This important argument draws attention to influences on nation-formation which have been almost entirely neglected in previous scholarship.

The argument of the book is deeply grounded, both theoretically and empirically. The first two chapters open up new research questions. Rather than asking why national movements succeed or fail to mobilize relevant groups in their cause – inviting responses in terms of cultural framing and identification – Lainer-Vos asks *how* they do so, and what difference those organizational processes make in

creating attachments. And whereas previous investigations of these "how" questions have usually treated nationalism as a political movement, emerging (or not) on the basis of pre-existing identities, this book focuses instead on what we could term the cultural consequences of resource mobilization. To do so, Lainer-Vos establishes a new theoretical framework drawn from recent economic sociology, analyzing how gift giving, market exchange and, most importantly, hybrid transactions (with blurred, indeterminate boundaries) are mobilized as nation-building processes. This theoretical framework connecting economic sociology and the political sociology of nation-formation is a major contribution, and it offers exciting implications well beyond the Irish and Jewish cases.

...the focus on nations as organizational accomplishments makes a genuinely important step beyond existing scholarship, which usually emphasizes either the cultural construction (and challenge) of shared symbols and rituals or the politics of integration and separation, often taking for granted the processes of resource mobilization involved.

Against this background, *Sinews of the Nation* continues by comparing the two cases, with a close analysis of archival evidence of the initiation of diaspora charitable giving, for instance by fostering status competition to replace the reciprocity of gifts, and gift giving as enrolling members in the nation (ch. 3); of emergent contradictions in both cases in interpretation of the gifts and of national membership, and the conflicts they generated between homeland and diaspora groups (ch. 4); of the creation of bond offerings intended to resolve those conflicts, paradoxically introducing an element of market exchange to tighten the national bond (ch. 5); and of how the differential success of those offerings in the two cases influenced subsequent national attachments (ch. 6). Lainer-Vos' assemblage of evidence from many vivid episodes in the politics of diaspora fund-raising make all this an engaging read: it is a long time since I have seen such genuinely new and interesting evidence about nation-building. Two concluding chapters delve more deeply into the implications of these outcomes. Rejecting explanations in terms of initial conditions, Lainer-Vos emphasizes instead the cultural entrepreneurship of organizations, especially in managing the interpretation of diaspora gifts. He also expands on the implications of his theory of nations as "organizational accomplishments."

So *Sinews of the Nation* makes a theoretically important argument which is also empirically interesting and deeply grounded in extensive archival evidence. In my view, several unique features make this book important for comparative-historical sociologists.

First, the focus on nations as organizational accomplishments makes a genuinely important step beyond existing scholarship, which usually emphasizes either the cultural construction (and challenge) of shared symbols and rituals or the politics of integration and separation, often taking for granted the processes of resource mobilization involved. This argument draws attention to some influences on nation-formation which have been almost entirely neglected or misunderstood in previous scholarship. Of particular importance is the counter-intuitive reversal of common sense assumptions, that identity and attachment are not only a motivation for practical support, but also a

consequence. The insightful argument that the cultural framing of resource mobilization may generate, strengthen or weaken attachment should make us reconsider many now standardized corners of the literature on nationalism, from arguments about "tradition or modernity," to analysis of federalism and regional groupings, to theories of immigrant incorporation.

Second, the argument that national identity is better conceptualized as national attachment makes a lucid and clarifying amendment to the field which has been necessary for some time. As Lainer-Vos argues, "attachment" carries less baggage: it does not incline us to assume commonalities, it directs attention to mechanisms, it may be a matter of degree, and it encompasses both instrumental and non-instrumental motivation (e.g. 168-69). Most research on national "identity" as a cultural construction is not naive about any of these issues, but thinking in terms of attachment allows a clearer distinction between actors' various motivations and available symbolic repertoires. Conceptualizating national identity as national attachment is particularly valuable, I think, for analyzing center-periphery variation in nations (Spillman 1997, 34-37), and for comparing nations with other forms of political community (Spillman and Faeges 2004, 436).

Third, the connections between economic exchange, gift-giving, and nationalism which are well theorized here are extremely insightful and productive. They create synergies between economic and political sociology which, in hindsight, seem like they should have been recognized long ago, and are genuinely exciting for scholars like me who have worked in the field for some time. We need to return to all the questions about the ways populations unify across difference, and establish boundaries with other nations, and reconsider them in the light of the theories of embedded exchange now common in economic sociology. For instance, what would Benedict Anderson's "imagined community" look like if we added another dimension– not only the cultural connections across populations and time, but also their grounding in expanding markets? How important are nationalizing markets for forming national attachments? Some neglected classics in the comparative-historical sociology of the nation, such as Deutsch's *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1962), could get a new lease on life with recent theory on the embeddedness of economic action.

So for all these reasons and more, I hope this book will be influential in re-invigorating the comparative historical sociology of nationalism, not to mention our investigation of other collective identities. But what should scholars building on this work beware of, and what could they do better?

First, I think Lainer-Vos makes something of a straw man of previous approaches in terms of "identity," and of investigations of symbolic representation and symbolic repertoires. Certainly, his emphasis on organizational accomplishments and forms of exchange adds something new and important to previous studies: but he sometimes give the impression that he is challenging some sort of Parsonian stereotype, and that studies of national identity in terms of representation have neglected difference, variation, and organization. Nothing could be further from the truth: to read the term "identity" as suggesting commonality and sharing would be to ignore the main thrust of recent literature. And it is also important to recognize that the organizational processes he identifies – processes resulting in blurred boundaries, for example, or establishing hierarchical national membership – are processes of cultural production. Unlike the author, I see his contribution very much as an extension of "social constructivism," not a critique. Perhaps

we are not quite all cultural sociologists now, but avoiding a simple binary in favor of an argument about previously unrecognized cultural mechanisms would seem to me to be more productive in future work.

Second, future scholars building on this work could strengthen its methodological rationale. Lainer-Vos makes a strong case that variable-based comparative research design emphasizing different initial conditions leading to different outcomes misses too much about the processes he analyzes to be useful, and emphasizes instead close comparison in process-tracing of similar groups facing similar problems to identify mechanisms of national attachment. His work is easily understood in terms of recent methodological reflections which make the case for moving beyond variable-based explanation in more depth (e.g. Calhoun 1998; Steinmetz 2004; Spillman 2004; Timmermans and Tavory 2014; Hirschman and Reed 2014). Future scholars could do more to articulate a strong rationale for the sort of comparative process-tracing for which Lainer-Vos provides an exemplar, and to develop appropriate criteria for its assessment.

Clearly, though, these improvements – fuller recognition of the cultural nature of the argument about organizational accomplishments, and more explicit development of the epistemological grounds of the comparative logic – are minor quibbles about the achievement of *Sinews of the Nation*, and more suggestions for the future than criticism of the existing work. I hope to see more scholars making the connection between the theoretical tools offered by economic sociology and the problems preoccupying comparative-historical sociologists very soon.

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Comments on *Sinews of the Nation*

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The double meaning of the word "bonds" lies at the heart of Dan Lainer-Vos's *Sinews of the Nation: Constructing Irish and Zionist Bonds in the United States*. In this tightly argued work, Lainer-Vos carves out new space at the intersection of political sociology — and particularly the study of nationalism — and economic sociology—specifically the cultural, relational strand pioneered by Viviana Zelizer (1983, 1994). The "bonds" in the book are, indeed, the mundane debt instruments used to raise capital. But they become much more, as nationalist organizations deploy them not only to raise money but to strengthen ties with

diaspora communities—sometimes with remarkable success; others with the opposite result.

The book is organized around two cases (Ireland circa 1920 and Israel circa 1950) in which ethnic organizations were raising funds from the American diaspora in support of an emergent nation. But while donations were considerable in both cases, relations between the homeland and the diaspora were not always smooth.

The Irish, for example, had in 1920 just declared an independent Parliament and felt that the Irish-Americans were perhaps not doing quite as much as they could on the financial front. They sent a representative to the U.S.-based Irish Victory Fund requesting an accounting statement.

The Irish-Americans reacted with dismay: "It is evident from the tone of your letters that you misunderstand the situation…we are under no obligation to submit statements to any other organization. In view of the assistance given to the Irish cause by the Friends of Irish Freedom permit me to add that the insinuation of threat contained in your letter…comes with very bad grace from one in your position" (p. 1). Similar tensions arose between the Israeli settlers in Palestine and Jewish Americans: one side saw the support as deserved and possibly insufficient; the other wanted recognition for all it had already done.

This tension sets up the central dilemma of the book: that the challenge of nation-building is not just about creating a cultural representation, but about building attachments that permit heterogeneous groups with diverse interests to develop lasting connections. The book's core argument, then, is that the creation of bonds — a strategy both nations turned to, with varying degrees of success — is a way to establish ties and produce national sentiment, not just transfer cash.

Yet the process of attachment also holds the possibility of detachment, as both cases show to different extents. What explains the varying success of such efforts? Here *Sinews* draws on science and technology studies (STS) and organizational sociology to make its argument. Rather than treating the Irish case as a failure and the Israeli case as a success, and seeking explanations for their divergence, it acknowledges up front that such explanations are likely to be elusive, and outcomes overdetermined. Instead, Lainer-Vos focuses on identifying mechanisms that help produce attachment or detachment.

From STS comes a focus on bonds as technologies: sociotechnical devices with features that could elide the fraught question of whether a bond was more of a gift, as the diaspora tended to see it, or a market exchange, as homeland groups typically emphasized. Technical decisions about how to set interest rates, about periods of nontransferability, about repurchasing clauses and convertability into national currency — all these had the potential to smooth social relations by aligning the interests of the diaspora with that of the homeland and keeping the gift/exchange distinction indeterminate. By contrast, a poorly structured bond could cause, in Lainer-Vos's phrase, "forced clarification" of whether it was gift or exchange, disrupting a tenuous tie that depended on maintaining this ambiguity.

From organizational sociology comes attention to specific organizational processes through which ties are built and maintained. An "imagined community" (Anderson 1982) does not simply emerge, but must be achieved through "mundane administrative arrangements," to borrow Selznick's (1957) phrase. Success may result from perfecting the technique of "card-calling," in which pre-selected individuals are called upon at a public dinner to increase their previous donation,

forcing others to step up their game. Or failure may occur because poor bureaucratic procedures for getting paper bonds to bond-buyers generates distrust and detachment.

This is a book, then, that is not seeking to identify some general set of conditions leading to greater or lesser success at "bonding" the nation. Instead, it aims to identify particular, local details that explain outcomes at specific historical moments: how one set of techniques worsened a particular inter-organizational conflict, how another organizational practice rewarded those who bought or sold a particular quantity of bonds, and so on.

In veering away from the grand, macrohistorical explanations of a Barrington Moore or a Theda Skocpol, we have moved more and more toward contingency, small-scale patterns, and local mechanisms. As much as we might admire classic comparative-historical works, how many of us really believe that revolutions, or the emergence of capitalism, or democracy, or whatever other standard problem of comparative-historical sociology can be explained by the presence or absence of a handful of factors?

The book is well-researched, well-argued, and innovative in its framing. It is a significant contribution to comparative-historical sociology. But in the rest of my comments I want to identify one critique, point to one possible path out of it, and suggest one broader conversation the book might profitably open up.

Comparative-historical sociology's problem with mechanisms

First, the critique. *Sinews of the Nation's* focus on mechanisms and contingency is its strength, and, perhaps, also its weakness. Lainer-Vos is quite successful at marshalling evidence in support of his claims—that bonds, and in particular their technical characteristics and the organizational practices of those who create them—actually produce attachments, and sometimes disattachments, between nations and their diasporas. I especially admire the book's attention to the ways that technical decisions structure social relations.

Yet while the book repeatedly, and with good reason, says it is not attempting to explain why the Israeli case succeeded while the Irish case failed, I nevertheless found myself wanting a greater theoretical payoff than a list of mechanisms that produce attachment or detachment. This is a trap that comparative-historical sociology finds itself in with some regularity these days, and one I am personally familiar with.

In veering away from the grand, macrohistorical explanations of a Barrington Moore or a Theda Skocpol, we have moved more and more toward contingency, small-scale patterns, and local mechanisms. As much as we might admire classic comparative-historical works, how many of us really believe that revolutions, or the emergence of capitalism, or democracy, or whatever other standard problem of comparative-historical sociology can be explained by the presence or absence of a handful of factors?

Yet in moving to mechanisms, we are admitting the weakness of our whole project: that history doesn't have simple causal explanations, or even conjunctural ones; that while some patterns may repeat themselves, we'll never be able to predict when we'll see them or identify scope conditions for their

emergence; that, with their respect for complexity, contingency, and the uniqueness of particular times and places, the historians were right all along — we comparative-historical sociologists are trying to do the impossible. We are reduced to saying, "Here's a list of things that can cause other things—if historical circumstances are right."

And maybe that's the best we can do. Certainly it's more honest than a one- or two-variable explanation of some macrohistorical process. But as someone who hasn't entirely given up on the project of social science, however qualified, it's less than satisfying.

A way forward?

One path out of this might be to accumulate and systematize our observations about mechanisms and processes: to work harder to identify commonalities across disparate situations, to think more rigorously about when certain ones come into play or not. But most mechanism-and-processes work, including that done by *Sinews*, takes a very historically specific approach to considering its mechanisms. We are left with just-so stories: entirely plausible accounts of why things turned out a particular way in a particular case, but with no well-defined sense of when we would or wouldn't expect to see events unfolding similarly. Having abandoned macrohistorical explanation, but unwilling to follow historians and fully embrace contingency, we risk becoming mediocre historians with a penchant for abstraction.

That need not be the case, however. For *Sinews*, the "zone of indeterminacy" created by bonds is one good candidate for such theoretical extension. Part of what works about bonds as a means of attachment is their dual character. They can simultaneously be seen by people in the homeland as an investment, and by those in the diaspora as a gift.

This property of bonds—their multivocality—has considerable overlap with several other concepts we already have. Working to clarify the similarities and differences among these would be valuable. Lainer-Vos's zone of indeterminacy has affinities with Padgett and Ansell's robust action (1993, and further developed in Padgett and Powell 2012), in which certain identities simultaneously do different work in multiple networks. It brings to mind Abbott's (2005) concept of hinges in linked ecologies, in which an organizational actor can pursue strategies that work for it simultaneously in two different ecologies. And it overlaps with Peter Galison's (1997) trading zones, in which different scientific communities exchange objects to which they may ascribe quite different meanings.

Having abandoned macrohistorical explanation, but unwilling to follow historians and fully embrace contingency, we risk becoming mediocre historians with a penchant for abstraction.

Thus one could imagine putting *Sinews of the Nation* into conversation with all this other scholarship to think more generally about the ways that cultural objects do work in different networks (fields, ecologies, communities) through multivocality. This kind of theoretical move would push toward greater generality without turning to reductionist explanations of historical outcomes.

A fiscal sociology of nation-building

Finally, the book's conclusion discusses how its findings might be opened up to think about other kinds of community that might be

produced in similar ways. For example, it proposes that bonds might serve as a means to produce ties within the homeland as well as among the diaspora.

I think this could be pushed even further than Lainer-Vos suggests — that the book is laying the groundwork for a whole sociology of nation-building through fiscal processes. For example, taxes, as well as bonds, have the potential to produce attachments — think of the World-War-II-era Donald Duck cartoons meant to make people feel good about paying their income tax.[1]

At the same time, just as the second wave of Irish bonds helped sever the relationship between the Irish and their American diaspora, fiscal ties can be used for exclusion. South Carolina, for example, instituted sales taxes for the purpose of maintaining segregation.[2] Or consider the efforts of tax protest movements to mobilize negative sentiment around taxes, so that they become theft or slavery, not exchange or gift (Martin 2008). The multivocality of economic transactions may extend still further, and *Sinews* will perhaps provide inspiration for future scholars to consider other ways economic transactions produce and destroy various types of attachment to the nation.

In conclusion, Lainer-Vos has written a fine and potentially very generative work. I hope that a new generation of sociologists will continue to explore and develop this fruitful space in comparative-historical sociology.

Endnotes

1. Images from these cartoons can be found here: http://www.themarysue.com/tax-day-donald-duck-video/

2. I thank Beth Pearson for this example.

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Comments on *Sinews of the Nation*

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Dan Lainer-Vos's *Sinews of the Nation* is an exciting book that covers important new ground in research on diasporic nationalism. By treating transnational fundraising on behalf of nascent nation-states not as a byproduct of preexisting patriotic sentiments, but as a constitutive process in the creation and intensification of new national attachments (or what he calls "enrolling the diaspora in the nation"), Lainer-Vos brings into nationalism research insights from economic sociology and the study of organizations — two literatures that nationalism scholars have ignored for too long. The resulting account is as original as it is insightful, both for illuminating its empirical cases — those of Irish and Jewish Americans

and their relationships to their imagined homelands — and for enriching our understanding of how organizationally mediated financial transactions figure in the production of groupness. Before offering some thoughts on possible elaborations of the book's arguments, I want to highlight a few of its many theoretical merits.

First, while most nationalism research situates its objects of analysis at either the macro level (as in Gellner's account of the impact of industrialization on the rise of the nation-state) or the micro level (as in the many survey-based analyses of nationalist attitudes), *Sinews of the Nation* investigates the production of national sentiment at the meso level of organizational processes that mediate between individuals and social institutions. This is true of both its explanandum and its explanantia: the outcome to be explained across the two empirical cases is the degree of national attachment found in each transnational community and the primary cause, according to Lainer-Vos, is the specific form taken by economic exchange relations that interpellate donors as co-nationals: in the case of Irish Americans, the funding efforts faltered because they were interpreted largely through the framework of charitable giving, while in the case of Jewish Americans, they succeeded because the specific structure of the transactions complicated the distinction between donation and investment (the divergent meanings in the two cases mattered because they shaped the mutual expectations of the respective home and diaspora communities and determined the structure of the ethnic organizations that managed the transnational relationship). As a result of this meso-level focus, Lainer-Vos's explanation is able to steer clear of problematic claims about the causal power of abstract social forces or the singular accomplishments of powerful individuals; instead, his book follows, in rich detail, the operations of concrete organizations embedded in transnational fields of cooperation and competition, which generate complex and often cross-cutting incentives for organizational leaders. While the meticulous attention to the nuances of the archival material gives the book the feel of a serious work of history, Lainer-Vos never loses sight of his primary objective of constructing generalizable sociological theory.

Second, the outcome on which the book focuses is itself highly innovative and consequential for nationalism research, because it shifts the emphasis from the study of national identity (i.e., a set of stable and widely held principles that define a nation's political culture) to the study of national attachment (i.e., the degree to which identification with the nation supersedes other collective affiliations). Heeding Brubaker's (2004) call to turn the constants of nationalism research into processual variables, *Sinews of the Nation* asks under what circumstances members of a diaspora feel a sense of attachment to the ancestral nation and when such attachment translates into political and economic action for that nation's benefit. This perspective explicitly takes into account the dynamism of national identification based on the classic insight that social identities, including national ones, vary in salience over time and across contexts (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Collins 2012). It is an important but difficult task for scholars of nationalism to systematically trace such variation, but *Sinews of the Nation* takes this problem seriously and offers a clever solution: instead of aggregating individual-level data on social identities, Lainer-Vos operationalizes the strength of national attachment in a given community based on the vigor of that community's organizational life.

Third, few studies of nationalism have taken the meaningfulness of economic processes seriously, but this is precisely the core preoccupation of Lainer-Vos's book. While the

modernist tradition in nationalism scholarship makes frequent references to large-scale economic transformations, such as the rise of print capitalism (Anderson 1983) or educational reforms necessitated by an increasingly rationalized work force (Gellner 1983), these accounts entail multiple levels of abstraction from concrete economic exchanges embedded in everyday social interactions. In contrast, *Sinews of the Nation* draws on theoretical advances in economic sociology concerning the mutual constitution of exchange media and social relations (Zelizer 1996) and weaves them together with an organizational field analysis to demonstrate that specific decisions about the form and timing of diaspora financial support have major consequences for nation-building. As the book demonstrates, it is the inherently relational and deeply meaningful nature of economic transactions that makes them such powerful tools in the production of shared national belonging.

One implicit (and on occasion, explicit) claim in the book is that economic exchange is an integral element of nation-building in general. I wonder, however, whether this is actually the case and, if so, on what kinds of transactions scholars should focus when studying other cases, such as the early American republic or post-Revolutionary France.

Finally, the book's core thesis relies on a number of original and generative theoretical claims. For instance, the accepted wisdom in nationalism research is that elites use calculated, instrumental action to foster nationalist sentiments in the populace, which in turn give legitimacy to the elites' nation-state building projects. This perspective affords elites considerable political agency but treats everyday people as primarily motivated by disinterested (and irrational) collective sentiments. In contrast, Lainer-Vos demonstrates that inherently interested economic behavior can be a crucial mechanism through which everyday people come to develop nationalist sentiments. A second example of the book's theoretical insight is the argument that the persistence of unresolved ambiguities concerning the legitimacy of national membership across subsets of the national community (in this case the diaspora vs. the population residing in the home nation) can actually be much more productive for the nation-building project than the open airing of differences. While both empirical cases involved the simultaneous drawing and blurring of group boundaries, it was the lack of agreement—and more importantly, the lack of open discussion about this lack of agreement—about the meaning of both the Israel bonds and the Jewish-American community's status vis-à-vis Israel that allowed for the successful integration of the Israeli diaspora into the nation. This suggests that successful nation-building may rely as much on the subtle regulation of difference than on its systematic eradication.

These stimulating contributions of *Sinews of the Nation* raise a number of questions for further consideration. As with any work of theory building, it is essential to consider the scope conditions within which the posited explanatory processes are likely to work. One implicit (and on occasion, explicit) claim in the book is that economic exchange is an integral element of nation-building in general. I wonder, however, whether this is actually the case and, if so, on what kinds of transactions scholars should focus when studying other cases, such as the early American republic or post-Revolutionary France. It seems plausible

to argue that the primacy of financial contributions in the development of national sentiments is a particular feature of diaspora nationalism, which is characterized by long-distance social relations rather than by more immediate interactions with co-nationals or the institutions of the nation-state. If this is the case, do most diasporas engage in some form of transnational financial support? And does national attachment typically follow rather than precede such economic relations?

Relatedly, one of the central claims in the book is that for purposes of nation-building, it is productive to leave unresolved the existence of multiple categories of legitimate belonging (with the diaspora typically being viewed as possessing a less legitimate claim to national membership than the home population) and instead focus on the overlapping interests that unite distinct co-national communities. The logic here is that when differences in status between groups are openly raised, the resulting social cleavages can generate impediments for the nation-building project. This approach echoes Lainer-Vos's (2014) other work, which stresses the importance of self-conscious difference in the successful construction of shared national beloning. This is a compelling argument, but it raises the question of why so many cases of nation-building feature explicit attempts by political elites to construct cultural sameness — usually through ideological means but all-too-frequently through coercion as well — within the national population. Perhaps a more careful management of status ambiguity between home and diaspora would have enhanced the chances of the Irish bonds' success, but if so, that is because this status difference was inherently malleable and relative; no one questioned the ethnic "Irishness" of the diasporic donors, who were uniformly white, Catholic, and of Irish ancestry. Is the strategy of ignoring differences plausible in cases where other cleavages, such as racial or religious difference, are present in the national population? Or is the baseline assumption of common national membership a necessary prerequisite for the "overlapping interests" paradigm?

The scope conditions of the book's arguments aside, one issue that is largely unaddressed by the narrative is the likely importance of political differences between the homeland and the diaspora. In many cases of large-scale migration, the political tendencies of diaspora populations become decoupled over time from those of the home populations, often resulting in the diaspora being more politically radical. This may be a result of selection processes (who emigrates) or certain features common to the migration experience itself (longing for an ossified version of home). We see some evidence for this in the book's discussion of the Jewish American critique of Israeli socialism and concomitant attempts to encourage free market reforms. We also see it in the Irish Americans' outrage at Irish leaders' conciliatory moves toward England and disagreements across the Atlantic about the implications of the newly formed League of Nations for Irish nationalism. It seems important to consider to what extent these political differences — rather than the diaspora's position vis-a-vis the nation or ethnic organizations' competition over resources (i.e., the mechanisms posited in the book) — are the primary factors shaping the diasporic nation-building process. It could be the case that particular political positions of the national leaders discussed in the book played as important a role in shaping the outcomes in question as did any inherent qualities of the financial transactions involved.

Another fascinating argument in the book is that participation in transnational fundraising created strong bonds to the nation among the diasporas where none had existed before. Yet, early chapters of the book mention a number

of ways in which members of the Irish and Jewish diasporas had been deeply interested in and committed to their respective homelands prior to the inception of the donation and bond programs. It is interesting to think about the kinds of data that would be necessary to resolve this seeming contradiction. Would opinion polls before and after the charity and bond drives reveal differential levels of commitment to the homeland? Or are public attitudes not sufficient for measuring the degree of the diaspora's "enrollment in the nation"? Is richness of organizational life oriented toward supporting the nation a better measure of attachment? These are partly questions about operationalization, but they also get at the heart of what it is that we mean by national attachment. More generally, it would not be surprising to find that some degree of national attachment must pre-exist the kinds of fundraising efforts described in the book — otherwise, such efforts would have been unlikely to succeed in the first place.

Finally, in the spirit of imagining alternative mechanisms for the causal processes outlined in the book, it seems worth considering whether the book's account could be interpreted not primarily as a case of nation-building, where success depends on the ability of elites to bring diasporas into the national fold, but rather as a case of organizational conflict in the transnational social movement field. In particular, the major crises of the charity and bond drives arose from the unusual structural position of the diaspora organizations as intermediaries between the émigré communities and the home state. One could argue that when relations soured and the Irish and Israeli state (or quasi-state) agencies launched critiques of the U.S. organizations, they were not critiquing the diaspora itself in an effort to place it on the periphery of the nation, but rather, that they were accusing the intermediary organizations of exploiting their members and reneging on their prior financial commitments. If so, it would appear that the diasporas were in fact treated as part of the Irish or Israeli nations, but that those communities' unelected representatives in the ethnic fundraising organizations took advantage of their generosity (and in the process usurped power from the home state). This raises the possibility that Lainer-Vos's narrative could be reinterpreted as an account of organizational competition as an end in itself rather than as a means to diasporic nation-building.

I raise the above issues not as strong critiques of this excellent book, but as starting points for further discussion. What is clear to me is that *Sinews of the Nation* marks an important achievement in the sociology of nationalism, which is bound to spur important new research on the role of economic exchange and organizational activity in the production of national attachment. I highly recommend the book to anyone interested in political identity formation, migration, and economic sociology. It is a truly illuminating and engaging piece of scholarship.

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Author's Response

Dan Lainer-Vos
University of Southern California

It is an unusual privilege to discuss my book with three brilliant scholars. Thank you for taking the time to so deeply engage with my work. I will try to reciprocate for your intellectual generosity in my response.

Comparing the Irish and Zionist cases

One of the key challenges I confronted while writing *Sinews of the Nation*, which did not escape my critics' attention, was coming up with a method for comparing the Irish and Israeli cases. The problem was not so much lack of comparative methods, but the dominance and intuitive nature of one comparative approach that I find inadequate. Under the influence of the works of Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol, and of multivariate analysis more generally, we almost automatically seek explanations in similarities and differences in initial conditions and outcomes. The different religious and socio-economic backgrounds of the Irish- and Jewish-American communities, as well as their different political status, and their different historical trajectories offer almost automatic answer to why the Irish case developed the way it did and the Jewish-Zionist followed a different trajectory.

Trying to make sense of my data, however, I became increasingly skeptical about this approach. In the first place, given the many differences between the Irish and Jewish cases, attempting to identify one or even a cluster of factors that could "explain" the different outcomes was futile. There were simply too many moving parts in this puzzle to allow for an unambiguous solution. Second, and more fundamentally, upon close inspection it became clear that the effect of key variables, even ones that seem unproblematic at first glance, was unpredictable. Difference in political status, for example, seems like a straightforward way of explaining success or failure in bond floating. At the time of the issue of the bonds, Israel was a state whereas the Irish Republic was more wishful thinking than a reality. Yet, as I delved into the data, I realized that the political status of Israel was a challenge or an obstacle, not a straightforward advantage. In the Irish case, to my surprise, very few actors were concerned about the shaky political status of the so-called "Irish Republic." A good number of other seemingly important variables displayed similar variability. What good are these macro-historical variables if their effect on the ground is indeterminate? Finally, I was also concerned about the a-priori nature of variable-based comparisons. Variable-based comparative analysis requires the analyst to prepare a list of key variables or factors ahead of time and much of the empirical work consists of measuring these variables. This approach makes it unlikely that we will identify new and previously unattended factors and processes that affect historical events.

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Looking for an alternative comparative method, I came across Jeffrey Haydu's fantastic work on "reiterated problem solving"

(Haydu, 1998, 2009). Rather than anchoring explanations in difference in initial conditions, Haydu urges researchers to focus on the process through which actors confront more-or-less equivalent problem situations. While originally developed for a different purpose, this method provides a simple, hands-on, open-ended way of comparing cases.

I still believe that this pragmatic process-oriented approach is promising but it obviously suffers from some problems and limitations. First, as Spillman points out, the problem-solving comparative approach I use in the book is no more than a rule of thumb for collecting and organizing data, not a fully articulated method. To pose a real alternative to variable-based comparisons, scholars (myself included) will have to better articulate the rationale for their solutions. Working out the rationale of this new approach also requires, as Spillman points out, developing criteria for assessment of explanations. I wholeheartedly agree with this point.

Seriously addressing this issue would require more than I can do here, but I want to suggest a few ideas for how this could be done. In my understanding, the main virtue of the problem-solving comparative approach is in providing flexible but clear guidance for inclusion and exclusion of data. In principle, the data to be included in the analysis is composed of the obstacles that key actors encounter and the solutions they devise in order to overcome them; nothing less and, equally important, nothing more. That is, a priori beliefs about the importance of particular factors or variables should not serve as a guide for the investigation, no matter how strongly we believe that class or religion or gender or what have you shape social life. Instead, the actors' own actions are the best guides for the inclusion and exclusion of data, not the researchers' conviction.

This principle can and should be used as criteria for the evaluation of research. A good problem-solving account must reject the temptation to include in the analysis hidden processes that lurk under the surface but that, nevertheless, fail to appear directly and explicitly in the problem-solving process. The complimentary criterion for this principle of exclusion is the idea that the analysis must include all the processes that preoccupy the actors in the course of solving the problems they confront. A good problem-solving account should not permit the bracketing away of processes that preoccupy the actors themselves, even if they deem it somehow outside the purview of the research.

It is important to note that these guidelines or criteria for assessment hold also for non-comparative research. What a comparative problem-solving approach adds is a way to move between cases, using insights gleaned from one case to the other as a sensitizing tool for analyzing the other case. This moving back and forth between cases offers an empirically grounded way of transcending the particularities of individual cases. I can illustrate this point with an example from *Sinews of the Nation*. In the course of studying the Irish bond issue, I noticed that a few months after the first issue, subscribers that had filled out the application form and paid for their bonds but never received them showered the underwriting organization with bitter complaints. This organizational glitch discredited many local organizers in their communities and played a role in the failure of the second issue. I previously explored the Israeli case but back then I paid no special attention to the challenge of delivering bonds to subscribers. Realizing that in the Irish case delivery procedure was so consequential forced me back to the data of the Israeli case and this time, my search was more focused — I tried to understand how the organizer of this Israel bond issue delivered bonds to their

subscribers and escaped the problems that plagued the Irish case. As it turned out, the organizers of the Israel bond issue devised a more reliable system for the delivery of bonds, which served to increase confidence in the organization. The Irish case, therefore, gave me an empirically grounded clue for deepening my understanding of the Israeli case. Had I used a variable-based comparative method, I would have probably missed this dynamic altogether. This story might suggest that I am just obsessed about details but it has a broader theoretical significance because it helps make the case that nation building is an organizational accomplishment.

Berman points to another difficulty associated with process-tracing comparative approaches. While the grand variable-based comparisons of Moore and Skocpol, for example, offered general solutions, process oriented comparisons, mine included, rarely escape the particularities of the cases studied. In fact, the explicit argument, at least of my work, is that details and conjunctures of particular cases play a causal role and cannot be treated as mere "technicalities." As a result, Berman argues, we "are left with just so stories: entirely plausible accounts of why things turned out a particular way in a particular case, but with no well-defined sense of when we would or wouldn't expect to see events unfolding similarly." I can understand Berman's concern, but I do not believe that the price we pay in the move toward process-oriented analysis is so high. Yes, we run the risk of becoming "mediocre historians with a penchant for abstraction," but this is not all too bad (if we take away the "mediocre" at least…). We have a lot to learn from historians, especially when it comes to not letting theory take the front seat in our accounts. All too often, as Iddo Tavory and Stephan Timmermans point out, we see studies that "fit ideas into predetermined theoretical account" (2014). The empirical work, in such cases, is used merely for the purpose of illustration. If the pendulum of historical comparative sociology swung too far toward abstraction, a dosage of detailed engagement with data would be useful. Yes, the goal of such process-centered investigation is not really prediction but a more nuanced understanding of particular cases and perhaps also conceptual refinement. This aspiration may be less grand than those of the old grand theories, but it is more achievable.

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Multivocality and cooperation

Berman does not really bemoan the demise of the old comparative method as much as she looks for a way forward. In a nutshell, Berman suggests that in order to escape the "just so" accounts, historical comparative researchers should strive to identify commonalities across disparate situations and on the basis of those generate more robust generalizations. Specifically, Berman suggests exploring the different works that engage with the problem of multivocality and cooperation. This is a brilliant suggestion. I believe that we are witnessing a significant and under-theorized change in how we understand cooperation. In the old days, and Weber's work on bureaucracy illustrates this point well, scholars believed that cooperation is the byproduct of clarity and substantive agreements. Today, however, a slew of works suggest almost the

opposite — that sometimes multivocality, ambiguity and lack of consensus enable coordinated action. Working out the limits and scope conditions of this idea is a fantastic theoretical and empirical challenge. Of course, a study that engages with "trading zones" (Galison, 1997), "linked ecologies" (Abbott, 2005), "boundary objects" (Star & Griesemer, 1989) and "robust action" (Padgett & Ansell, 1993) will not be a study of nation building but that is beside the point—it will still be a very valuable endeavor. The pertinent question for this research is under what kind of conditions cooperation without consensus becomes possible. It would also be necessary to unpack the two terms: cooperation and consensus. I will add this project to my immediate to-do list!

Transactional nation building

Bonikowski, Berman and Spillman, in different ways, ask about the applicability of my argument in other settings. I believe that there is room for growth in what can be called "transactional nation building," i.e., an investigation into the various relational mechanisms that allow the diverse members of the nation to cooperate and take part in the national project. The bonds that stand at the center of *Sinews of the Nation* are obviously exceptional, both in terms of the specific quasi-philanthropic character of this transactional instrument and in terms of the populations engaged. Extending this research to other transactional instruments and other (within-homeland) settings presents a great opportunity for further research. In a thought-provoking article, James Sparrow coined the term "fiscal citizenship" to describe the emerging set of rights and obligations that developed from the sale of US war bonds during WWII (2008). In an implicit challenge to Tilly's preoccupation with soldiers and direct violence, Sparrow shows how the rights and obligations of citizenship become associated with an act of consumption. Exploring practices of taxation, as Berman suggested, would provide a way to increase the specificity of this transactional nation building research. Taking a cue from Margaret Levi's famous work on taxation and state building (1989), I believe that the mechanisms that would be found in such investigations would not rely only on coercion; the contours of these mechanisms remain to be discovered.

In my understanding, however, focusing on economic nation building mechanisms is too narrow. Nation builders can use a whole host of "goods" and processes in the process of attaching various groups to the nation. In an extension of chapter 3 of *Sinews of the Nation* that appeared recently in *Men and Masculinities* (2014), I looked on masculinities as "goods" that partake and take shape in the context of nation building. In this study, not money but masculinity emerges as a "good" that can be used in the regulation of the relationships between the groups that make up the nation. The mechanisms and processes that partake in

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nation building, in other words, are diverse, and we should study the entire repertoire of these mechanisms. The trick lies in finding a way to study these relations without being over-burdened by what has already been written on transactional nation building.

The place of difference and sameness in nation building

Spillman and Bonikowski take issue with my treatment of the concept of identity. Spillman suggests that I overlook recent studies that emphasize difference and variation in membership. Bonikowski, in contrast, questions the relationships between difference and sameness in the process of nation building. These are serious matters and I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify my position. With regards to the literature on identity, I believe that Brubaker and Cooper's critique of the term, although authored some decade and half ago, is still valid (2000). Brubaker and Cooper do not argue that the literature ignores difference but that it is bifurcated. Some scholars hold onto a "strong" conception of identity, which ignores difference. Others, which are more relevant here, acknowledge that identity is fragmented, ambivalent, fluid, etc. and proceed with a watered-down version of the term. The "weak" version of identity is good at pointing out the essentialist nature of the "strong" version but it is not very useful when it comes to describing processes of identity formation. Relatively few scholars take the extra step of showing how the fragmented nature of the nation plays a productive role in nation building and in identity formation (but see Bhabha, 1990; Surak, 2012). I hope that my work joins these trailblazing works.

As for the relation between difference and sameness in nation building, the inspiration for my thinking on this tension comes from Bruno Latour's *We have Never Been Modern* (1993). In this work, Latour describes the modern engagement with nature as consisting of simultaneous processes of purification and hybridization. Moderns (us all) constantly reach into "nature" and make it part of our lives (hybridization), while, at the same time, redraw the boundaries between "nature" and "society" (purification). Latour argues that the simultaneous performance of these seemingly contradictory practices defines modernity.

Latour's work has nothing to do with nationalism but I can borrow his metaphor. In my work on nation building I see nation builders that constantly announce, "we are one" (call it hybridization) while, in the same breath, claim "but you and I are different" (purification, maybe). These two contradictory utterances give ground to differential demands and to hierarchical conceptions of membership in the nation. While the book emphasizes the role of difference in nation building, I believe that the two moves — constructing homogeneity and constructing difference — play a crucial role in nation building. Take away the notion that deep down all Jews are alike, and no one would buy the Israeli bonds. As a consequence, Israeli and American Jews would drift apart. Take away the idea that American Jews are different from Israeli Jews, and bond subscribers will ask why they need to subsidize that other fragment of the nation and demand a businesslike return from their bonds. Nation building, from this perspective, is about balancing the tensions inherent in these two constructions in a way that allow distant strangers to relate to one another as belonging (differentially) in the same nation.

Another way of thinking about this problem is using Boltanski and Thévenot's concept of "orders of worth" (2006). Orders of worth, fundamentally, affect both homogenization and differentiation at the very same time. They place individuals on the same scale, but on different positions on that scale. Boltanski and Thévenot, of course, never wrote about a

"national order of worth" but their approach is open-ended and generative. It would not be hard to construct such national order in specific cases. If this suggestion carries merit, it may be useful to think about nation building less as the creation of an imaginary container wherein all individuals are somehow functionally equivalent, and more as the creation of a scale of sacrifices that comes along with special tests to determine the worth of different members of the nation.

The double role of "attachment"

Finally, Bonikowski points out that the book treats richness of organizational life as both a cause of national attachment and as an indication of the existence of such an attachment. This is a serious problem, and I admit that my treatment of these distinctions is not sufficiently clear. Bonikowski goes a step further and suggests that this tautology could be avoided by creating an independent measurement of attachment. In this design, organizational life would work as a cause only, and attachment would be measured by another instrument, perhaps a longitudinal attitude survey. Putting aside the practical difficulties of obtaining such a measurement in historical cases, I believe that the suggestion is sound. Such a survey, of course, would not be a complete trump card because there are so many confounding variables that can account for attitudinal change but still, the direction Bonikowski suggests is clearly the way to go. It is clear to me now that I should have been more careful in my thinking about this issue in the book.

The comments and suggestions of Spillman, Berman and Bonikowski gave me a lot to think about and I hope to continue and develop some of the lines suggested here in future publications. It is a real privilege to be given this kind of constructive attention. I am so deeply grateful. Thank you.

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Essays

Identities

Editors Note: The following essays mark the return of this newsletter's "Identities" feature. These are short autobiographical essays where section members reflect upon what drew them to comparative and historical sociology and how the latter has subsequently shaped their professional identities and influenced their research agendas. My thanks go out to Cedric de Leon and Emily Erikson for agreeing to contribute essays, and to past newsletter editors for hatching the original idea.

The Junkie

Cedric de Leon
Providence College

My gateway drug into comparative historical sociology was trade unionism. I majored in sociology at Yale in the 1990s, because I thought it gave me insight into the U.S. labor movement's then painful transition from a service model, in which unions treated workers like clients, to an organizing model, in which unions behaved more like militant social movements.

Between 1994 and 1997, I worked as a researcher and organizer for the United Farm Workers and the Service Employees International Union. What I remember most about those years was how smart union organizers seemed to be. They had this breezy way of quoting folks like Lenin, recommending abstruse readings like the Grundrisse, and saying stuff like, "The Republicans' existential dilemma is that they mourn the passage of the very world they helped to destroy." I thought for sure when I graduated from college in 1996 that I would be an organizer-for-life. It was hard work, but it was good work and romantic besides.

Little did I know that organizers work sixteen-hour days (I met workers at shift change: 7am, 3pm, and 11pm). I had barely any time to sleep, let alone read. Like so many young organizers in the 90s I burned out quickly, and when that happened all I wanted to do was go back to school. I went to Cambridge.

Cambridge University in those days was typically English in its preoccupation with social class. Though I myself saw the world in primarily class terms back then, I found it alienating that so few people talked about gender or racial inequality. Not even the prominent British sociologist, Paul Gilroy, was being assigned there; the only woman we ever read was Rosemary Crompton. Moreover, when Cambridge sociologists talked about class, they did so not in terms of class formation, which I would come to love years later, but in terms of stratification. The leading figure was John Goldthorpe of Nuffield College, Oxford, and everyone including the Cambridge crowd was reacting to him. I found the intellectual experience stale, even though socially it was one of the best times of my life. I knew then that to get the training I wanted I had to go back to the States, and that's how I ended up at the University of Michigan.

In contrast to Cambridge, Ann Arbor was intellectually alive. People were still buzzing off the historical and cultural turns. All the glamorous folks seemed to be doing interdisciplinary work and presenting at the

Program in the Comparative Study of Social Transformations (CSST). In our department, the leading lights were Julia Adams, Michael Kennedy, Howard Kimeldorf, Jeff Paige, Peggy Somers, and George Steinmetz. They were all comparative historical sociologists. Years later Mayer Zald would tell me that he thought Julia, George and the rest were going to take over the whole profession. Some folks were turned off by the whole scene, but I became a stone cold junkie.

I stumbled on a passage in Barrington Moore's* Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy *(1966) that I disagreed with completely. Having found my voice, I developed my own puzzle: why did American workers, who had been fierce critics of wage dependency, reorganize in support of liberal capitalist democracy in the mid-nineteenth century only to reject it shortly thereafter? That puzzle remains unchanged after all these years...

I got the theoretical training I craved in a course that was co-taught by Julia and George. That class was a tour-de-force of intellectual lineages from utilitarianism to Marxism and post-structuralism. It was hugely influential in my development as a scholar as indeed a graduate theory course should be.

I discovered political parties in Mayer Zald's class on cultural sociology (those who knew Mayer will remember that he read widely and voraciously). He asked us to do a Raymond Williams "keyword" exercise; I chose "party" because I was then still monumentally pissed off with the political consensus on so-called welfare reform. I found out – to my endless fascination and the initial consternation of my committee – that political parties were once widely viewed as treasonous combinations. From there I came to a formative analytical conclusion: that parties were instrumental in their own legitimation and were therefore relatively autonomous from both state and society.

I have since written three books on party politics: *Party and Society* (Polity 2014), *The Origins of Right to Work* (Cornell University Press 2015), and *Building Blocs* (Stanford University Press 2015) with Manali Desai and Cihan Tugal.

Howard Kimeldorf got me hooked on puzzles. After trying on about a dozen of what his advisor Maurice Zeitlin called "specifying questions," Howard sat me down (as apparently Zeitlin did him) and told me to relax and read around my general area of interest. As I was reading about a book a week in an antebellum U.S. history class with the southern historian, Mills Thornton, it was easy advice to take. I kept reading and searching long after the course was over until, after months of delayed gratification, I stumbled on a passage in Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966) that I disagreed with completely. Having found my voice, I developed my own puzzle: why did American workers, who had been fierce critics of wage dependency, reorganize in support of liberal capitalist democracy in the mid-nineteenth century only to reject it shortly thereafter? That puzzle remains unchanged after all these years and is on page 3 of *The Origins of Right to Work*. The answer turns on the workers' on-again/off-again relationship with the American two-party system.

Before I end my confession, I have a story to tell about Mark Mizruchi (who doesn't?). At a

Michigan business school party, my wife, Emily, was telling Mark about our first anniversary. She said that I had the nerve to interrupt our celebration with a trip to the archive for one last piece of data. When Emily finished, expecting some affirmation, Mark asked me, "Did you get the data?" I said, "Yes." And he said, "Good. I was worried about you before, but now I know you'll be alright." Such was my addiction.

Now that those projects are done and I'm tenured, I suppose you might say that I'm searching the streets for my next big fix. I have stuff in the pipeline of course and I'm doing a lot of good public sociology, but there's no high like the first. It lasted so very long: I was a kid in Ann Arbor, and as a grown man I'm just now starting to move on. I'm not in recovery so much as withdrawal. Maybe I need a break, but I don't think so. My name is Cedric, and I am a comparative historical sociologist. (Hi, Cedric.)

Emily Erikson

Yale University

My trajectory as an academic and comparative-historical researcher has early roots. My father was a part of the independent press movement of the 1970s. His press, Ross-Erikson Publishing, published poetry, anthropology, and literary criticism. I grew up around Aghananda Bharati, swami and professor of anthropology, Peter Whigham, translator of Catallus, and Kenneth Rexroth, a beat poet. Everyone hated Carlos Castenada and had personal stories about his problematic behavior at this or that time. My mother was a modern dancer and became a movement therapist. She worked with the schizophrenic population in an outpatient clinic run by Ventura County. She often brought me to client parties and retreats. We lived in Santa Barbara, which was then largely a bohemian community, a real paradise of hippies, hot tubs, oak groves, beach breaks, and solstice celebrations. So I had an eclectic upbringing.

There was really no way that I was not going be intellectually inclined. The surprising thing is how pragmatic I have been about it, which I have been told comes from my Swedish great grandmother, Ida Erikson. I do not recall this, but my friend Jorene Lopez likes to remind me that when I would visit her at her job collecting tickets for the city parking lots (a very popular teen job in Santa Barbara), I would talk to her about my academic career – so I was planning on academics from a young age.

When I started as an undergraduate at UC Berkeley I wanted to study cognitive science. I think it was a little surprising to my mother (my father had passed away while I was still in elementary school) that I wanted to pursue something that at least shaded into the harder sciences – but I thought it was probably the frontier of research into the big questions. Maybe it was, but it was also extremely disappointing. I found a much more complex and satisfying idea of individuals and society in the history department – and switched majors. I really fell in love with the idea of large-scale supra-individual intellectual projects, like the 'enlightenment project.' I also became fairly obsessed with Natalie Davis, Carlo Ginzburg, and Marshall Sahlins. I did not take any sociology courses, which of course I now regret.

By the time I graduated, I loved history but thought the discipline was too conservative (in the sense of traditional). I wanted to go on to graduate school, but was not sure which field to choose. So, I took the natural step of following my father's footsteps and moving to New York in order to go into publishing. My artist friend, Lisa Solomon, always had *Artforum* around on her coffee table, and I

liked its theory-heavy, avant-gardist approach, so I took some truly awful temp jobs in order sustain myself while interning there. Soon I was hired and then worked my way to Assistant Editor.

If history had been too conservative, the Marxist, post-structuralist, critical theory bent of *Artforum* was a little too excessive – not to mention unmoored. I eventually read a book called *The Gray Book*, which was a sort of exploration of vagueness, ambivalence, and uncertainty. It so frustrated me that I definitely decided against that world of arts and literature and began the application process for graduate school the next day. I had settled on sociology since it was similar to history, but I felt more methodologically rigorous and theoretically developed (apologies to historians!).

I was already in New York and was accepted to Columbia, which was very good for comparative-historical, but everyone at that time had me pegged for culture because of my background in the arts. Even though this was not my ultimate trajectory, it meant that I immediately began talking with Harrison White, who has always been interested in culture and cultural sociology (although this may not be as widely known as it could). This of course was very lucky for me.

I was also lucky enough to have Peter Bearman as the instructor for my intro graduate theory course, which I loved. I signed up for his next course, a seminar on comparative historical sociology. This was the best class I have ever taken – I really can't imagine a better course. Peter saw me as a historian, which was my training after all, and worked to turn me into a sociologist – but a comparative historical sociologist. The other important influence was Duncan Watts, who, to my eyes, was – and still is – doing transformative work at the boundary between the social sciences and hard sciences. Of course so many other people were so important, but I can't list them all here – even though I would like to.

With these three incredible mentors my trajectory was pretty clear. I was going to be a comparative historical sociologist who specialized in understanding the role of social networks in social change. I began working very closely with Peter, who drilled in the importance of finding good data. I was returning to my undergraduate interests, particularly by trying to find something in the era of contact, á la Marshal Sahlins' *Islands of History*. Peter was interested in finding records of mutinies. Things worked out better for me since the first thing that goes over board in a mutiny is any record of events. But Peter, whom everyone already knows is one of the most wonderfully brilliant and generous advisors (and persons) the world has ever seen, stuck with me and we produced a paper of which I am very fond, on incentives, network structures, and trade expansion in the early modern era.

I eventually read a book called* The Gray Book*...It so frustrated me that I definitely decided against that world of arts and literature and began the application process for graduate school the next day.

For me theory and pure fascination with the social process has always driven my research trajectory, but I have such great admiration for people who are driven by tackling an important substantive problem, and honestly I wish I could be more like them in that way. If I did do one thing right, however, it was to allow learning and contingency to play a role in the development of my career over time.

Book Reviews

Culling the Masses:
the democratic origins of racist immigration policy in the Americas

Harvard University Press

David Scott FitzGerald & David Cook-Martin

Editors Note: My thanks to César Ayala, Sara Goodman and Ali Chaudhary for all agreeing to contribute their reviews to the newsletter. **Culling the Masses** *will also be featured at an author-meets-critics panel at the upcoming ASA conference in Chicago.*

César Ayala

University of California – Los Angeles

The central claim of this book is that the decline of ethno-racial state preferences in immigration is not a product in any way of an advance of democracy. In fact, the two most democratic states in the sample of 6 cases on which this study is based, the United States and Canada, introduced racial and racist preferences for immigration earlier and abolished them later than the other states. The analysis is grounded in a larger architecture in which states are subject to horizontal and vertical forces. Horizontal refers to the pressures which other states bring to bear on any given national state. Vertical refers to the pressures that societies internal to the national states in question bring to bear. The latter were the initial factor pushing for the development of ethnic exclusions, while the former, the horizontal forces, have been instrumental in eliminating ethnoracial ethnic selectivity in immigration. Geopolitical concerns such as the need for an alliance with China during World War II were determinant in eliminating anti-Chinese statutes in the United States, for example. It was horizontal forces, or international pressures if you will, and not the advance of internal democracy, which eliminated ethnoracial preferences in immigration. The Civil Rights movement cared precious little about immigration, according to Fitzgerald and Cook-Martín, and César Chávez actually favored the elimination of competition of farm laborers from Mexico, so there is very little support for the idea that the elimination of racial criteria in immigration was a victory of U.S. democratic forces. If anything, it was international pressures during World War II, the rise of national states in the colonial world, and the ensuing competition for the hearts and minds of the ex-colonials between the Soviet Union and the United States, which forced the hand of the racists and eliminated ethnoracial exclusion. To top it off, not only is the relation between the horizontal and vertical influences bearing on the U.S. polity not what we think, but non-democratic countries abolished ethnoracial preferences before the United States. "While all countries on the Americas eventually adopted ethnic selection policies, undemocratic regimes in Cuba, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Mexico reversed their discriminatory laws and pioneered the explicit deracialization of immigration policy in the 1930s and '40s, a

generation or more before liberal-democratic Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand." (p. 334).

In states in which the will of the internal forces of society are relayed efficiently to the state, as in the case of democracies or populist/corporatist regimes that can transfer the demands of labor movements to the state, pressures for selectivity of migrants started earlier, have been more salient, and have lasted longer. In societies in which the efficiency of the relay of the will of civil society to the state has been weakest, or in which oligarchies have determined immigration policy, racist immigrant exclusion has been weaker. So democracy has, overall, been positively associated with ethnoracial immigrant selectivity and racist exclusion. The United States, which is the case used to bracket all the other ones, restricted the immigration of blacks in 1803 and that of the Chinese in 1862, and eliminated national origin quotas for immigration only in 1965. The apparently most democratic of the states were the earliest to introduce ethnoracial exclusion of immigrants, and the last to eliminate it.

The book, however, is much more than that central thesis. The six substantive chapters on the national cases are impressive. The authors examine two Anglo settler colonies, the United States and Canada, who were at once the most democratic and the most exclusive in matters of selection of immigrants, particularly against the Chinese. It also examines two plantation societies, Cuba and Brazil. The latter received in colonial times the largest influx of slaves of any nation in the Americas, and Cuba, believe it or not, received more trans-Atlantic slaves than the United States (my fact, not the book's). In these societies, ideologies of so called racial democracy in Brazil, and of a "nation for all' in Cuba," were the conflictive field upon which race relations were played out. In both places, elites paid lip service to racial equality while promoting immigration aimed at whitening the nation. The mulatto nations would experience improvement as the percentage of the stock that was European increased, or so was the established notion. These nations were not democratic, but both applied immigrant selectivity favoring Europeans, in the case of

In states in which the will of the internal forces of society are relayed efficiently to the state, as in the case of democracies or populist/corporatist regimes that can transfer the demands of labor movements to the state, pressures for selectivity of migrants started earlier, have been more salient, and have lasted longer. In societies in which the efficiency of the relay of the will of civil society to the state has been weakest, or in which oligarchies have determined immigration policy, racist immigrant exclusion has been weaker. So democracy has, overall, been positively associated with ethnoracial immigrant selectivity and racist exclusion.

Cuba under the coercive influence of the United States, in the case of Brazil under the fire of competition with neighboring Argentina, which was attracting millions of immigrants in the late nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth.

Mexico was never a recipient of immigrants at the same level as Brazil or Argentina, but it nevertheless formulated policies of exclusion because United States policies excluding certain groups ended up rerouting U.S.

migration by adding a stop in Mexico. So, through strategic accommodation to U.S. policies, Mexico developed its own exclusion of the Chinese, while at the same time engaging in a process of nation building which sought to incorporate the indigenous and mestizo masses into the corporatist state created after the revolution of 1910-1920. It also developed its own logical opposition to racist policies, largely because, in matters of migration, its largest issue for Mexico was defending its own nationals against racism in the United States.

The Argentinian case is the most puzzling and at the same time the most encouraging. The country has defined itself as a crucible of Europeans and has openly promoted European immigration throughout its history. It is also the only case in which the language stating explicit preference for Europeans has never been removed from constitutional and legal documents. At the same time, it has hardly ever excluded anyone from the possibility of migrating and entering the country, with the notable exception of exclusion of some Jews during World War II. Its internal structures are aimed at incorporating immigrants on equal terms with established citizens, and it has in certain periods had two years of residence as a requirement for citizenship and automatic citizenship, without the immigrant even applying, after 5 years, unless the immigrant explicitly rejects that option. Let me put what this means in perspective: Can we imagine the United States declaring to the 12 million undocumented residents in the country that, unless they present themselves at an immigration office and declare their explicit wishes to the contrary, they will be declared citizens after 5 years and will be forced to receive the same privileges as any established citizen? California undocumented students will have to suffer the indignities of a forced Tuition Assistance Program that will help them go to college after five years of residence, unless the individuals explicitly declare they do not want the burden of being counted among the citizens of the republic? This amazing book is also the repository of amazing facts, such as the following one, which I cannot resist quoting: "the 1.1 million migrants who disembarked in the port of Buenos Aires in the three years before the outbreak of World War I represented more Europeans 'than had arrived in all of Spanish America during more than three centuries of colonial rule.'" (p. 302).

In addition to the national histories of immigration regimes, this book examines the "epistemic communities" of experts that met internationally and shaped racial thinking. The development of the Eugenics movement, its representatives in each of the 6 cases, and the reaction to the movement and the creation of counteracting views, receives considerable attention throughout the book, not as a separate chapter but as sections of each of the national chapters. The same is true of anti-semitism and especially of the reactions in each one of the 6 cases to the Jewish refugee problem created by Nazi persecution in Europe. All of the six countries under examination turned away Jews in their hour of need, some more than others. Among the Latin American cases, Argentina received the largest number of Jews in the 20th century. This theme is treated carefully in each of the six cases, as a sort of barometer for the influence of racist ideologies in each immigration regime.

The phenomenal task of assembling this comparative-historical account of six cases of immigration regimes required that the authors thread together six national histories, six histories of immigration, six histories of racial stratification, six political histories of the formation of the state (federal v. local power, oligarchic rule v. democracy, whether the regimes were populist or corporatist). It also required examining the national histories of six labor movements to find out to what extent

these labor movements had demanded restrictions on immigration, and whether these restrictions were couched in racial terms. This complex study required assembling six diplomatic/ foreign policy histories, one for each case, to examine to what extent horizontal forces shaped the immigration regimes. Research into the policy regimes in each case was aimed at determining how much of the statecraft in immigration matters was exercised from parliament or publicly through laws, and how much happened quietly via administrative measures, some of which remained secret for decades, as is the case with the exclusion of Jews from Argentina during World War II, which remained buried for 70 years.

The bibliography and archival sources cited are also impressive, as is the book.

Sara Wallace Goodman

University of California, Irvine

Culling the Masses is an interdisciplinary tour de force. FitzGerald and Cook-Martín are both sociologists, but the book makes theoretical insights and unearths empirical evidence that is of broad interest to political scientists and historians alike. There is a lot contained in these pages: case studies, archive work and legislative history, a nuanced literature review ranging from international relations to social movements, to name but a few aspects. It pushes a novel agenda, challenging existing disciplinary boundaries and practices with theory-driven analysis, case selection, and qualitative comparison. In the end, it raises a number of though-provoking questions on the relationship between liberalism and exclusion, on liberal democracy more generally, and of the history that shaped American immigration and thus, American identity and values.

The book begins with a surprising puzzle. Less preoccupied with the question of "Why democracies practice ethnic selection?" — asserting that liberalism and racism share conjoined, not contradictory, histories — it asks "Why have governments turned against selection?" In other words, the rise of ethnic selection is unsurprising, and part and parcel to the histories of democratic consolidation and colonialism; it is the fall of ethnic selection — specifically the timing thereof — that the authors find puzzling. Their answer represents a major contribution to immigration studies, challenging prevailing accounts on a number of fronts. It was not the run-away train of liberal ideology, norms diffusion, or democracy, nor other domestic factors like courts (which, they find, promoted racists policies) but, unexpectedly, geopolitical factors that led to the demise of racial selection, as externally oriented elites overcame the public's racist preferences.

To develop this argument, the authors take two innovative steps. First, FitzGerald and Cook-Martín look beyond liberal democracies, in contrast to other de-ethnicization studies that largely focus on the US and Europe. Second, the authors look outside of the state itself, to the international origins of norms. They employ a three-dimensional theoretical model, taking into account temporal change, vertical change (i.e., domestic politics like lobbying and institutions) and, crucially, horizontal change, or interstate behavior, including strategic emulation and leverage. All of these planes matter, but the authors ask "When do horizontal conditions matter most?" Their answer: when policymakers assign a high diplomatic price in maintaining negative ethnic selection rules - in other words, when policymakers identify reputation costs. This sort of argument sits squarely in the IR liturgy, hearkening back to Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory, in which policymaking elites simultaneously negotiate on both horizontal

and vertical planes.

Given this dynamic and innovative approach, I wonder whether this is a model only for immigration policy? Does it not provide claims about sufficient conditions that may prove relevant in other fields, especially the insight that weaker countries selectively but effectively exercise collective leverage against stronger ones? I was also curious if the authors could identify tipping points, finding the temporal plane to be the least theorized of the three. For example, much discussion is dedicated to consensus-building in the Global South during the interwar years, but how did each international meeting build on top of the previous to foment a norms consensus? What was the point at which collective action on behalf of smaller states began to matter to larger states? Or, to point to a second example, why was World War II not enough to produce change, despite the recognized power of Axis, then Soviet, propaganda? De-ethnicization did not come until the 1960s, yet this occurred in parallel to — and possibly deliberately disassociated from — the civil rights movement. Why?

Moving away from the theory and toward the case studies, I am struck by a number of general observations that, in highlighting here, I believe will stand as some of the seminal contributions of the book. First, the case studies offer a constant reminder that there is a difference between *de jure* policy and practice, between regulations and more shaded administrative procedures. This is made very apparent in the US, Canadian, and Mexican case studies, in which we observe de-ethnicization in policy but not in practice. This disjuncture is a point consistently missed in contemporary immigration studies today because "practice" is hard to quantify, which is difficult to square with the vogue-ish turn toward indexing (Helbling 2013) and importing of policy measures into regression models. More valuable, though, is the counter-evidence this insight provides to Christian Joppke's (1998) "liberal norms" hypothesis, a structuring preoccupation of the book. Elites knew that questionable policy choices on ethnic selection were subject to criticism, either domestically or in the interstate context, as we saw in Brazil and Canada. But this did not end policy; it only drove practices behind closed doors and off the books.

Second, there is an interesting theoretical supposition embedded in these case studies about the despotism of democracy, where – to reference the Brazil case study specifically – "broadening the range of voices at the policymaking table has fostered ethnic discrimination in immigration law" (p. 297). This case study - as well as the chapter on Canada – highlight the importance of insulating immigration policy decision-making from the populist public. This is an institutional argument; if democracy is a channel for racist policies, are some systems better than others for de-escalating policy, or mitigating the effects of policy? In other words, and for example, are systems that allow for insulated policymaking (as opposed to more publically-responsive systems, e.g., single-actor party system) preferential for, or more effective at, de-ethnicization? This is not a criticism, but a question. Indeed, the book inspires questions such as these that can be theoretically developed and tested in this and other policy arenas, e.g., health care and gun control.

Finally, the conclusion of the book observes how ethnic exclusion persists in the form of "positive discrimination" and selection, and assimilation is also included in this condemned category. However, to play devil's advocate, I wonder, is there a way to consider positive discrimination or assimilation not as violations or perversions of liberalism but ways to maintain it? A type of necessary, internal

reinforcement? Historically, assimilation replaces race and eugenics. It persists today in more innocuous forms (e.g. French-speakers are rewarded through a points-based immigration system in Quebec). There is no shortage of academic arguments that suggest states need exclusionary criteria along one line or another. Dating back to Aristotle (1984), he defined an ideal city-state as being of finite size in population. As such, citizenship is required in modern nation-states not merely to identify occupants but also to effectively allocate resources. Here, then, I would push the authors to think about a finer distinction between assimilability as a criterion for immigration (entry) versus citizenship (membership), the latter of which is prevalently practiced. This is not merely a hypothetical point: European policymakers, for example, are active in safeguarding liberalism through mandatory culture requirements known as policies of "civic integration" (Goodman 2014). To quote PM David Cameron, "a genuinely liberal country…believes in certain values and actively promotes them…Each of us in our own countries, I believe, must be unambiguous and hard-nosed about this defence of our liberty." The fact that the promotion of liberalism occurs through assimilatory measures—mandatory language acquisition, value commitments (e.g., ceremonies, oaths), etc.—is hard to reconcile, and I am curious how the authors would attempt to do so within the framework of the book and its argument. To speculate, I believe the book's answer to such a puzzle would be to say that such contractions are interwoven with liberalism, and notions of pure state neutrality are a chimera. But this resurgence of assimilation – coupled with the troubling rise in popularity of far-right parties – suggests a re-ethnicizing "wave" is at hand, and thus, a bit more work on the implications of their work is warranted, expanding the impact of this great work even further.

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Ali R. Chaudhary

University of Oxford

Culling the Masses offers a sophisticated cross-national analysis of immigration policy in the Americas. The book reveals how an interaction between racist ideology and liberal democracy came to shape immigrant selection criteria of the governments of Cuba, Mexico. Brazil, Argentina, Canada and the United States. The analysis follows two central lines of inquiry. First, the authors investigate why governments

throughout the Americas maintained racist immigration policies and why they eventually turned against selecting immigrants by race and national origins. Second, the authors investigate why the process of moving away from racist immigration policies took longer to unfold in liberal-democratic countries in the Americas—namely the United States and Canada. Drawing on historical-comparative case studies of several countries in the Americas, FitzGerald and Cook-Martin reveal how government decisions to move away from racist immigration policies were not the result of liberalism or the institutions of democracy. Rather, the anti-racist turn in immigration policies resulted from internal and external political pressures. However, pressures to move away from racist immigration policies counter-intuitively occurred in non-democratic Latin American countries almost a generation before similar reforms took place in Canada or the United States. The authors explain these puzzling findings by revealing how domestic politics along with geopolitical factors effectively forced governments to abandon ethnic and racial prejudices, which ultimately paved the way for anti-racist reforms to immigrant selection policies in the Americas. Throughout the book, the authors' arguments are clear and complimented with rich historical-comparative data on the immigrant selection policies as well as domestic and geopolitical contexts relevant for each case.

The key theoretical contribution of the book is the authors' 'three-dimensional model of policymaking'. Rather than emphasising the unique historical specificity of each country, the authors use the first two chapters to introduce the analytic model and describe the organizational landscape in order to frame the subsequent case studies. The analytic model consists of a temporal, vertical and horizontal dimensions. These three dimensions, in turn, enable the authors to compare and contrast how the immigration policies of multiple countries are shaped by domestic and international factors at different historical moments. The authors' conceptualization of the temporal dimension draws on the study of organizations and institutions within sociology and political science which seeks to understand how historical contexts determine social actions and preferences of organizational actors at any given time. In this case, the social actors are an assortment of domestic and international organizations that pressure governments to either adopt restrictionist or anti-racist immigration policies at different historical moments. For instance, FitzGerald and Cook-Martin reveal how regional and global organizations of eugenicists reinforced racist immigration policies across the Americas in the early 20th century and how these policies were subsequently reformed through similar forms of domestic and international policy diffusion in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, the authors' use of the temporal dimension enables them to compare the development and subsequent diffusion of immigration policy for multiple countries across several important historical junctures.

The second dimension of the model is referred to as the vertical dimension. The vertical dimension of policymaking refers to domestic politics and other internal contextual factors shaping the immigration policy of any particular country. While the authors draw on both pluralist and institutionalist theories of the state in order to conceptualize the vertical dimension of immigration policymaking, they devote more time to the pluralist approach to domestic policymaking. Accordingly, interest groups within a given polity are assumed to struggle to achieve disparate policy goals and preferences. These interest groups are conceptualized and differentiated by class and what the authors refer to as "racist ideologies" (see page 15). Thus, vertical policymaking within a given country is theorized as resulting from struggles between different group

interests as well as voices from below.

The third and final horizontal dimension may be the most innovative and critical component of the analytic model because it allows the authors to theorize how domestic immigration policymaking is intrinsically intertwined with geopolitical factors and foreign-policy objectives. The authors conceptualize the interaction between domestic politics and international affairs as an "intermestic hybrid" (p. 20). The key elements of the horizontal dimension of the authors' analytic model include "policy diffusion" and the "politics of international humiliation". Thus, the horizontal dimension of the authors' analytic model successfully embeds immigration policymaking into temporal dimensions of geopolitics. In addition to the analytic utility of examining the influence of external factors on domestic policymaking, the horizontal dimension of the analytic model draws on the wealth of literature within the field of international relations. This enables the authors to generate a conceptual dialogue between migration studies and political science. Since the vast majority of existing scholarship on immigration tends to under-theorize geopolitical factors and international relations, the authors' analysis offers a much-needed theoretical bridge between these key disparate areas of research.

While it is difficult to identify any significant limitations of this work, the discussion of critical race theory may be the only aspect of the book that is underwhelming. The authors suggest that the anti-racist reforms to immigration policy coupled with the dramatic racial and ethnic transformations of U.S. and Canadian societies challenge critical race perspectives that assume governments continue to practice covert forms of racial discrimination and maintain racial hierarchies. However, the authors' exclusive normative focus on immigration policy under theorizes processes of racialization that occur outside the confines of official policies and laws. Since critical race scholarship tends to analyze structural racial inequality and processes of racialization in the post-Civil Rights era, evidence of reforms to official immigration selection policies in the 1960s does not directly challenge the theoretical perspectives derived from empirical research within the critical race tradition. Furthermore, the lack of attention given to recent scholarship on the racialization of immigrants and migration policies renders the authors' engagement with critical race scholarship underwhelming. However, this minor limitation does not diminish the overwhelming analytic and theoretical contributions of the book. It should also be noted that the book would be of interest to critical race scholars looking to better understand the development and evolution of racist immigration policies in the Americas.

Culling the Masses will undoubtedly become a classic in the field of international migration because it offers a set of useful theoretical tools that can help immigration researchers better appreciate how geopolitical contexts and international relations affect domestic immigration issues over time. The book also offers an important contribution to existing scholarship on the intersection of race, immigration and democracy. It will appeal to social historians, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, legal scholars and scholars of Latin American studies. In addition, the authors' analysis offers one of the best examples of comparative historical cross-national research that draws on theoretical ideas from multiple social science disciplines. As a result, the book would make an excellent contribution to graduate-level courses on historical-comparative research methods as well as seminars on migration, race/ethnicity, organizations-institutions and Latin American studies.

New Publications

Articles and Book Chapters

Baltz, Matthew J. 2015. "Protecting citizens in hard times: citizenship and repatriation pressures in the United States and France during the 1930s." *Theory and Society*, 44(2), 101-124.

Eger, Maureen A. & Sarah Valdez. 2015. "Neo-nationalism in Western Europe." *European Sociological Review* 31(1): 115-130.

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-- 2015a. "The Ecology of Herding: Conclusions, Questions, Speculations." Pp. 267 – 280 in *The Ecology of Pastoralism* edited by P. Nick Kardulias. Boulder: University Press of Colorado.

-- 2015b. "A 'Perfect Storm' in the Collapse of Bronze Age Civilization? Useful Insights and Roads not Taken: A Review Essay on Cline's 1177. *Cliodynamics* 5:75-86.

Luft, Aliza. 2015. "Toward a Dynamic Theory of Action at the Micro-Level of Genocide: Killing, Desistance, and Saving in 1994 Rwanda." *Sociological Theory*. 33(2).

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Schmid, Carol. 2014. "The New Woman and Urban Modernism in Interwar Berlin and Shanghai" *Journal of International Women's Studies*, 15(1):1-16.

New Publications

Books and Edited Volumes

Social Systems Theory and Judicial Review: Taking Jurisprudence Seriously

Ashgate, 2015

Katayoun Baghai

This book demonstrates the empirical gains and integrative potentials of social systems theory for the sociology of law. Against a backdrop of classical and contemporary sociological debates about law and society, it observes judicial review as an instrument for the self-steering of a functionally differentiated legal system. This allows close investigation of the US Supreme Court's jurisprudence of rights, both in legal terms and in relation to structural transformations of modern society. The result is a thought-provoking account of conceptual and doctrinal developments concerning racial discrimination, race-based affirmative action, freedom of religion, and prohibition of its establishment, detailing the Court's response to boundary tensions between functionally differentiated social systems. Preliminary examination of the European Court of Human Rights' privacy jurisprudence suggests the pertinence of the analytic framework to other rights and jurisdictions. This contribution is particularly timely in the context of increasing appeals to fundamental rights around the world and the growing role of national and international high courts in determining their concrete meanings.

Lynched: The Victims of Southern Mob Violence

The University of North Carolina Press, 2015

Amy Kate Bailey and Stewart E. Tolnay

On July 9, 1883, twenty men stormed the jail in Morehouse Parish, Louisiana, kidnapped Henderson Lee, a black man charged with larceny, and hanged him. Events like this occurred thousands of times across the American South in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, yet we know scarcely more about any of these other victims than we do about Henderson Lee. Drawing on new sources to provide the most comprehensive portrait of the men and women lynched in the American South, Amy Bailey and Stewart Tolnay's revealing profiles and careful analysis begin to restore the identities of - and lend dignity to - hundreds of lynching victims about whom we have known little more than their names and alleged offenses.

Comparing victims' characteristics to those of African American men who were not lynched, Bailey and Tolnay identify the factors that made them more vulnerable to being targeted by mobs, including how old they were; what work they did; their marital status, place of birth, and literacy; and whether they lived in the margins of their communities or possessed higher social status. Assessing these factors in the context of current scholarship on mob violence and reports on the little-studied

women and white men who were murdered in similar circumstances, this monumental work brings unprecedented clarity to our understanding of lynching and its victims.

Radicals, Revolutionaries, and Terrorists

Polity Press, 2015

Colin J. Beck

Terrorism, mass uprising, and political extremism are in the news every day. It is no coincidence that these phenomena come together in the contemporary era. *Radicals, Revolutionaries, and Terrorists* provides a comprehensive survey of the intersection of radical social movements and political violence. The book considers eight essential questions for understanding radicalism, inducing its origins, dynamics, and outcomes. Ranging across the globe from the 1500s to the present, the book examines cases as diverse as 19th century anarchists, fascism, Che Guevara, the Weather Underground, Chechen insurgents, the Earth Liberation Front, Al-Qaeda, and the Arab Spring. Throughout, these cases are connected to key social movements concepts and theories to demonstrate how using multiple areas of research results in better explanations.

Radicals in America: The U.S. Left since the Second World War

Cambridge University Press, 2015

Howard Brick and Christopher Phelps

Radicals in America is a masterful history of controversial dissenters who pursued greater equality, freedom and democracy - and transformed the nation. Written with clarity and verve, *Radicals in America* shows how radical leftists, while often marginal or ostracized, could assume a catalytic role as effective organizers in mass movements, fostering the imagination of alternative futures. Beginning with the Second World War, *Radicals in America* extends all the way down to the present, making it the first comprehensive history of radicalism to reach beyond the sixties. From the Communist Party and the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, its coverage extends to the Battle of Seattle and Occupy Wall Street. Each chapter begins with a particular life story, including a Harlem woman deported in the McCarthy era, a gay Japanese-American opponent of the Vietnam War, and a Native American environmentalist, vignettes that bring to life the personal within the political.

Transcending Capitalism: Visions of a New Society in Modern American Thought

Cornell University Press, 2015 (paperback)

Howard Brick

Transcending Capitalism explains why many influential midcentury American social theorists came to believe it was no longer meaningful to describe modern Western society as "capitalist," but instead preferred alternative terms such as "postcapitalist," "postindustrial," or "technological." Considering the discussion today of capitalism and its global triumph, it is important to understand why a prior generation of social theorists imagined the future of advanced societies not in a fixed capitalist form but in some course of development leading beyond capitalism.

Howard Brick locates this postcapitalist vision

within a long history of social theory and ideology. He challenges the common view that American thought and culture utterly succumbed in the 1940s to a conservative cold war consensus that put aside the reform ideology and social theory of the early twentieth century. Rather, expectations of the shift to a new social economy persisted and cannot be disregarded as one of the elements contributing to the revival of dissenting thought and practice in the 1960s.

Rooted in a politics of social liberalism, this vision held influence for roughly a half century, from its interwar origins until the right turn in American political culture during the 1970s and 1980s. In offering a historically based understanding of American postcapitalist thought, Brick also presents some current possibilities for reinvigorating critical social thought that explores transitional developments beyond capitalism.

A New Insurgency: The Port Huron Statement and Its Times

Maize Books, 2015

Howard Brick and Gregory Parker (eds.)

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was just one of several new insurgent movements for democracy and social justice during the late 1950s and early 1960s, and it must be understood in the context of other causes and organizations — in the United States and abroad — that inspired its founding manifesto, the Port Huron Statement. In *A New Insurgency: The Port Huron Statement and Its Times*, a diverse group of more than forty scholars and activists take a transnational approach in order to explore the different—though often interconnected—campaigns that mobilized people along varied racial, ethnic, gender, and regional dimensions from the birth of the New Left in the civil rights and pacifist agitation of the 1950s to the Occupy movements of today.

This volume features three never-before-published "manifesto drafts" written by Tom Hayden in early 1962 that generated the discussion leading to the Port Huron meeting. Other highlights include recollections from leading women in the Port Huron deliberations who, three years later, protested the subordination of women within the radical movements, thus setting the stage for the rise of women's liberation. *A New Insurgency* is based on the University of Michigan's conference commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Port Huron Statement in 2012.

Do-It-Yourself Democracy: The Rise of the Public Engagement Industry

Oxford Univeristy Press, 2015

Caroline W. Lee

Citizen participation has undergone a radical shift since anxieties about "bowling alone" seized the nation in the 1990s. Many pundits and observers have cheered America's twenty-first century civic renaissance-an explosion of participatory innovations in public life. Invitations to "have your say!" and "join the discussion!" have proliferated. But has the widespread enthusiasm for maximizing citizen democracy led to real change?

In *Do-It-Yourself Democracy*, sociologist Caroline W. Lee examines how participatory innovations have reshaped American civic life over the past two decades. Lee looks at the public engagement industry that emerged to serve government, corporate, and nonprofit clients seeking to gain a handle on the increasingly noisy demands of their constituents and stakeholders. The

beneficiaries of new forms of democratic empowerment are not only humble citizens, but also the engagement experts who host the forums. Does it matter if the folks deepening democracy are making money at it? How do they make sense of the contradictions inherent in their roles?

In investigating public engagement practitioners' everyday anxieties and larger worldviews, we see reflected the strange meaning of power in contemporary institutions. New technologies and deliberative practices have democratized the ways in which organizations operate, but Lee argues that they have also been marketed and sold as tools to facilitate cost-cutting, profitability, and other management goals - and that public deliberation has burdened everyday people with new responsibilities without delivering on its promises of empowerment.

The Origins of Right to Work: Antilabor Democracy in Nineteenth-Century Chicago

Cornell University Press, 2015

Cedric de Leon

"Right to work" states weaken collective bargaining rights and limit the ability of unions to effectively advocate on behalf of workers. As more and more states consider enacting right-to-work laws, observers trace the contemporary attack on organized labor to the 1980s and the Reagan era. In *The Origins of Right to Work*, however, Cedric de Leon contends that this antagonism began a century earlier with the Northern victory in the U.S. Civil War, when the political establishment revised the English common-law doctrine of conspiracy to equate collective bargaining with the enslavement of free white men.

In doing so, de Leon connects past and present, raising critical questions that address pressing social issues. Drawing on the changing relationship between political parties and workers in nineteenth-century Chicago, de Leon concludes that if workers' collective rights are to be preserved in a global economy, workers must chart a course of political independence and overcome long-standing racial and ethnic divisions.

Building Blocs: How Parties Organize Society

Stanford University Press, 2015

Cedric de Leon, Manali Desai, Cihan Tuğal (eds.)

Do political parties merely represent divisions in society? Until now, scholars and other observers have generally agreed that they do. But *Building Blocs* argues the reverse: that some political parties in fact shape divisions as they struggle to remake the social order. Drawing on the contributors' expertise in Indonesia, India, the United States, Canada, Egypt, and Turkey, this volume demonstrates further that the success and failure of parties to politicize social differences has dramatic consequences for democratic change, economic development, and other large-scale transformations.

This politicization of divisions, or "political articulation," is neither the product of a single charismatic leader nor the machinations of state power, but is instead a constant call and response between parties and would-be constituents. When articulation becomes inconsistent, as it has in Indonesia, partisan calls grow faint and the resulting vacuum creates the possibility for other forms of political expression. However, when political parties exercise their power of interpellation efficiently, they are able to silence certain interests such as those of secular constituents in Turkey. *Building Blocs* exposes political

parties as the most influential agencies that structure social cleavages and invites further critical investigation of the related consequences.

The Iron Cage of Liberalism: International Politics and Unarmed Revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa

Oxford University Press, 2015

Daniel P. Ritter

Over the last forty years the world has witnessed the emergence and proliferation of a new political phenomenon - unarmed revolution. On virtually every continent, citizens have ousted their authoritarian leaders by employing nonviolent tactics such as strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, and civil disobedience against them. At the same time however, similar movements elsewhere have been brutally crushed by autocrats determined to cling to power.

In this book, Daniel Ritter seeks to understand unarmed revolutions by posing two interrelated questions: Why do nonviolent revolutionary movements in some countries topple autocratic regimes while similar movements elsewhere falter, and why has the world witnessed the proliferation of unarmed revolutions in the last forty years? Through a comparative historical analysis of the Iranian, Tunisian, and Egyptian revolutions, he argues that close and friendly international relations between democratic states in the West and authoritarian regimes elsewhere constitute a plausible explanation for nonviolent revolutionary success.

In an original conceptualization of revolutionary dynamics, Ritter argues that Western-aligned autocrats eventually find themselves restrained by their strong links to the democratic world through a mechanism he refers to as 'the iron cage of liberalism.' Having committed rhetorically to the West's fundamental political discourse of democracy and human rights, the dictators in Tehran, Tunis, and Cairo found themselves paralyzed when nonviolent crowds challenged them with tactics and demands fully compatible with the political ideals the regimes claimed as their own.

Transnational Trajectories in East Asia: Nation, Citizenship, and Region

Routledge, 2015

Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal (ed.)

In recent decades, East Asia has become increasingly interconnected through trade, investment, migration, and popular culture at regional and global levels. At the same time, the region has seen renewed national assertiveness and nationalist impulses. The book interrogates these seemingly contradictory developments as they bear on the transformations of the nation and citizenship in East Asia. Conventionally, studies on East Asia juxtapose these developments, focusing on the much-exercised dichotomy of the national and transnational. In contrast, this book suggests a different orientation. First, it moves beyond the simplistic view that demarcates the transnational as "the West". Second, it does not view the national and transnational as distinct or contradictory spheres of influence and analysis, but rather, focuses on the interactions between the two, with a view on how these interactions work to transform the ideals and practices of the "good nation", "good society", and "good citizen". The chapters cover a broad range of empirical research - education, science, immigration, multicultural policy,

human rights, gender and youth orientations, art and food flows, politics of values and regional identity - which highlight the ways in which the nation is reconfigured, and the relationship between the citizen and (national) collective is redefined, in relation to transnational dynamics and frameworks.

Transnational Trajectories in East Asia provides a new perspective on and original analysis of transnational processes, bringing a fresh understanding to developments of the nation and citizenship in the region. It will be of great interest to students and scholars of transnationalization and globalization; comparative citizenship, migration, and multiculturalism; and Asian politics, society, and regionalism.

Section News

Section Awards and Other Announcements

The Barrington Moore Book Award

Varieties of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarity
Cambridge University Press, 2014

Kathleen Thelen
Political Science, MIT

Charles Tilly Best Article Award

Winner:

"Fewer and Better Children: Race, Class, Religion, and Birth Control Reform in America." *American Journal of Sociology* 119(6): 1710-1760. 2014.

Melissa Wilde and Sabrina Danielsen
Sociology, University of Pennsylvania

Honorable Mention:

"Economists, Capitalists, and the Making of Globalization: North American Free Trade in Comparative-Historical Perspective." *American Journal of Sociology* 119(5): 1324-79. 2014.

Malcolm Fairbrother
University of Bristol, UK

Theda Skocpol Dissertation Award

Socialist Internationalism at Work: Changes in the Czechoslovak-Vietnamese Labor Exchange Program, 1967-1989

Alena K. Alamgir
Sociology, Rutgers University

Dissertation Committee: Jozsef Borocz (chair), Ann Mische, Catherine Lee, and Dominique Arel.

Reinhard Bendix Student Paper Award

"Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide: The Collective Rescue of Jews in the Netherlands during the Holocaust" (Forthcoming, *American Political Science Review*)

Robert Braun
Political Science, Cornell University

Call for Proposals

Palgrave Macmillan is launching a new book series called "Historical Social Studies." The series is intended to showcase cutting-edge work that integrates social-scientific inquiry and historical investigation. Series editor Chad Alan Goldberg (University of Wisconsin-Madison) invites members of the CHS Section to submit book proposals and to encourage their doctoral students and colleagues to do so as well. Please direct proposals and questions to cgoldber@ssc.wisc.edu.

Call for Submissions

The Work in Progress blog, of the Organizations, Occupations and Work section of the ASA, invites submissions (800-1,200 words) on all topics related to organizations, occupations and work, broadly understood. The primary purpose of the blog is to disseminate sociological findings and ideas to the general public. Articles should be accessible and jargon-free, written like a New York Times op-ed. We currently get over 3,000 views per month and are followed on social media by journalists from the New York Times, Washington Post, NPR, BBC and other outlets.

We will publish summaries by authors of all monographs related to organizations, occupations and work. Additionally, we invite proposals for three types of article: research findings (from your own study or summarizing the findings of others), news analysis, commentary. Interested authors should send a proposed title and topic (one paragraph maximum) to Matt Vidal (matt.vidal@kcl.ac.uk). The WIP Editorial Team will decide whether to invite a full submission.

Other Awards

Paul Almeida received the 2015 Distinguished Scholarship Award from the Pacific Sociological Association (PSA) for his book, *Mobilizing Democracy: Globalization and Citizen Protest* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014). He has also received a Fulbright Scholar Fellowship from 2015 to 2017 in Honduras for his project entitled, "Nongovernmental Organizations and Community Well-Being."

Susan Eckstein has been awarded a John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship for her study of Cuban immigration exceptionalism since the country's 1959 revolution, entitled *U.S. Cuban Immigration Policy: The Long Cold War.*

Karen V. Hansen has been awarded a Fulbright Distinguished Chair of American Studies for her project, "The Entanglements of Migration." She will be at Uppsala University in Sweden from January to June, 2016.

Dmytro Khutkyy has been awarded the Fulbright Faculty Development Award to conduct research at the University of California - Riverside.

Aliza Luft's "Toward a Dynamic Theory of Action at the Micro-Level of Genocide: Killing, Desistance, and Saving in 1994 Rwanda," was awarded the 2015 Candace Rogers Best Student Paper Award from the Eastern Sociological Society.

Monica Prasad has been awarded a John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship for her book on the Reagan tax cut of 1981, based on access to previously unseen documents from the Reagan presidential library.

PhDs on the Market

Aliza Luft
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Behavioral Variation during the Holocaust: The Case of the French Catholic Church

My dissertation examines how French bishops during the Holocaust in France deviated from their support for Vichy to help save Jews despite the high personal and institutional costs associated with defection. The Catholic Church was a primary source of political and moral guidance during the Holocaust in France. When French bishops endorsed Vichy, they legitimized authoritarianism by officially supporting anti-Semitic policies, including the *Statut des Juifs*. When they deviated from this stance and protested the French state's persecution of Jews, French bishops de-legitimized the Vichy regime and mobilized Catholics on behalf of European Jewry, eventually leading French civilians to save the second-largest number of Jews in any occupied country during the Holocaust.

Drawing on a range of historical sources collected from 15 archives in 10 cities and 3 countries (France, USA, Israel), I analyze Catholic bishops' biographies, notes, letters, diaries, and correspondences from 1936-1945, as well as other relevant documents for my research. Process-tracing methods are combined with a network analysis and a prosopography to explain what motivated bishops' original support for Vichy anti-Semitism, as well as their defections from this stance to save Jews two years later.

The theoretical findings so far call attention to critical events that triggered a shift in how French bishops' thought about the war, to networks both inside and outside the Church that provided information and ideas about how to respond to unfolding events, and to the personal backgrounds of bishops who understood transformations in French political life through a lens shaped by their previous experiences. I aim to develop a theory of high-risk political defection that can be applied and tested in future work with similar cases.

In addition to the dissertation, my research seeks to examine the "grey zones" of human behavior: how the same individual shifts stances throughout a single violent episode, what explains behavioral variation in highly dangerous contexts, and what the consequences are of such decisions for trajectories of political conflict. This scholarship does not focus on violence in one particular time or location: papers I have written and works in process include an analysis of killing, desistance, and saving behaviors in the 1994 Rwandan genocide (*Sociological Theory*, 33:2), the contribution of social movement theory to genocide (to be presented at the ASA Comparative-Historical mini-conference), and differences across time and space in rates of sexualized violence during the Holocaust (with Evgeny Finkel). My teaching and scholarly interests include political sociology, political violence, collective action and social movements, race and ethnicity, gender (especially women in war), and sociological theory.

Committee: Ivan Ermakoff (Chair), Chad Goldberg, Pam Oliver, Myra Marx Ferree, Bob Freeland, Laird Boswell (History)

Website: http://www.alizaluft.com

PhDs on the Market

Shai Dromi
Yale University

From Charitable Concern to Concerted Effort: How Humanitarian Aid Became an International System

The 1860s calls to establish the Red Cross Movement — the first modern large-scale network of humanitarian relief societies — were met with some enthusiasm, but they also provoked skepticism, pragmatic objections, and ethical opposition. And yet, within little over a decade, the movement became a prominent presence in European, and later global, philanthropic life with outposts fast spreading across the continent and beyond. The growing movement permeated new ideas about organized humanitarian activism — that humanitarian societies are an independent and permanent sector, that they should work impartially, and that they must be afforded neutrality — and these principles continue to undergird the humanitarian community today. In my dissertation, I ask how and why this shift occurred, and how it contributed to the establishment of long-distance humanitarianism as a social field.

Based on archival research at the International Committee of the Red Cross and related archives, I identify the crucial role of Evangelical Calvinism and of patriotic discourse and imagery in propelling the principles propagated by the early Red Cross. I show that the founding members of the Red Cross came to believe that an independent and neutral network of relief societies should be established based on their Calvinist beliefs about the nature of warfare and human agency. Compared to other ideas about medical relief circulating at the time, their proposed program fit directly with intersecting political, organizational, and moral concerns that preoccupied multiple parties across mid-nineteenth-century Europe. Indeed, actors ranging from nobility to working class identified the Red Cross with their own (often quite different) understanding of the common good and adapted its proposals to their own contexts. By the 1870s, the notions that humanitarian relief societies must maintain a permanent presence in civil societies, that they must maintain a level of autonomy from other institutions, and — crucially — that they must be evaluated on their own terms had become widely and internationally prevalent. Despite considerable differences from the Red Cross, contemporary humanitarian INGOs continue to rely on the same ethical infrastructure and thus bear the imprint of their late-nineteenth-century antecedents. Based on these findings, I highlight the ways in which preexisting belief systems contribute to the establishment of new social fields and shape the logics that govern them.

Dissertation Committee: Jeffrey Alexander (chair), Philip Gorski, Philip Smith.

Research interests: Comparative-historical and cultural sociology, with specific interests in (1) the social responses – both individual and group level – to socially or geographically distant suffering, with specific focus on humanitarian INGOs; and (2) the ways groups come to believe that they are victims of collective trauma, and how they shape subsequent beliefs about altruism, morality, and social solidarity.

Coming up in
the next issue of

Trajectories

Can Comparative Historical Sociology Save the World?
The debate continues following the ASA
Annual Meeting in Chicago

A new book symposium on:
The Cultural Revolution
at the Margins
by Yiching Wu

And Much
More!